

JPRS-WER-84-012

1 FEBRUARY 1984

West Europe Report

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

1 February 1984

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL

FINLAND

- Press, Parliament View Cruise Missiles' Effect on Finland
(UUSI SUOMI, 23 Nov 83)..... 1

APN Commentator on Sweden's Defenses, by Spartak Beglov
Roundup of Editorial Opinion
New Parliamentary Defense Committee Needed

ITALY

- CGIL Executive Committee Report on Peace, Disarmament
(Michele Magno; RASSEGNA SINDACALE, 25 Nov 83)..... 5

TERRORISM

FRANCE

- Basque, Breton, Corsican Autonomist Renewal After Amnesty
(LE FIGARO, 24-25 Dec 83)..... 21
- Amnestied Bretons of Separatist Groups Resume Bombings
(Jean-Pierre Cressard; LE FIGARO, 24-25 Dec 83)..... 23
- ASALA, Iranian Papers Show Restaurants as Possible Targets
(Jean-Charles Reix; LE FIGARO, 29 Dec 83)..... 25

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Berlin Colloquium Reveals French Concerns for FRG Future (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 22 Dec 83; DIE ZEIT, 23 Dec 83).....	28
'New German Pacifism' Feared, by Guenther Nonenmacher French Security Role Undefined, by Kurt Becker	

FINLAND

Koivisto Again Criticizes Press on Handling Foreign Affairs (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 3 Jan 84).....	34
Stalinist Party Paper Attacks 'Foreign Policy Opposition' (Editorial; TIEDONANTAJA, 22 Dec 83).....	36
Stenback: Coalition With Rural Party, SKDL Is Impossible (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 29 Dec 83).....	37
Party Figure Blames U.S. for Breakoff of Arms Talks (Jukka Luoma; UUSI SUOMI, 22 Dec 83).....	38
Editor of New Communist Party Compromise Organ Resigns (TIEDONANTAJA, 22 Dec 83; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 29 Dec 83, 3 Jan 84).....	39
Stalinist Paper Decries 'Boycott', Editorial Paper Fails to Attract Subscriptions YHTEISTYO's Editor Quits	

GREECE

Ex-PASOK Members Plan New Socialist Party (AKROPOLIS, 15 Dec 83).....	43
ND Strategy in Prepatation for Euro-Elections (I KATHIMERINI, 8 Dec 83).....	44
Communique on Results of KKE Panhellenic Meetings (I AVGI, 11 Dec 83).....	47
Assessment of Papandreu-Karamanlis Relations (KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 6 Nov 83).....	53
KKE Officials Discuss EEC, Euro-Elections (V. Efraimidis, T. Adamos Interview; RIZOSPASTIS, 9 Dec 83).....	55

Comment Compares PASOK to Post-War Dogmatic Left (I KATHIMERINI, 24 Nov 83)	58
List of ND Euro-Election Candidates (MESIMVRINI, 8 Dec 83)	60
Papandreou Considers Ministerial Council Cuts (I KATHIMERINI, 7 Dec 83)	62
Activities, Officials in Greek Communist Youth (TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS, 27 Nov 83)	63
Range of Views on New Electoral Law (I KATHIMERINI, 10 Dec 83)	67
Former ND Minister Calls for Comprehensive Foreign Policy (Miltiadis Evert; TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS, 11 Dec 83)	69
Alleged Government Bugging of ND Offices (AKROPOLIS, 9 Dec 83)	74

ITALY

Barbieri Examines Soviet Leadership Problems (Frane Barbieri; L'ESPRESSO, 8 Jan 84)	76
--	----

NORWAY

Willoch in Press Conference Discusses Oil, NATO, Poll Trends (AFTENPOSTEN, 22 Dec 83)	83
Paper Ponders Visability of Willoch's Coalition (Editorial; AFTENPOSTEN, 4 Jan 84)	87

SPAIN

AP Congress To Approve Ideological Manifesto (F. L. de Pablo; YA, 3 Jan 84)	89
--	----

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Navy Study Warns Against USSR-Kiel Ferry Route (Nils Norten Udgaard; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Dec 83)	92
---	----

FINLAND

Training Chief Rejects Calls for Increased Service Period (UUSI SUOMI, 22 Dec 83)	94
Report Criticizes Shortcomings in Refresher Training (UUSI SUOMI, 21 Dec 83)	96

GREECE

Reorganization of Navy War College (I KATHIMERINI, 1-2 Jan 84)	98
Briefs Romanian Heavy Repair Equipment	99

NORWAY

Denfese Minister Sjaastad on Proposals for Restructuring (Anders C. Sjaastad; AFTENPOSTEN, 4 Jan 84)	100
---	-----

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

Impact of Union Wage Demands on National Economy (ABC, 3 Jan 84)	102
Fishing Fleet To Undergo Complete Revamping (Jesus F. Briceno; YA, 3 Jan 84)	104
Agrarian Organizations Disagree With Produce Prices (Cesar Lumbreras; ABC, 3 Jan 84)	107

TURKEY

Positive Response to Ozal Interest Policy (Editorial; DUNYA, 21 Dec 83; TERCUMAN, 21 Dec 83)	110
Optimistic Patience Counselling Ilıcak Praises New Policy	
Assessment of Causes, Impact of Ozal Policy (CUMHURIYET, 21 Dec 83)	114
Ulagay on Causative Factors, by Osman Ulagay Dogan on Interest Rates, by Yalcin Dogan	

Ozyoruk on Budgetary Needs of Justice System (Mukbil Ozyoruk; TERCUMAN, 21 Dec 83)	118
Central Bank Policy Focuses on Interest, Competition (Yener Kaya; DUNYA, 21 Dec 83)	120
New Regulations Govern Cost of Foreign Exchange (CUMHURIYET, 30 Dec 83)	122
Review of Government's Import, Export Regime (CUMHURIYET, 30 Dec 83)	123

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Strauss Seeks Constitutional Guarantee for Environment (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 16 Dec 83)	126
Second Environmental Agreement With GDR in Preparation (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZFITUNG, 21 Dec 83)	128
Biedenkopf Urges Market Instrument for Emission Control (Hans D. Barbier; SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 13 Dec 83)	130
Zimmermann Announces New Round of Environmental Measures (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 29 Dec 83)	132

PRESS, PARLIAMENT VIEW CRUISE MISSILES' EFFECT ON FINLAND

APN Commentator on Sweden's Defenses

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 23 Nov 83 p 10

[Commentary by Spartak Beglov: "The Challenge of Danger to the World: A Soviet Viewpoint"]

[Excerpts] The first American cruise missiles have been brought to Great Britain. This confirms the worst fears of the peace movement and undermines the basis of the agreement which was supposed to restrict and decrease the arsenal of nuclear weapons in Europe.

First of all, what catches the eye is the rush in which the operation is being realized. The delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States are still having talks in Geneva, but the missiles are already here in Europe. It is hard to imagine a more cynical way of the Reagan government (with the slavish help of Mrs Thatcher's government) to confirm that from the very beginning it has only been interested in placing new missiles and not in the agreement which would prevent the new cycle in the arms race.

Hiroshima Bomb Sixteen Times Smaller

Furthermore, one has to notice how stupid and shortsighted those supporting NATO's additional weaponry acquisitions really are. These people are now trying to calm down the public on the grounds that the arrival of the cruise missiles is not a big threat to peace.

The Cruise Missiles: Danger to Many

Finally, we can also notice attempts to interpret the threat created by the cruise missiles as a problem only in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, this is not the case.

The recent statement of the Swedish defense minister, according to which this country is looking for methods to prevent cruise missiles from flying over its territories, and that it has the right to shoot down such missiles, brought up all the dimensions of this new danger, the countries through the air spaces of which the low-flying and relatively slow missiles' flight paths go on the Pentagon maps are faced with questions of life and death.

Also the neutral countries are facing double responsibility. They are responsible both for letting the missiles meant for a nuclear attack pass through their airspace and for protecting the survival of their own people.

And finally, in the Pentagon plans the cruise missiles are only the first swallows which signal the reorganization of the United States' global nuclear strategy, taking into account the so-called local needs. The purpose is to place U.S. cruise missiles on U.S. aircraft carriers cruising all over the world as well as in the bases in Japan and elsewhere in Far and Middle East.

In other words, the first cruise missiles in England are signaling a nuclear threat on a new level which is a challenge to all countries and the entire world.

Roundup of Editorial Opinion

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 23 Nov 83 p 2

[Article: "The Antiaircraft Defense Must Be Enforced in Case of Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] The cruise missiles to be placed in Western Europe are not a direct threat to Finland because their paths will hardly go over our country, said Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Vayrynen last week. However, the missiles of the new generation which are still being developed do represent a threat, said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vayrynen's speech was commented by SUOMENMAA.

The Finnish military authorities have also confirmed that Finland has started to make preparations against the threat eventually caused by the cruise missiles. In practice this means that the control of the airspace and the anti-aircraft defense have to be intensified, and at the same time greater emphasis has to be put on the defense.

* * *

KANSAN UUTiset (SKP/SKDL) estimates that the purpose of Vayrynen's speech was to prepare the ground for the purchase funds related to these areas. This announcement brings one, above all, to contemplate the question whether this kind of armament, requiring huge investments, is reasonable.

* * *

A new parliamentary defense committee should be quickly established in case of the cruise missiles. This is how SUOMENMAA headlined the summary of Vice Speaker of the Parliament Mikko Pesala's speech.

According to Pesala, the missiles create insecurity also in the Nordic countries, and this insecurity is not decreased by the fact that our experts are not sufficiently familiar with the operational systems of the missiles. According to Vice Speaker Pesala, the academic debate whether the missiles would go through Finland's airspace in a real situation or not is worthless.

* * *

In AAMULEHTI the pseudonym V. J. Suomalainen states that the development of arms technology, which has been going on already for years, is in question. On both sides the generals have been allowed to develop new missiles, obviously, without thinking deeply at all of the political consequences. One wonders whether even the politicians did foresee what kinds of international problems these missiles would create as they approved the arms program.

New Parliamentary Defense Committee Needed

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 23 Nov 83 p 3

[Article: "The Chairman of the Defense Committee: A New Defense Committee Perhaps Already Next Year"]

[Text] The chairman of the parliamentary defense committee, Mauri Mieltinen (Coalition), estimates that perhaps next spring will be opportune time to appoint a new parliamentary defense committee. Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamäki (Center) says that so far nothing concrete has been done in order to establish a committee.

During the weekend the second vice speaker of the Parliament, Mikko Pesala (Center), presented the idea of establishing the fourth parliamentary defense committee. As grounds for this need Pesala brought up, among other things, the rapid development and introduction of the arms technique. In addition, the committee should draw up a new estimate of the situation with regard to national security.

Both Mieltinen and Pihlajamäki are satisfied with the results obtained by the former defense committees.

"The former committees have created a long-range aspect in the discussion. It has been possible to discuss the defense policy and the national defense in the spirit of consensus" says Mieltinen.

'Good Frame'

"The committee reports have been a good frame for further development. If the matters had been discussed only in connection with budget talks, the operation would have been pretty bumpy--although it has not been possible to realize the proposals made by the committee to their full extent."

"Without any doubt Pesala's arguments, in other words, the changed international situation and the technological development, favor the formation of a new committee," says Mieltinen.

If the discussions lead to the conclusion that a new committee is needed, then it will certainly be brought up next spring since the recommendations of the previous committee do not go past 1986."

"It is true that the issue has been alive all the time one way or the other. As the years covered by the previous committee's recommendations have passed, there is a need for a new committee," says Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamäki.

"We cannot delay the establishing of the committee too long, but we cannot tell the exact time yet. The matter is at our fingertips, but perhaps the time is not yet ripe for the decision."

The report of the previous, third parliamentary defense committee was completed less than 3 years ago. In its report the committee drew up the plans for the development of the armed forces for 15 years. It set more detailed goals till the end of 1986.

The work of the third defense committee was also marked by the discussion of the interpretations of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, in regard to which the outbursts of opinions raged quite hot.

The fourth parliamentary committee has already been proposed by Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa last December and by the previous cabinet's Defense Minister Juhani Saukkonen last January. A year ago there was already a pretty wide unanimity about the necessity of the fourth committee.

12190

CSO: 3617/53

CGIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REPORT ON PEACE, DISARMAMENT

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 25 Nov 83 pp 26-30, 32

[Article by Michele Magno and resolutions by the CGIL Executive Committee: "Executive Committee--The CGIL for Peace--Rome, 15 November 1983"]

[Text] This meeting of the Executive Committee definitely answers a need strongly felt in the leadership group and among the militants of the CGIL.

It could not be otherwise. Indeed, a confederation of workers with our patrimony of internationalist struggles and traditions cannot help but feel the need to get to the truth about a brand-new role and problems faced by the union in the midst of a dramatic crisis in the detente process.

The purpose of this examination is perfectly obvious: to revive a unitary line and initiative on the part of the CGIL-CISL [Italian Confederation of Trade Unions]-UIL [Italian Union of Labor] Federation on the great subjects of peace and disarmament. It must necessarily go through the process of an open inquiry into the difficulties that have hindered action in recent months.

The trade unions are sometimes accused of not having an autonomous "culture of peace" on the questions of nuclear disarmament, or in any case, of not knowing how to express one. This is a severe and ungenerous criticism. To some extent, though, it speaks to a real problem.

The trade union is not an ecological, "innocentist" or "unilateralist" movement. It is a political organization which, on the subjects of security and defense too, answers to a specific political logic, founded on evaluation of the risks, of the political-military alliances, of the existing power relationships.

Simultaneously, though, we maintain--and rightly so--that the mass-destruction capacity of atomic weapons is by its nature contrary to a supposed exclusively defensive use of them, and is therefore unsuitable for representing a true guarantee of the security of the peoples.

If we rid the debate of sterile polemics on the "choices of alignment" of one component or another of the unitary Federation, I believe that the

fundamental origin of some hesitancy on the part of the Federation, of the scant enthusiasms with which some of the workers have received its most recent positions, as well as of its tormented relationship with the pacifist movements, is to be sought in this contradiction and in the way that it has been experienced.

In short, even among "our own people" there is an unresolved conflict between the awareness that a balance of forces is necessary for maintaining peace and the simultaneous rejection of founding it on the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence."

We can reach some very different judgments about that complex and highly variegated phenomenon that goes by the name of "pacifism." It is indisputable, though, that also by virtue of pacifism, people are reflecting on the fact that the concept of security on which the policies of the states were built in the postwar period is losing significance today, with the proliferation of atomic weapons and their technological sophistication.

Perhaps there is not a full awareness of this historical and cultural datum in Italy. But we must say frankly that if a dispute should arise among us about who is "pacifist" and who is "concerned about security," we would expose ourselves to the intolerable risk of opening up lacerating splits in the trade union and of sowing confusion in the orientation of the workers.

In the recent congress of the French Socialist Party (Bourg-en-Bresse, 28-30 October), emphasis was rightly placed on the necessity not to repeat the experience of 1947, to keep a new cold war from drawing, within the left, a line of demarcation between those who look to Moscow and those who look to Washington.

This is a vital question for the entire European left. The risk does indeed exist. It exists for objective reasons--i.e., on account of the growing international tensions. But it exists also because of the acute dissension on several problems that runs through the parties of the left that are in the government or in the opposition in the individual countries of Europe.

The parliamentary debate opened yesterday on installation of the Cruise missiles confirms the subsistence, in the Italian left too, of differences of great political import.

The trade-union movement cannot help but be a sounding board for these discords. Otherwise, its capacity for expressing an original and autonomous view of the big international questions would be flawed. A force such as the CGIL in particular cannot shirk the task, even in these circumstances (rather, especially in these circumstances), to work as a unitary crossroads for the entire Italian left. The "culture of peace" is not, of course, limited to the question of disarmament or the Geneva negotiations on the intermediate-range missiles. I shall speak more on this farther on. This question is central and decisive today, though, for us and for Europe.

Freeze

Let us avoid aping the military strategists, getting bogged down in numbers and formulas, and let us get to the political substance of the problem.

Let us begin from several indisputable established facts: 1) the current nuclear parity between the two superpowers on the intercontinental level; 2) the current indisputable superiority of the USSR in the European theater; 3) the contradiction in terms, on the conceptual level, of any nuclear-deterrence strategy by which one threatens nuclear war in order to avert it.

On the empirical level, the doctrine of deterrence has never halted the arms race, but on the contrary, has intensified it. Indeed, its credibility requires a continual development of military technology, which in turn stimulates further armament for the purpose of keeping up with the adversary.

Therefore, a military strategy without contradictions does not exist, as is the case also with any pacifist strategy that prejudicially rejects the so-called "balance of terror" as a now stable element of the relations between the blocs.

Is there a way out of this vicious circle? We have indicated one, as a prospective matter, in the proposal--made indeed by a majority of the U.S. Congress, by the ICFTU and by many groups of scientists throughout the world--for a freeze: that is, a proposal for a worldwide freeze of the production, experimentation and movement of nuclear weapons, as a premise for negotiating sizable, mutual and verifiable reductions of all the existing arsenals.

The freeze is the only coherent conclusion to be drawn if one grants, as all do, the existence of a strategic balance between the two blocs.

There are certainly some partial imbalances, in favor of one bloc or the other--geographic imbalances, connected with the physical location of the United States and the USSR, and imbalances among the various categories of atomic weapons. But in the global strategic context, the partial imbalances have a very relative sense, unless--and this is the point--one really believes in the possibility of more or less limited nuclear wars.

Now we have not espoused the hypothesis of a "freeze" in order to avoid the knotty problem of the Euromissiles but rather because it points out the main road to be followed in the Geneva talks too.

The entire question of theater missiles has had mainly a political significance in the two camps. The Soviet decision to go ahead with installation of the SS-20's in a number that is not at all justified by any defensive consideration (like the recent decision to install SS-22 batteries in Czechoslovakia and in the GDR) was doubtlessly in favor of an objective, as someone has rightly stressed, of "political intimidation and, in prospect, neutralization of West Europe."

The framer of the idea adopted by NATO in 1979, former chancellor of the FRG Helmut Schmidt, has pointed out several times that the authentic interpretation of the dual decision presupposes that the USSR, in order to avoid the installation of the Pershing 2's and the Cruises or make them superfluous, would "dismantle much of what it has installed." The Social-Democratic leader has therefore always talked of substantial destruction of the SS-20's, not of total destruction of them (the "zero option," dropped because the European allies themselves considered it was impossible to propose), or else of installation of a certain number of American missiles in any case (Reagan's "intermediate" proposal that NATO has backed).

Again without any pretense of speaking as a "specialist," something should be said about the arsenals of Great Britain and France, which seem to constitute the main obstacle to an agreement. Several of the objections raised by NATO about the "strategic" character and, therefore, the difference in the nature of those arsenals from that of the medium-range missiles, are certainly well-founded. But still they are in Europe, and they are pointed in a certain direction.

Now an objective analysis of the facts cannot help but bring out the fact that the stagnation into which the negotiations are drifting derives from a twofold set of prejudgments. The Soviet pretension that the Atlantic Alliance should in any case renounce installation of the Pershing 2's and the Cruise missiles is certainly a prejudgment. But NATO's insistence on installing some of them in any case also constitutes a prejudgment.

These evaluations lead us to point out forcefully that the only acceptable outcome of the negotiations is an agreement that would provide for substantial destruction of the SS-20's and noninstallation of the Pershing 2's and the Cruise missiles, at Comiso or anywhere else in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact and NATO must not carry out any acts that might prejudice the outcome, which reflects the will and feelings of the majority of the European peoples.

Let the USSR draw the consequences, with concrete acts, from the superiority that it enjoys in the field of medium-range weapons, and let the Atlantic Alliance reconsider the time-schedule and modes of its so-called "dual decision" of 1979.

Let Us Call for Suspension, and on Geneva, We Are with Trudeau

We cannot accept the position of those in various quarters who consider the negotiations already compromised. Going on with the negotiations is a moral duty and a political necessity. The CGIL therefore asks for the Geneva talks to be continued without a break all through 1984. One year is a politically reasonable length of time for exploring in depth the sincerity of the two superpowers' will to negotiate.

We therefore call on the Italian government, precisely while an important democratic examination of its orientations is being carried out in the Parliament, to suspend the decision to receive the first Cruise missiles at the Comiso base.

We are not asking the Western governments and our government to split, to weaken, or to call their political-military alliances into question. But with the request for suspension--which does not necessarily mean revocation of decisions made--we are suggesting an act of good will and political wisdom that would broaden the area of popular consensus with them, that would strengthen faith in the possibility of breaking the atomic spiral through negotiation.

We consider important and we support the proposal formulated by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to hold, in the near future, a conference of the five nuclear powers--a conference in which the other European states, of West or East, directly concerned in the question of the missiles could be associated --for agreeing upon sizable reductions of the atomic arsenals of all types. The CGIL is unequivocally against all the means of mass extermination--nuclear, chemical and bacteriological. We cannot accept the idea that the security of the peoples should be entrusted to them. They should therefore be reduced to the lowest possible levels at once, and looking to the future, should be eliminated in the East and in the West, in Europe and throughout the world.

The year 1984 should live in the consciousness, in the commitment and initiative of the workers, as the year in which to revive great and decisive negotiations on the subject of disarmament. It is the nonexclusive but particular role of the trade unions to throw into the scales the entire weight of the values of which it has always been the bearer, of the method of the negotiations, as an instrument, to which there is no alternative, for restoring a climate of mutual trust between East and West.

The exigencies and objectives indicated go in the direction of formulation of a clear and reasonable political proposal, it seems to us.

But the credibility of this proposal depends on an immediate, exceptional mobilization of the CGIL and of the trade-union movement.

What we ask is not any kind of trickery. We are speaking of things that have been at the base of the extraordinary struggle by the European trade unions that culminated, in the second half of October, in great popular demonstrations.

The unitary Federation and the DGB have committed themselves to promoting actions of struggle by the ETUC [European Trade-Union Confederation] in the coming months. We have met with similar positions of availability in the CFDT, in the Dutch socialist trade union and in other important confederations.

But as desirable as a supranational program of action is, we cannot substitute it for our commitment and our specific responsibilities, here and now. We cannot remain inert because, as others say, there are differing options and orientations among the workers on the subject of peace.

The Italian trade unions, like the European ones, have a number of correct and unitary positions. It is our duty to make them become the basis for action by all the workers. We have certainly not drawn back when, in the years past, we have had to join together solidly in some very tough and bitter battles on the big knotty problems of development of the country, even in the middle of conflicts among the workers.

That there is need to revive initiative by the trade unions, and a strong initiative, is beyond dispute. It is imposed not only by the dramatic nature of the situation but also by the necessity of resuscitating an exhausted relationship with the working class, with the younger generations, with broad strata of the citizenry.

A Plan for Demonstrations for Peace

Let us set aside the personal opinions of each of us on the nonparticipation of the CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation in the pacifist rally in Rome on 22 October. That occasion has gradually taken on a traumatic and painful significance, because it laid bare the trade unions' lack of an active role in the struggle for peace, and indirectly reflected its stunted role, a role without bite. I do not mean to say by this that the trade-union movement has remained paralyzed in the past months. There have been many conferences, seminars, leadership and militant meetings and demonstrations too (I recall in particular the important one in Milan, in May, with comrade Lama). But it has been mostly a matter of political testimonials by individual structures and limited groups of workers, isolated and fragmented, not coordinated by an explicit and unifying plan of mobilization. Therefore, as is said, we really need to make a qualitative leap.

The CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation is currently working on the basis of two hypotheses: the holding of three interregional assemblies of trade-union cadres (in the North, Center and South), and the holding of a Conference on Peace by the three General Councils, open to the ETUC and to several continental trade unions. These two initiatives are important and should be well prepared for.

We believe, though, that they are not sufficient. We therefore propose to the Executive Committee that the CGIL promote a campaign of leadership and militant meetings, territorial and by category, in the zones, in the districts and in the regions. This campaign must have the maximum unitary character, and should therefore be directed toward the largest possible number of workplaces.

In the second place, we propose that the regional structures of the CGIL use this discussion on the content of our and the ETUC's platform for a national day of mobilization for peace and disarmament to be held, with mass initiatives, in every regional capital on 10 December.

This entails a plan of initiatives that must have a strong unitary inspiration, purpose-directed, as it is, toward a strong amplification of the workers' consensus around the trade-union line. But for us, the demonstrations should also be an occasion, thus making up for the lags of the past, for a

coming-together with all the forces of culture, science, the schools and the world of youth, committed, like the trade-union movement, in the battle for detente.

Finally, we propose to the CISL and to the UIL that they agree, as an aspect of unification and of revival of the workers' struggle on these themes, a symbolic labor stoppage throughout the national territory, to be carried out in the context of the conclusion of this round of the Geneva negotiations.

We are quite familiar with the practical difficulties that could beset the implementation of this program, especially on the eve of our Organizational Conference. But this cannot conflict with the political exigency that clearly emerges from the problems that we have attempted to identify. Further, we know that various structures of the CGIL are already preparing initiatives that follow along the lines already drawn. We stress the importance of a national day of trade-union mobilization and struggle for peace. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the proposals formulated cannot be rigidly subordinated to schedule restrictions and deadlines. The essential thing is that they be implemented in a unitary framework that is clear and concentrated in time.

The European Community

We are all convinced that in the present-day critical system of international relationships, Europe should play a considerably more important role. But the reality is well-known. The Community's structure is in pieces. The compromise between agricultural protectionism and industrial liberalism on which it has been based so far is in tatters. In short, we find ourselves with a lacerated Community, stricken with a protectionist fever, characterized not by two but by three or four rates of development, with notable political consequences in the international arena, which is weighed down with the burdensome situations of armaments, of trade with the East, of the Middle East crisis--all of them questions on which Europe has not yet managed to cross the threshold to an autonomous initiative. But not all of the left accepts the European dimension today as one of its specific areas for initiative. The real stakes for it, in the June 1984 elections for Parliament, are all to be found in this: restoring a unity of political approaches on the basis of a proposal capable of responding to Europe's demands in the economic, institutional and security fields.

The trade union is immersed in this labor up to its neck. The ETUC, with the document on peace approved last 14 October, has given a sincere proof of independence from the political alignments and the contradictions that the parties of the left are nevertheless experiencing in each country. We must make thorough use of this document, not only for its specific content but also for the positive political implications of a general nature that it has.

But the same cannot be said if we examine the other grounds on which the ETUC should express a well-rounded, incisive proposal alternative to the responses that the employers and the majority of the continental governments are giving to the economic crisis. Indeed, the ETUC does not yet have an industrial policy of its own, it does not yet have a policy of its own on employment and

on labor. We are not exempt from responsibilities either. An important European trade-union conference on employment will be held in the Spring of 1984.

The next year, the biggest continental trade union, the DGB, will open a big contract battle for reduction of working hours, with an approach that leaves one somewhat perplexed but that in any case is destined to condition deeply the strategy of all of Western trade-unionism. We cannot just look in from the outside. The CGIL and the unitary Federation must commit themselves and stake more on the building of a European trade-union strategy. We believe that a balance-sheet of the significance and the limits of our experience in the ETUC will have to be drawn up by an ad-hoc meeting of the CGIL's Executive Committee, which could be held at the beginning of next year.

But our attention should be drawn also to the debate and reflection, initiated some time ago in social-democracy, on a new security policy. One need only think of the Palme report and the report by the Parliamentary group of the SPD, to cite the latest more significant documents in this regard.

Today we are witnessing a profound tormenting of the European conscience, which is a dramatic datum of our political situation. The fact is that Europe is being urged by the United States to join in the nuclear race, and by the USSR not to take part in it. Taking part in an unstable game gives no guarantee of stabilizing it. Withdrawing from the game offers no certainty of interrupting it. The only way to get out of the dilemma would be to change the game--that is, by having Europe take on a role that it does not have.

Is it possible for this new player, this new international subject, to start its game? Three hypotheses in this regard are being worked today. The first is that of a neutral and disarmed Europe. This is doubtlessly wishful thinking. The second is the establishment of a continental "force de frappe." Against this are some formidable contraindications--of a financial, political and psychological nature--that make it Utopian. The third hypothesis, as formulated some time ago by Giorgio Ruffolo, is that of an autonomy for Europe that would have a gradual but systematic character, to be pursued within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and with acceptance of the fundamental obligations, but with progressive introduction of an autonomous defense factor through extension of the Treaty of Rome to cooperation in the field of security. Notable objections can be raised against this idea too, especially in a phase that imposes the maximum possible concentration of the available resources for economic development, and certainly not for providing Europe with a self-defense capacity, even if minimal. But apart from this, I wanted to get back to this discussion in order to stress that the problem exists in any case, it is not worth the trouble to exorcise it, and credible and positive responses should therefore be made to it.

In substance, there is the problem of rooting a new conception of security in a new "realpolitik," so to speak, of pacifism. On this point, it seems to me that we cannot avoid comparison with the pacifist movements.

The Pacifist Movements

The trade unions have run up mainly against a practical difficulty and a cultural incomprehension of the pacifist phenomenon. The difficulty lies in establishing a contact that is not ephemeral with an interlocutor who, on account of its own organizational structure, evaded the traditional forms of "representation" and of political mediation. The incomprehension (or late understanding) is of the original nature, the "institutional atypicality" of this subject, the presence in which of ideal and political positions that were also quite distant from one another was legitimized exclusively by an ethical stance: rejection of war based on the universal feeling about the nuclear peril.

In this sense, I believe that right of citizenship in the pacifist movements is possessed also by the tendencies favorable to unilateral disarmament, without that scandalizing anyone. The problem does not lie in this. The problem for us is that such tendencies not achieve hegemony and that, especially, they not be confused with the "service orders" carried out by the pro-Soviet groups, for whom there are good missiles and bad missiles. But these are knotty points in a political battle that the peace movement must be able to tackle and resolve, as it has already begun to do, in an atmosphere of full autonomy.

But the most serious problem that has to be discussed has to do with the limitations that the pacifist movements are showing in working out proposals and promoting effective mobilization on the most explosive international questions.

I believe that the heart of this weakness lies in the separation that is still theorized between the attention paid to--as someone has felicitously defined it--the "virtual" conflict (the atomic-weapons race) and the attention paid to the "actual conflict" (the policy of the blocs, or the fundamental cause of the excessive increase in military expenditures and of the growing international tensions).

The trade unions cannot afford this separation. The virtual conflict is avoided also by winning the actual one, by transforming the struggle for peace into a constant commitment of affirmation of human and trade-union rights, of the liberty of the peoples, of economic cooperation between different kinds of regime--that is, by transforming that struggle into day-to-day solidarity with every expression of independence from the dominant powers, from Poland to Afghanistan, from Chile to Central America, from Grenada to the new tragic explosion of the Lebanese and Palestinian tragedies.

Two recent events, in recent weeks, have dominated the international panorama.

The CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation and the CGIL have expressed clear judgments on these events, and therefore it is not necessary to present them here.

But one fact deserves to be emphasized. Differing sensibilities have been manifested in our ranks, different lines of attack on the ideal level, different commitments to action on the basis of them. In substance, contrasting humors and reticences of various kinds have once again come to light and have run the risk of introducing a sort of watershed of judgment depending on the alignment loyalty that one episode or another might surreptitiously evoke.

If this is true--and it is true, at least to some extent--it would really be worth the trouble to open a free discussion, as frank as possible, in our organization to purge the causes of such phenomena, projecting this verification in a structural critical analysis of the ideal coordinates that inform the international political culture of the CGIL, on the basis of the deliberations of the last congress of the Executive Committee, a truly important and courageous one, of January 1982, on Poland and the USSR.

I believe that the initiative decided on by the CGIL of Lombardy, to conduct a seminar on these topics, should be valued. Perhaps it could be successfully repeated and generalized.

The Nth Palestinian Catastrophe

We are all more or less worried by many feelings these days. Not the least of them is the excessive silence, the resigned indifference, and in some cases the ill-concealed satisfaction with which the world is witnessing the nth capacity of the Palestinian people.

One cannot help but appreciate the dynamism and the positive new approaches that have characterized the political-diplomatic action of the Italian government on this as well as on other questions of foreign policy.

The minister of foreign affairs has made some important statements on the role of the PLO, and of Arafat within it. And under his guidance, the PLO has indeed given a national dignity to a population of refugees, he has broken the desperation-terrorism spiral, seeking to give the Palestinian question a political strategy and an international dimension.

But all these facts are being recognized at a time when, unfortunately, they run the risk of being cancelled out by a decision to eliminate, even physically, the present leadership of the PLO. This decision is part of a broader design for partitioning of the entire area of the Near East, including Lebanon, the main protagonists of which are Syria, Israel and, behind them, the big powers. And then when all these facts are recognized, how is it possible to go on not recognizing the PLO of Yasser Arafat? How is it possible to continue confusing--as the minister of defense often does--the question of mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO, which for us too is a just basis for resolution of the Palestinian problem, with the question of its recognition through an autonomous act by the Italian government?

After 35 years of war in the Middle East, to ask for recognition of the rights of the Palestinians is really not to ask for too much. The CGIL maintains that this is the obligatory route for a far-seeing, concrete and very

urgent political initiative in that area by the Italian government as well as by all the European countries.

If we place particular emphasis on this point, we are not, for all that, ignoring the tragedy of Lebanon, in which Italy is directly committed through its participation in the Multinational Peacekeeping Force. We can only state again our positive judgment on the role so far carried out by the Italian military contingent. At the same time, we cannot help but stress that that contingent runs the risk of finding itself facing a hotbed of growing political tensions and military conflict, that can objectively endanger the contingent's safety and its very function. We repeat, therefore, that if and when--for any reason--the danger of an involvement of the Italian troops in a conflict between opposing formations should take more concrete form, the government should submit to the Parliament the decision on withdrawal of the peace force from Lebanon or its remaining there, and on the basis of the same criteria that rightly made for its decision not to send military forces and observers into the Chouf for the time being.

The Economic Aspect of the International Confrontation

The political confrontation between the great powers should be firmly combatted because it accelerates the arms race, the enormous costs of which help intensify the crisis of world accumulation [as published].

The economic confrontation between the two blocs should likewise be combatted, because it too would aggravate the economic crisis, which for the workers represents a problem of security in the broadest sense of the term.

The interrelationship between the arms race and development truly merits a clearer definition.

The ETUC calls for a European "employment pact" on the basis of which the Community could pursue a more expansive economic policy. This objective could be accompanied by a request--like the one proffered by the congress of the Socialist International at Albufeira--for an agreement whereby the most highly industrialized countries, of the West and of the East, would commit themselves to cutting their military expenditures by a certain percentage and earmarking the funds thus saved for productive investments.

We should solicit a great European trade-union initiative on this point too--in coordination with, for example, the European Disarmament Conference that will begin in Helsinki in January 1984.

There is a second question that it is worth the trouble to raise, very summarily.

The trade-union movement is showing a growing embarrassment just in talking about a reconversion of the war industry. And the subject is certainly an embarrassing one, at a time when the war sector is the most prosperous in the national economy, and when we are witnessing phenomena of "reverse" reconversion of civilian production into military production (the case of the SNIA [expansion unknown]-Viscosa, for example).

The problem obviously is not whether our country should or should not have its own armaments industry (which in any case enables it to be the world's No 4 or No 5 exporter of arms today). The problem is what armaments industry it should have, and--especially--who should decide on this important aspect of economic and security policy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a few final considerations.

When we stress the approach of detente and dialogue, the method of mutual trust and talks for countering the trend toward a "militarization of politics," we well understand--and we have always said this--that there is a "democratic disparity" between the struggle for peace in the West and the one that is carried on in the countries of the East. In their positions, the trade unions of the East are always in favor of disarmament, to be sure. But they do not recognize an obvious truth: that by definition, there are always at least two participants, and that all of the thermonuclear bombs are always offensive weapons.

Again, to be sure, the trade unions of the socialist countries also organize big demonstrations for peace, but they never call their governments' policy into question.

This disparity is not to be overcome either, obviously, by "rebalancing it downward" or with ideological anathemas.

There are in fact other ways, other initiatives, more effective and incisive ones, for getting the trade-union movement of the East to face up to its responsibilities, and also for stimulating the critical ferments that do exist to some extent in the positions of some governments, such as the Romanian and Hungarian ones. It is for this purpose, for example, that a CGIL delegation, led by comrades Lama and Del Turco, will indeed go to Hungary next week.

The CGIL can never abandon this line.

The problems and difficulties that we have experienced in the past months, the substantial inertia shown in the face of the Palestinian strategy, almost make one suspect that there is a kind of inurement of the workers and of public opinion to slaughters, to military violence, as if the idea had gradually taken hold that the international controversies obeyed rules of high policy which the trade unions and the masses could do very, very little to affect. Perhaps things are not really that way, and even depend on us in order not to become too insidious.

In the coming weeks, the mobilization proposal that we have made will, if well-received, represent a serious and committing measuring-stick of our determination to launch again a vast and articulated movement of struggle that will really bring back again the greatest, most specific themes of the trade union's battle for peace.

As I stated earlier, the question of the missiles is the most burning one on the European scene in the immediate future.

The ETUC's document concludes with a peremptory declaration: "The trade-union movement will not accept a failure of the Geneva negotiations." The Federation of German Metalworkers, at its Munich congress (9-15 October 1983), passed a resolution in which it is declared that with the deployment of the Pershings, the FRG's national sovereignty is being renounced and transferred to another power.

In the coming days, after the Italian Parliament, the Dutch and Belgian Parliaments will decide on installation of the theater missiles. An extraordinary congress of the German Social-Democratic Party will do the same thing.

In this part of Europe, there is a ferment of ideas, initiatives and political debate that places in the foreground this very problem of national sovereignty and, in any case, of the inalienable right of binding joint decision-making on the use (it is frightening to say it) of the Euromissiles, and of control of the nuclear bases by the European states. But this is not the problem for us. Our choices lead us to rule out, as others are perhaps thinking, Comiso's becoming the "symbol" or the trench of a passive and hopeless resistance in a struggle already lost.

The commitment has a far longer and deeper political, moral and cultural import.

There is nothing ineluctable and predetermined. But a movement capable of enduring is needed. The events and the critical process of mobilization of the coming days are what will suggest to us the ways by which to go ahead with it, in order to do our part thoroughly.

Conclusive Resolution on Peace

The Executive Committee of the CGIL approves the report made by Michele Magno in the name of the secretary. The Executive Committee expresses deep concern about the deterioration of international relations. The hotbeds of tension are multiplying in many regions of the planet. The tendency to resolve the controversies between states by recourse to military force is growing stronger.

The economic crisis is accentuating the instability of the relations between East and West, between North and South, in the world. This is accelerating the arms race, the enormous costs of which are in turn contributing to an intensification of the crisis of international accumulation.

It is necessary to counter firmly these dangers to the fate of humanity. Only in peace can the peoples and the states find true security.

A primary task of the trade-union movement is to struggle in defense of peaceful coexistence, economic cooperation and resolution of conflicts by the method of dialogue, talks, mutual trust.

The CGIL rejects the doctrines based on the assumption that war can be prevented only by wielding the threat of use of nuclear weapons. This logic should be refuted. It is necessary to counter it with the concept that in the atomic era, the common survival should be entrusted to a policy of control and reduction of the armaments to the lowest possible level, to be extended as far as abolition of all means of mass extermination.

As first steps for opening up this prospect, the CGIL supports:

--the proposal for a global freeze on the experimentation, production and movement of new nuclear weapons, as the premise for negotiating extensive, reciprocal and verifiable reductions of all the existing arsenals. This proposal is, indeed, entirely coherent with the present parity of the nuclear balance on the strategic level;

--the proposal to hold in the near future a conference of the nuclear powers --in which the other European states, of West and East, directly interested in the installation of the missiles would be associated--for the purpose of agreeing on sizable reductions of the atomic arsenals of every type.

The CGIL declares that the only acceptable outcome of the Geneva negotiations on the theater missiles is an agreement that would provide for substantial destruction of the SS-20's and nondeployment of the Pershing 2's and the Cruise missiles, at Comiso or anywhere else in Europe.

The USSR must draw all the consequences from the indisputed superiority that it enjoys in the area of medium-range missiles, with proposals and concrete actions for destruction of the SS-20's, for the purpose of reaching a balance at the lowest possible level. NATO must reconsider the time-schedules and modes of the "dual decision" of 1979.

The position of those in various quarters who consider the negotiations already compromised is not acceptable. It is a moral duty and a political necessity to continue with them.

The CGIL therefore asks that the talks be continued in 1984--that is, for a politically reasonable time for exploring the sincerity of the two superpowers' will to negotiate.

Therefore the CGIL, while it does not raise the problem of a revocation of decisions reached by the parliament, asks the Italian government to suspend the decision concerning the installation of the first Cruise missiles at the Comiso base.

This request is not intended to call into question the political relations or the military alliances of Italy.

It is indispensable to strengthen faith in the possibility, through negotiations, of achieving concrete results through balanced reductions of atomic armaments.

The CGIL urges the workers to support the union's positions contained in the latest documents from the unitary Federation, of 7 October, and of the European Trade-Union Conference. It stresses particularly the indivisibility of the commitment and battle for peace from the battle for liberty and political democracy, for the independence and self-determination of the peoples.

The Executive Committee has decided to open a campaign of discussion of these topics with leadership and militant conferences and meetings in all its structures. This must also contribute to the implementation of two unitary initiatives already delineated by the secretary of the CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation:

- interregional meetings of cadres and delegates in the North, Center and South;
- a conference of the three General Councils of the Federation on peace, with participation by the leaders of the ETUC and of the European trade unions.

The discussion campaign must have the maximum unitary character and must reach into the workplaces.

The Executive Committee asks all its structures, regional and category types, to reach agreements with the CISL and the UIL on mobilization programs in the workplaces, the zones and the regions.

The Executive Committee stresses the necessity, in this framework, of the CGIL's promoting unitary mass initiatives in very regional capital, to be concentrated, even if without rigid time-schedules, in a national day of mobilization on 10 December. All these initiatives should be aimed not only at strengthening the workers' consensus around the positions of the trade-union movement but also at the opening of a committed coming-together with the peace committees, with the political forces and the forces of the world of youth, of culture and of science.

Finally, the Executive Committee charges the secretary of the CGIL to propose to the unitary Federation a national work stoppage for peace and disarmament.

Resolution on the Palestinian Question

The Executive Committee of the CGIL expresses fraternal and great solidarity with the president of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. Under his guidance, the PLO has given political dignity to the Palestinian nation and has sought to build a correct and reasonable line for recognition of their inalienable rights.

The Executive Committee expresses a firm condemnation of all those forces that are making themselves the instrument of a design for the partitioning of Lebanon and the area of the Near East, from Syria to Israel [as published], who are aiming at an ignoble liquidation of the present leadership of the PLO and at defeat of the cause of the Palestinian people.

The Executive Committee calls on the Italian workers to make their active solidarity with Yasser Arafat felt, with a strong mobilization.

The Executive Committee finds in these tragic circumstances a new reason for repeating its request to the Italian government for urgent recognition of the PLO. Such action represents a duty and is coherent with the asserted necessity of reaching a just solution to the Palestinian question.

11267

CSO: 3528/34

BASQUE, BRETON, CORSICAN AUTONOMIST RENEWAL AFTER AMNESTY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24-25 Dec 83 p 9

[News commentary by I. de Ch.: "Autonomist Fever"]

[Text] On the front of autonomisms, whether they be Basque, Corsican or Breton, tension is increasing, persisting or being revived. Everywhere, in fact, the coming to power of the socialists had been followed by truces which were more or less respected. Everywhere, however, the "hopes" nourished by the autonomists have been frustrated; and the general amnesty of June 1981 above all had permitted the clandestine reconstitution of the dismantled networks. Everywhere, finally, the ambiguity of a policy whose essential character seems to be incoherence has given several subversive groups or movements at one and the same time the means and motivation for rebirth. For weeks we have been witnessing a renewal of violence.

In Basque Country, the autonomists are demonstrating in the streets. The "Iparretarrak" Movement continues to harass the forces of order. One gendarme has been killed, another wounded. Everything started up again when the Spanish police fighting the Spanish ETA [Basque Homeland and Freedom], convinced that France is serving as a rear base for the terrorist movement, on several occasions have crossed the border. By tracking down Spanish Basques in France, they have triggered a reaction of solidarity among the French Basque autonomists. A cycle of intrigue and acts of violence.

The situation in Corsica is not the same. On the Island of Beauty we are witnessing a long, slow deterioration. It is true that the number of acts of violence (573 as of 12 December 1983 compared to 804 in 1982) is a decrease; however, in reality the pressure of the independentists has moved to a more subtle and fluid terrain.

The dual Orsoni-Massimi affair and its fallout on the continent in a way sums up the new strategy of the terrorists whose organizations, the FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front] and CCN [Council of Nationalist Committees] have been dissolved. This affair also marks an escalation. For the first time since the Liberation, a top official, Pierre-Jean Massimi, has been assassinated in Corsica.

In Brittany, the autonomists of the FLB [Brittany Liberation Front] have not spoken of these organizations for 4 years. But bad examples can also serve as

a beacon light. After the fashion of Corsica and the Basque Country, Brittany is stirring once again. On 15 October, the ARB (Breton Republican Army) announced: "We are resuming the struggle." Since then a series of acts of violence have taken place in Brittany, a minor but significant shock wave, which is being echoed by an eruption of fever in the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories], particularly in Guadeloupe.

8143

CSO: 3519/159

AMNESTIED BRETONS OF SEPARATIST GROUPS RESUME BOMBINGS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24-25 Dec 83 p 9

[News commentary by Jean-Pierre Cressard: "Brittany: The Reawakening of the FLB"]

[Text] Rennes--There was reason to believe that the Breton separatists had quieted down and had abandoned the path of violence. For 4 years in fact the FLB-ARB (Brittany Liberation Front-Breton Republican Army) had not been the subject of conversation. But doubtless it was lying dormant...In 3 months, it has claimed responsibility for four acts of violence. Is this just a spasm or a new offensive? The reawakening of the Bretons, in any case, is a disagreeable surprise.

On 30 May 1979, in Plouezec, Cotes-du-Nord, FLB terrorists blew up the house of their old adversary, Roger Le Taillanter, Judicial Police division chief. Le Taillanter on several occasions had dismantled the organization's networks. Several weeks later, he had the perpetrators arrested. They were found guilty. Two years of silence followed.

In June 1981, all militant Bretons were given amnesty by the new president of the republic; the FLB announced a truce. On 15 October 1983, those who claimed to be the heirs of the clandestine movement declared: "We represent socialism's struggle for liberation." According to them, the new government had not responded to minimal Breton aspirations. At the same time, the ARB did not claim responsibility for the act of violence committed in September 1982 against the monument to the dead of Scrignac, Finistere, and two aborted acts of violence, one in Champtoce (Maine-et-Loire) against the SNCF [French National Railroad] and the other in Plouharnel, Morbihan, against an electric power tower.

These acts of violence were attributed to "dissidents."

On 15 October 1983, an explosion damaged a pillar at the judicial police facility being built in Rennes. There was considerable damage. However, there will be no delay in the inauguration of this building (scheduled for June 1984). Responsibility for this act of violence was claimed by the ARB.

On 30 November, an explosion destroyed one of the statues decorating the entrance to the Saint Cyr-Coetquidan camp. It is likely that, in the darkness, the person who planted the bomb mistook the statue of Bayard for the one next to it, the statue of Bertrand Duguesclin, the perennial adversary of Breton autonomists. In 50 years, three of the statues have already been blown up. Let us recall that Duguesclin had placed himself in the service of the king of France.

New Climate

On 17 December, the day before the second round of the Auray legislative election, an electric power tower was slightly damaged in Plouharmel, on the Quiberon Peninsula. One of the two charges failed to explode. Responsibility for the act of violence was claimed by the ARB with this explanation: "The work of Christian Bonnet must not be left standing." We know that the former minister of interior was elected senator of Morbihan last September and was replaced in the National Assembly by Aime Kerguerin, who was elected last Sunday.

The fourth and most spectacular act of violence was committed during the night of Wednesday to Thursday against the offices of the Treasury General in Rennes. There the damage is spectacular, not because of the size of the explosive charge but because of the effects of the blast. The offices of the payment branch were devastated, which will delay settlement of the claims of businessmen who have worked for the various administrative services of Ile-et-Vilaine. The perpetrator of this act of violence had allowed himself to be locked up in the offices Wednesday afternoon. He lit a slow fuse around 0130 hours and escaped through a window leading onto a terrace.

These four acts of violence, for which the ARB has claimed responsibility, took place in a new climate which has been produced since 1979. In the first place the word "autonomist" is now claimed by the "Breton Democratic Union," a party of the "left" which shares offices in some municipalities with the Communist and Socialist Parties. What is more, up to 1979, the Socialist Party--then in the opposition--was saying: "We disapprove of these acts of violence, but we know that there are reasons for discontent here."

Today, Edmond Herve, mayor of Rennes, and secretary of state for health, does not mince words: "An act of this kind reveals the cowardice of its perpetrators. It is all the more pointless since it cannot advance the cause it proposes to defend and what is more it endangers human lives."

The opposition has retained the point of view it held when it was in the majority: "We condemn and will always condemn these acts of violence."

The investigation being conducted by the Rennes Judicial Police is not easy. It seems that the ARB group is an unsophisticated [artisanale] organization made up of a dozen persons at most. Doubtless it will have trouble carrying out its activities since these acts of violence are unanimously condemned in Brittany. We should also recall that the most recent members of the FLB taken prisoner were somewhat bitter malcontents, unlike the noteworthy militants of the opposition present at the birth of the FLB in 1967.

ASALA, IRANIAN PAPERS SHOW RESTAURANTS AS POSSIBLE TARGETS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29 Dec 83 p 12

[News commentary by Jean-Charles Reix: "Terrorism: Red Alert"]

[Text] The investigation of the attack on 23 December 1983 against the famous Parisian restaurant "Le Grand Vefour" is beginning to look more and more like a criminal operation, in all regards similar to the one perpetrated on 20 November against another great restaurant, "L'Oree du Bois." As a matter of fact, in both cases the methods and explosive used resemble one another. The device used was a 500-gram stick of common industrial explosive which was ignited by a slow fuse. The stick of explosive was placed against a door and lit around 2300 hours, at a time when there were still enough customers to cause serious injuries. This campaign of attacks against well-known establishments raises serious questions. Is this an attempt at intimidation leading to the extortion of money under threat? Or is it the prelude to much more dangerous terrorist undertakings? There are some indications which seem to point in that direction.

At year's end, is France once again to become the favorite target of Middle East terrorists? Without delving into the psychosis of the attacks, we are nevertheless permitted to ask this question. In fact, the special services have just given warning of the imminent arrival in the Paris region of a commando of eight terrorists. One of them is said to be a sharpshooter. His accomplices are traveling under false names and have false Tunisian, Syrian and Iranian passports.

This report is being taken very seriously. It has also been communicated to the security services of Belgium and the FRG. The report states that the commando is going to attempt a spectacular act of violence in Europe. But its real objective is unknown. As recently as last week there had been reports of the movement of explosives in trucks coming from Belgium. According to the experts, the "European theater of operations" has become the number-one priority of the Islamic revolutionaries who were recently expelled from their rear base in Lebanon. Palestinian, Syrian and now Iranian terrorists are said to have bases in France, Belgium and Switzerland.

Brussels, a cosmopolitan city, is the place where the terrorists can obtain weapons most easily. At the end of October, three Syrians theoretically living in the Netherlands were arrested in Belgium. They had purchased Polish WZ 63 submachine guns, unusual weapons of the same type as those used during the wave of anti-Semitic attacks in the summer of 1982, notably against the Goldenberg restaurant on Rue des Rosiers in Paris (6 dead, 22 injured on 10 August). In Switzerland, the pro-Arab revolutionaries are obtaining the necessary financing from funds deposited anonymously in secret numbered accounts. In Paris, they are finding reception and support networks capable of providing them with lodging and false papers.

Armed with this information, the investigators are now beginning to wonder whether the recent attacks against two Paris restaurants are not part of the same strategy of terror designed to lay the groundwork for an operation of much larger scope. An operation which reportedly would fall within the framework of the disputes existing between France, Syria and, above all, Iran because of the situation in Lebanon. Two documents which have just been brought to the attention of the French services in fact mention the restaurants as potential terrorist targets.

'Guardians of the Revolution'

The first document is the "Manual of the Guardians of the Revolution" published in Tehran which, under the heading "tactics and Techniques" states: "We must strike one of the aspects of the decadent West: restaurants..." The second of these documents was issued by the ASALA (Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia). With a view to disassociating themselves from the hard line advocated by the historical leader Mihran Mihiranian, alias Agop Agopian, these dissidents in fact made the following statement in a communique issued a few weeks ago: "Under the false pretense of forcing the release of combatants taken prisoner, restaurants, stores and airports have been selected and meticulously chosen to serve as battlefield and as military targets."

According to the experts, the surviving members of the hard-line faction of the ASALA are now established in Tehran, financed and protected by the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. In exchange for this largesse, according to the dissidents, the Armenian terrorists who also have an infrastructure in France, are prepared to render services. Thus, still according to this hypothesis, these Armenians (acting for a cause other than their own, which prevents them from claiming responsibility for their actions) could have placed three bombs: one at the Marseilles fair (1 dead, 26 injured on 30 September 1983), another at "L'Oree du Bois" (six injured on 20 November) and the last on 23 December at "Le Grand Vefour."

Of course this is nothing more than a school hypothesis; however, it seems all the more credible when we consider the fact that 11 Iranian subjects have been asked to leave French territory since 23 December, the day before the attack on the big Palais-Royal restaurant. While under close surveillance by the DST [Direcote of Territorial Surveillance], with several under the tightest surveillance possible and assigned to residence at the Police Academy in Reims, have some of these Iranians made contact with Armenian terrorist mercenaries?

However, this is not the only clue being followed in the affairs of "Le Grand Vefour" and "L'Oree du Bois." The police are still studying the possibility of extortion efforts or "leftist" attacks against these "temples of consumption." An easy symbol to exploit during the holiday season. In any event, yesterday evening, a Briton linked with a French terrorist group was held for questioning by the police. Grenades, weapons and explosives were seized at his residence.

8143

CS0: 3519/159

BERLIN COLLOQUIUM REVEALS FRENCH CONCERNS FOR FRG FUTURE

'New German Pacifism' Feared

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 22 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Guenther Nonenmacher: "French Worry about Political Trends in FRG"]

[Text] There is something odd about the concerns presently being voiced in France about political trends in the FRG. To be sure, the new "uncertainties about Germany" do revolve around tangible issues (the German reaction to the deployment of new medium-range weapons is viewed as a litmus test for alliance reliability for example) and around specific events (the French view the SPD disavowal of the two-track resolution as having cost the party its capability to govern) and even around specific organizations—above all the "peace movement" but also including some segments of the SPD. But grounds for concern such as these have been known to come up in other countries as well. Great Britain also has a peace movement and the Labour Party has taken a more radical position than the SPD. But one is a good deal more relaxed about those things. But if Germany happens to be involved, then these things give rise to more profound and diffuse doubts which at least in part turn into a general lack of confidence in the political maturity of the German people.

The French suspect us of a penchant toward extremism. At the moment, however, this does not imply a susceptibility to the blandishments of extremist political parties. But intellectuals and members of the French "political class" are afraid that the Germans might not be able to find the proper approach to political events and might not react to difficulties, challenges and problems in a well-balanced, calculable and reasonable way. There are some neo-German phenomena which make the French—who look upon themselves as the epitome of the "juste milieu"—somewhat uneasy. For more than three decades, "materialistic interests" were dominant in the FRG; but now, the French feel, there are once again signs of almost religiously exaggerated idealism. Following a pragmatic phase, the pendulum is now thought to have swung toward romanticism and irrationalism. Following a period of contriteness, an awakening of German patriotism has been noted and this, in turn, has given rise to fears that it might develop into anti-Western nationalism.

Deep-seated misgivings such as these go a long way toward explaining the expressions of concern voiced at the colloquium entitled "Germany as a Part of Europe: Questions of National Identity" which was jointly sponsored by the Franco-German Institute and the Robert Bosch Foundation and held in Berlin. The constant doubt which is a part of the Franco-German relationship, Andre Fontaine, editor-in-chief of LE MONDE pointed out, is the reason why the Germans are now being accused of being too soft toward the Soviet Union after being accused of excessive compliance to the wishes of the United States in years past. It is also the reason why people in France today are concerned about "irresponsible pacifism" on the Germans' part while their supposedly innate tendency toward militarism was a great cause of anxiety just a short time ago. Peter Bender reminded the participants of General de Gaulle's statement to the effect that France was not unhappy about the Soviet Union's acting as a counterweight to American dreams of hegemony in Europe and equally glad about the Americans' acting as a counterweight to Soviet influence. After quoting the general's statement, Bender asked whether only the French had a right to be "Gaullists." And when he did, the immediate answer resounding through the assembly hall was "naturally." Alfred Grosser reduced one basic tenet of French policy to the following simple formula: Whenever it was hard to tell exactly where the Germans were headed, one would initially assume they were headed in the wrong direction. But it was probably Mainz political scientist Weidenfeld who really hit the nail on the head. The Germans might be headed in any direction they liked, he said; France would always observe their progress with misgivings.

"New German Pacifism"

It is hard for the Germans themselves to accept the fact that the FRG still is not viewed as an entirely normal nation and that its (domestic) policies are being watched with more than merely passing interest. Running the gamut from disappointment to irritation, SPD politicians and members in attendance—among them former Minister of State Huonker and Klaus Boelling as well as Richard Loewenthal whose reaction was the most believable of the lot—brushed any doubts of the SPD's western orientation and allegiance to the alliance aside. Nonetheless, we will have to come to terms with the fact that political controversy inside our country as well as the shifts and nuances of intra-German relations are not merely issues of domestic concern. Both Alfred Grosser and Andre Glucksmann, the philosopher, made reference to the "tragic experiences" which constitute the backdrop of Franco-German relations.

The discussions between the German and French politicians, scientists and media personalities concentrated on two major points. One of the topics was the "new German pacifism" as a basic attitude which goes beyond the confines of the "peace movement" and thereby has an impact on both the political and social life of the FRG. In addition, the

exchanges focused on the most recent developments in intra-German relations. (In this connection, frequent reference was made to the concept of the "community of responsibility" of the two German nations which was originally brought up by SED secretary-general Honecker and subsequently taken up by the chancellor—albeit with a different emphasis.) Singly, these two issues are of only moderate concern to the French. Grosser cited public opinion figures according to which 24 percent of the French population are in favor of neutrality (which is more than in the FRG) while 58 percent are in favor of negotiations and not of nuclear or conventional resistance in case the Red Army marches into France. And as for the fact that the Germans are "once again becoming more German," that is fact of life which a nation that views the national state as an inalienable article of its political faith can accept, albeit grudgingly. It is only when these two issues are viewed as one that they give rise to concern among many people in France. Joseph Rovin labeled this the specter of "national pacifism."

Goettingen historian Rudolf von Thadden pointed out that there is a dual religious motivation underlying the peace movement. It is strongly influenced by Lutheran Protestantism and Pietism and is working for a kind of peace which is "not of this world" and therefore in the final analysis a meta-political concept. It is this very aspect of it which is a cause of concern abroad, as statements by the French participants indicated. It is a French tradition to draw a distinction between political and military matters on the one hand and religious issues on the other. For the French, these issues belong to two different worlds not only by definition as it were but also in fact from a philosophical point of view. The French idea of rationality is based on convictions which have grown out of historical experience to the effect that radical political thought is perfectly acceptable but that political action must be all the more soberly and pragmatically conceived. According to this particular line of reasoning, politics is not the search for ultimate solutions but always the "choice of the lesser evil," as Rovin put it. The suspicion is that the "peace movement" transgresses on this basic rule.

Democratic Rules of the Game

Not only the at times irrational noises emanating from the peace movement are being carefully watched abroad; a growing lack of understanding for the rules under which a representative democracy is supposed to operate is being noted as well. Andre Glucksmann's diagnosis was that there is a virtual "mix-up between democracy and demoscropy." In referring to the public opinion polls stating that two-thirds of the German population are against the deployment of the Pershing II missiles and the outcome of the March election which gave a majority to the very parties who are in favor of modernization, Glucksmann said: "Public opinion polls help a people express express those desires and longings which are not always compatible; but in elections, a people reaches clearcut decisions."

Another thing which worries the French is the "ersatz patriotism" evinced by the peace movement with regard to intra-German relations. Close attention is also being paid to the fact that the dialogue between the two German states has continued substantially unchanged even after the change of the government [in Bonn]. There may be a good deal of understanding for the peculiar situation in which the Germans find themselves; there may even be support for efforts to alleviate the hardships suffered by people in both parts of Germany as a result of the division of the country. But warning voices were raised at the same time not to succumb to the illusion that intra-German relations might remain unaffected during an era of increased East-West tension. When Frenchmen speak out in favor of the right to self-determination and an end to division, they are not only thinking of Germany but of Europe as a whole. Like the citizens of the GDR, the citizens of Poland, of Czechoslovakia and other Eastern nations were hoping for freedom. Reunification was possible only within the context of a European solution, the French and German participants at the symposium agreed.

Europe—the very mention of the word not only provokes ritualistic sighs of disappointment concerning the state of EEC these days but also gives rise to ideas and speculations that would have been unthinkable just a short while back. Again and again, the debate would veer in the direction of a joint European defense concept or at the very least of increased cooperation in security policy and military affairs between the FRG and France. But there are only vague notions about exactly how this is to be achieved. Giscard d'Estaing was quoted as saying that France defends its very existence at the Rhine but its freedom along the Elbe; and there was talk of the need to let the FRG participate in the decision-making processes on nuclear strategy. The reaction of the German participants to these hints (they were no more than that for now) was one of reserve. At any rate, it does seem as though more thought is presently being given in France than in Germany to such issues—even beyond activating the pertinent clauses of the Elysee agreement. The motive behind this may also be to compensate at least in part for the diminished integrative trend within NATO by establishing a firmer link between France and the FRG—including one in the military field and at the same time to take the wind out of the sails of anti-American and pacifist movements (which not only exist in our country).

It was a Frenchman who finally voiced the suspicion which is not to be dismissed lightly that constant doubts concerning Germany's reliability as well as the painful question about German "identity" might not be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy which creates the very disruptions it is designed to remove. It may also be that such a high concentration of experts on Franco-German issues creates an exaggerated sensitivity for problems which are not felt to be as weighty and urgent outside conference halls of this sort. Andre Fontaine pointed out that current public opinion polls indicate that Frenchmen no less than Germans are not too concerned about one another but primarily about their own jobs.

French Security Role Undefined

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 23 Dec 83 p 2

[Article by Kurt Becker: "Anxiety About the 'Unruly Germans'"]

[Excerpts] The open discussion turned out to be a sounding board for all the "misunderstandings" presently existing between the two neighboring nations but which in effect represent deep-seated anxieties with regard to the FRG that have grown up in France over the past 2 years. In pinpointing these concerns, LE MONDE's editor-in-chief Andre Fontaine posed the following questions: What is the German attitude toward democracy? How do they intend to defend themselves? With nuclear weapons? What will the consequences be of the SPD's nullification of the foreign policy consensus which was at least as noteworthy as the government's arms modernization decision? Is reunification the goal the FRG has set for itself?

Without exception, the participants of the forum held in the old Reichstag building were passionately in favor of close Franco-German relations and sincerely advocated urgently needed further development of cooperation between the two governments—particularly in the light of the fiasco at the Euro summit in Athens.

As for arms modernization, the French participants in Berlin unanimously approved of it. Thus, there was no response to the contribution by Philipp Jenninger, the minister of state in the chancellor's office, when he spoke of the chancellor's foreign policy programs being based on continuity. After all, no one there really suspected Helmut Kohl of a foreign policy shift or of concluding secret agreements with the GDR. Instead, the persistent questions of the French participants focused on when and to what extent the German search for national identity which, in their view, was already in progress would lead to tangible results under whoever might be chancellor. Would the Germans turn their back on the West? Would there be a German reunification motivated by pacifism that would lead to neutralism at the same time?

The real concern of the French began with the emergence of the peace movement. The French view its roots as sinister because they cannot come up with a detailed and convincing explanation for its existence in view of the fact that no similar movement has emerged in France. Thus, their interpretation of the phenomenon was narrowed down to the formula—pacifism; anti-Western sentiments; vanished fears of the Soviet Union as posing a threat to freedom and democracy. The German participants offered a number of explanations without, however, agreeing among themselves—such as ersatz patriotism; an increased need for idealistic goals; inwardness of a Protestant coloration combined with skepticism toward government.

The SPD party congress in Cologne served to intensify French concerns aroused by the peace movement even further. It was taken as an alarming sign that Helmut Schmidt and his security policy were pushed to the sidelines. The loss of consensus on security policy might provide a strong impetus to a desire for neutrality in the French view. Social democrat Richard Loewenthal said he was convinced that the SPD leadership which had itself set the security policy shift in motion would also be able to slow the trend down. Still, he voiced greater skepticism than fellow party members Huonker and Boelling who insisted that the SPD was steering a continuous course in defense and alliance policy despite its refusal to vote for arms modernization.

In this context, French security thinking is of paramount importance. In the end, therefore, the discussion returned to issues of common security time and again. There was a French suggestion to provide greater protection against aggression to the Germans as a way of putting an end to their somewhat aimless search for national identity. Alfred Grosser commented on this by saying that "it is hardest of all to work out a common defense." The Giscard thesis "we defend our freedom along the Elbe and our existence at the Rhine" was not disputed by the supporters of Mitterand. But the Berlin symposium did not provide any clarity about why French spokesmen such as Defense Minister Hernu have lately been reviving the idea of a defense system along European lines or why Gaullist presidential aspirant Chirac has been making cryptic references to German participation in a European nuclear force.

French nuclear autonomy and for that matter French autonomy in security policy as such are unshakable. Nonetheless, there are important German questions to be addressed to France. For instance: Under what conditions would France be prepared to view an attack on Western Europe as an attack on its own territory? Where and by what means and at what time would it help defend the FRG? And what role would nuclear weapons play in such a defense? Behind these questions the great and perhaps crucial problem of future cooperation between Bonn and Paris lies hidden.

The official relations between the countries are good; in fact, they still are a lot better than they were 10 years ago. But the Berlin symposium showed that below the government level things seem to have gotten much more difficult and alarming than anyone would have imagined as recently as early this year when the 20th anniversary of the Elysee treaty was being celebrated.

9478
CSO: 3620/129

KOIVISTO AGAIN CRITICIZES PRESS ON HANDLING FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Jan 84 p 11

[Text] In a recent newspaper interview President Mauno Koivisto confirmed the fact that it was hard for him to understand many of the ways the Finnish press operates. He said that he felt that the way the press reports the news is completely incomprehensible and inconsistent and editors are like a swarm of lemmings, each following his respective opinion molder.

"I have no way of knowing in advance where a big issue is coming from in the press and when," the president marveled at and wondered about the ways the press operates.

In an extensive interview by the Swedish-language newspaper ABO UNDERRATTELESER, which is today, Tuesday, celebrating its 160th anniversary, Koivisto went through a whole slew of recent events, the news reporting of which he found it hard to understand.

In his opinion, these were the vote on Grenada, the speech delivered at the University of Toulouse in connection with his visit to France, special assistant Jaakko Kalela's explanation of the misunderstandings produced by the president's UN speech, the statements concerning the Swedish submarine incidents and the criticism directed against the fact that his statements are open to interpretation.

Grenada Vote and Editors

In Koivisto's opinion, the fact that, for example, in connection with the Grenada vote editors demanded detailed arguments in justification of the way Finland voted while, on the other hand, they at the same time demanded that Finland stay out of conflicts between the superpowers are inconsistent with one another. In the president's opinion, such detailed justifications would force him or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to compare the superpowers with one another in these two cases — and that would turn Finland's role into that of a thorn in their sides in conflict situations.

As one example of his criticism of the editors, Koivisto cited the speech he gave in Toulouse during his visit to France, a speech in which he reviewed Finland's periods of independence without specifically mentioning V.I. Lenin.

According to Koivisto, TIEDONANTAJA's editor, who went along on the trip to France, showed interest in a detail that did not appear in his speech, "and there were other editors who began to tag along after him" and made big headlines out of the affair.

Koivisto wondered at the fact that, when he at an Independence Day reception spoke on the same topic — and that time Lenin was included — not a word on it appeared in the newspapers, even though the press was present.

Opinion Molders and a Swarm of Lemmings

"It seems to me that, if some editor latches onto some issue or other, the others follow in his wake. There are apparently opinion molders and the others are like a swarm of lemmings," Koivisto mused. "It's probably the case that journalists, like other people as well, often merely flow with the current. If someone creates a news item, they don't dare run counter to the current."

The president is not overjoyed with the idea either that he occasionally expresses himself in an unclear manner. "It is almost impossible to be specific and more exact. Then, if ever, people might say that I was meddling in an affair of current interest," Koivisto argued.

Koivisto also responded to a critique presented in the Finnish edition of well-known Norwegian journalist Jahn-Otto Johansen's book, "Finland — the Art of the Possible," according to which the Finnish president is often dangerously unclear in his statements.

"He has shown great interest in our country. But he is in any event an outsider. He may not meddle in our internal debate as he has done."

During the interview Koivisto further commented on the criticism of the accusatory edition he presented on his birthday. To the question as to whether that speech was misunderstood, the president replied: "No, not at all."

The president feels that the risks in connection with making an accusation may involve not only the accused, but that all control over behavior must contain "risks in both directions."

Koivisto further said that, if an accusation is unjustifiably leveled, "as far as the accused is concerned, the situation must be restored to what it was before the accusation was made."

An Important Lesson of the President's Term in Office

Despite the unpredictability of the press, the president said that he has peaceful public relations with it. He has been unable to discern any predictable pattern in the way the press reacts to his statements. A debate can sometimes arise because of very unimportant matters.

The president said that he had learned one bit of wisdom from his first year as president: "You should never explain things if that can be avoided — and it should be avoided to the utmost degree."

"From now on I will take care to see to it that no one explains my line of thinking — not even myself."

STALINIST PARTY PAPER ATTACKS 'FOREIGN POLICY OPPOSITION'

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 22 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Foreign Policy Opposition"]

[Text] The foreign policy opposition of the Kekkonen era has not laid down its arms. We have seen this in the debate that stubbornly persisted throughout the fall over Finland's positions on the banning of a preemptive nuclear strike as well as on the occupation of Grenada. In both cases — and especially in the latter case — this was interpreted in conservative circles as our country's having deviated from our strict neutrality policy.

Members of the Commerce and Industry Commission were among the loudest critics. This is no wonder. After all the agency's leaders have closer relations with the West than with perhaps any other capital organization.

Even in Kekkonen's time, the Commerce and Industry Commission criticized the new foreign policy for Finland. The same policy line seems to be continuing during the Koivisto administration as well. The foreign policy debate now in progress and violent in form is aimed at the president, although they have not dared to mention his name aloud.

In foreign policy opposition circles they feel quite clearly disappointed since the change in presidents has not resulted in a change in Finnish policy. Now they take pleasure in picking away at and making a big racket in public about foreign policy mistakes. The same bunch complained loudly against Kekkonen too in the same way. Nothing seems to have changed.

11,466

CSO: 3617/66

STENBACK: COALITION WITH RURAL PARTY, SKDL IS IMPOSSIBLE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Dec 83 p 8

[Text] In the opinion of Swedish People's Party (RKP) chairman Par Stenback, there are in principle no obstacles to a return of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] to the government but, according to Stenback, a precondition would be the Finnish Rural Party's (SMP) moving into the opposition. It is hard to imagine that there would be room for both the SMP and the SKDL in the same government, Stenback said Wednesday on Mustasaari.

"Every government to some extent tolerates unilateral action and the shirking of responsibility, but the presence of these two parties in the government would easily lead to a heightening of the competitive situation and a weakening of the government's ability to function," Stenback said.

According to the RKP chairman, it is wrong to imagine that changes may occur in the government before the municipal elections, "but changes will be possible after the elections depending upon how the elections go for these two parties."

"I am of the opinion that there are in principle no obstacles to a return of the People's Democrats, assuming, however, that their internal problems are shifted to the back burner and that they are ready to make a harmonious, united and responsible contribution to the government.

"The SMP's participation will be resolved through the party's behavior, but obviously the most decisive factor has been the Social Democratic Party's functioning as the SMP's guardian angel," Stenback said.

11,466
CSO: 3617/66

PARTY FIGURE BLAMES U.S. FOR BREAKOFF OF ARMS TALKS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 22 Dec 83 p 7

[Article by Jukka Luoma]

[Text] Moscow—During an interview by the Moscow journal LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published Wednesday, Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen referred to the strengthening of Finland's defense capability against cruise missiles.

Vayrynen was interviewed during his recent trip to Moscow. The remark about preventing cruise missile flights was of the same sort Vayrynen made to Foreign Affairs Minister Andrey Gromyko on his previous visit.

The Center Party's Mikko Immonen also supported the strengthening of international cooperation on Wednesday in the trade union journal TRUD. Immonen said that President Ronald Reagan's government had acted contrary to the demands of reason in the Euromissile issue.

Immonen urged that the Geneva negotiations, which he claimed the United States had broken off, be set in motion again.

11,466

CSO: 3617/66

EDITOR OF NEW COMMUNIST PARTY COMPROMISE ORGAN RESIGNS

Stalinist Paper Decries 'Boycott'

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 22 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Complications of Press Solution"]

[Text] Obstacles in the path of implementation of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Central Committee decision concerning the press reached in September are piling up. The party's new newspaper, YHTEISTYO, has become the object of an actual boycott. They do not want to provide it with sufficient funds. They are also trying to weaken the paper's content by, among other things, letting Arvo Aalto force the paper to print his interviews in opposition to the party line.

As for KANSAN UUTISET, no positive development has occurred. On the contrary, KANSAN UUTISET policy has become even weaker, if that is possible. They have had to admit that this is so in the SKP Politburo too. However, the decision on the press specifically requires a clearcut change in the relationship between KANSAN UUTISET policy and the composition of the editorial staff. If KANSAN UUTISET continues to follow its present course, the press issue will not be resolved.

The solution of the press problem lies in unity and achieving it presupposes a positive change within the party. Arvo Aalto's exhortations to get back into the government in a spirit of historic compromise mean the downright disintegration of the requirements for a solution of the press problem.

Nor are the notices of termination issued at KANSAN SANA positive from the standpoint of a solution to the press problem.

In Pohjois-Hame an agreement between the Communists and the People's Democrats on normalization of the HAMEEN YHTEISTYO situation was concluded. The object of the agreement itself, HAMEEN YHTEISTYO, however, immediately in its most recent editorial tried to interpret the solution in its own peculiar way.

HAMEEN YHTEISTYO interprets the agreement as meaning that, after "a good 10 years of aimless straying from the fold" — presumably referring to HAMEEN YHTEISTYO's having been on the sidelines — HAMEEN YHTEISTYO has now been recognized as the common organ for all Pohjois-Hame organization men. In its

own editorial policy line the paper sees no reason for there having been an earlier abnormal situation, nor any reason for correcting it now.

The Pohjois-Hame agreement supports the Central Committee's September press decision, the heart of which is the establishment of its own organ for the SKP. HAMEEN YHTEISTYÖ has distorted this decision — or, more accurately put, the guidelines presented in the decision for a future proposed decision as to how they are to go from a weekly to a daily — to get rid of TIEDONANTAJA. Interpreting the matter in this way does not correspond to unity with regard to the press decision and it is directed against district organizations' rights to publish on their own.

Those who were counting on the SKP press decision's being as good as smashed to bits and watered down to destroy a united TIEDONANTAJA either did not understand the press decision at all or were deliberately working against the party.

Paper Fails to Attract Subscriptions

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Dec 83 p 9

[Text] The SKP's new newspaper venture, the weekly YHTEISTYÖ, has gotten underway with difficulty: According to even the most optimistic estimate, the paper's circulation amounts to no more than a little over 2,000 and the hiring of editors is progressing even more painfully.

Right now they are arguing in the SKP over expanding the editorial staff with four editors. A settlement of the dispute that has been going on for a couple of months now is expected on Monday when the board of directors of YHTEISTYÖ is to meet.

Designed to solve the SKP's two public problems, YHTEISTYÖ appeared this year as three sample editions, each of which had a printing run of 110,000 copies.

The sample editions were distributed to KANSAN UUTISET, TIEDONANTAJA and KANSAN SANA subscribers and in addition through the district organizations.

YHTEISTYÖ will begin to appear regularly starting with next week. When they start delivering to subscribers, they will try to make circulation figures look impressive by distributing the paper free throughout January to boot, to be sure only to SKP members.

About a month ago YHTEISTYÖ's circulation amounted to over 700 copies, the SKP reported Wednesday. They say that the number of subscribers has increased to over 2,000, although they did not find the exact figure.

The fact that the paper can now only be ordered for a half a year indicates the uncertainty of the venture.

Where Will They Get Editors?

At the present time there are two editors at YHTEISTYO, one of whom, chief editor Paavo Ruonaniemi, is considering the possibility of resigning. According to Ruonaniemi, it has been hard for the paper to find the "right" editors — as far as is known, none of those who were asked at the chief organ of the SKP-SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], KANSAN UUTISET, for example, were willing to switch newspapers.

According to an article by former SKP official, so-called hardliner Uolevi Mattila, which appeared in ILTALEHTI, Ruonaniemi announced his resignation as early as just before Christmas.

According to Ruonaniemi, the information, "at least literally, is not really true." He said that his name would be in the paper, at least it would still be in the issue that is to appear next week.

Just before the board of directors meeting, the parties are keeping their lips sealed with regard to the list of names but, as far as we know, at least one editor from Tampere's HAMEEN YHTEISTYO and one TIEDONANTAJA correspondent are being persuaded to become editors.

Goal Is 12,000

As late as this summer the SKP committee that shaped the solution to the press problem was hopefully planning on a circulation of tens of thousands, but in the fall the board of directors dropped their sights to 12,000 without setting a final deadline to achieve it. In the SKP they optimistically estimate that their goal will be achieved by early spring.

SKP leaders plan to merge the Stalinist organ, TIEDONANTAJA with YHTEISTYO at the party congress to be held next May, after which the publication would become a daily. Chairman Jouko Kajanoja has promised to come up with a proposal on the matter for the Central Committee's February session.

Few people, however, believe that the Stalinists will readily give up TIEDONANTAJA, which is published in eight districts under Stalinist control. According to a radio statement made by that paper's former chief editor, Urho Jokinen, TIEDONANTAJA's fate is not tied to YHTEISTYO or the newspaper to be founded at the party congress.

Since the conventional boundary lines have become obscure, at the SKP they do not want to predict any decision of the YHTEISTYO board of directors. Last week, however, there was a "new distribution of territory" in the SKP Politburo when the Stalinists and Kajanoja's supporters formed an alliance.

Moreover, in the voting the moderates won the new alliance by one vote. Two Stalinist delegates were absent. The vote had to do with certain Lapland and Helsinki district sections' right to participate in the preparations for the party congress.

YHTEISTYO's Editor Quits

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Jan 84 p 8

[Text] Paavo Ruonaniemi, the chief editor of the Communist newspaper YHTEISTYO, has resigned from his duties. The YHTEISTYO board of directors has accepted Ruonaniemi's resignation due to poor health as of 16 January.

The YHTEISTYO board of directors feels that the paper's circulation campaign is off to a relatively good start. It was earlier estimated that the circulation figure would come to from 2,000 to 3,000.

YHTEISTYO has risen as a symbol of the effort to restore harmony to the SKP. The Stalinists have backed the new Central Committee organ, but many moderates have been unfavorably disposed toward the paper because, among other reasons, it will weaken the activities of the chief organ of the People's Democrats and Communists, KANSAN UUTISET.

Circulation problems have also led the moderates to doubt whether it is worth the trouble to bring the whole newspaper project to a decision. Among others, SKP chairman Jouko Kajanoja has staunchly defended the newspaper project.

They had intended to discuss the newspaper venture at the February meeting of the SKP Central Committee and then at the party congress in the spring the paper would be turned into a Central Committee organ appearing 4 times a week.

After that, according to the more optimistic plans for it, the Stalinist TIEDONANTAJA would be merged with the paper. To be sure, Stalinist delegates have already hastened to express the opinion that TIEDONANTAJA will in any event survive.

The board of directors of YHTEISTYO has also expanded the paper's editorial staff and decided to select a new editor for the job in place of Runonaniemi as of 13 January.

11,466
CSO: 3617/64

EX-PASOK MEMBERS PLAN NEW SOCIALIST PARTY

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 15 Dec 83 p 10

[Text] The former 400 cadres of PASOK who dissented and left Mr. Papandreou's party (the known Kargopoulous et al group) have proceeded in creating a new socialist party and have formed the "Socialist Movement."

This came out as a result of an announcement in which it is reported that day after tomorrow, Saturday, there will begin the work of the II Conference of the movement's Central Committee.

Among the subjects on the agenda are the following:

1. The political proposals of the Executive Committee, which will examine the latest international developments, the government's policy and the prospects of the popular movement in general;
2. The discussion on the development and character of Greek society based on proposals by the ideological committee;
3. The proposal of the Organizing Committee, which comprises organizational policy principles, planning of the movement's activities, organizational development, involvement in the mass movements and economy;
4. Briefing on the contacts made with other political forces with the prospect of forming a new political organization and the development of a clear proposal.

It is forecast that the conference will close at noon on Sunday. The resolutions will be made public the same day.

9731

CSO: 3521/139

ND STRATEGY IN PREPARATION FOR EURO-ELECTIONS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Dec 83 pp 1,3

[Text] "New democracy" is being radically renewed while at the same time it is taking effective steps in order to be in a continuous readiness "for elections at any time." ND's estimates for the next electoral contest hold next June as the most probable time for the general parliamentary elections, at the same time as the Euro-elections. Around this landmark ND is staggering its activity and reform, whose first significant expression will be the drawing up of the electoral ticket for Eurodeputy candidates. This subject as well as the overall organizational effort of the ND were discussed during yesterday's meeting of the parliamentary group.

In addition to the statements on the subject made by ND leader, Mr. E Averoff, unimpeachable sources of information of KATHIMERINI report that: The leadership of the ND has decided upon a radical renewal of its electoral ticket for the Euro-elections from which old--veteran--politicians, such as Messrs. Leon. Mournias, Kon. Kalias, Akh. Gerokostopoulos, will be missing (on the other hand, several of these politicians made a specific request that new names be included on the ticket). It held that this class of politicians will constitute a special group that will place at the disposal of the Eurodeputies and the party their priceless and long years of experience. At the same time, the order for the election of the remainder of the deputies will be revised on the basis of what they have contributed by their presence in the Euro-parliament so that the renewal may be more substantial.

On the other hand, yesterday's statements by Mr. Averoff to the Parliamentary Group, in response to remarks by deputies on the subject (I.Varvitsiotis and G. Souflias in particular), were specific:

1. He emphasized his belief that "the result of the elections will depend on the make-up of the ticket."
2. He denied as being most inaccurate and deceitful the reports that circulate that "the ticket will be replete with former diplomats." He emphasized that "he had expressed no opinion to anyone."
3. He promised that the ticket will be drawn up on the basis of strictly merit criteria, after consulting with party officers and deputies as well as his opinion, and added: "I will make an effort to include on the ticket representatives

of workingmen, and representatives of the summit of the party hierarchy as long as they are able to represent us in the Euro-parliament. I sincerely believe that we can achieve this."

The Date of the Elections

Regarding the date for holding the parliamentary elections, Mr. Averoff said:

"I believe that with regard to the date on which the elections are going to be held, no prediction can be made. I know that Mr. Papandreou is under pressure to hold elections immediately because the government cannot control the economic situation, which is continuously worsening. I do not believe that these pressures will have any results.

"Another view is that the elections are going to be held at the time of the Euro-elections. This is more probable.

"A third view is that the elections be held at the end of the 4 years for the purpose, as those who support this view say, of the government taking over all controls and the better part of the economy so that a large portion of the people will come to believe that it cannot live without the government's blessing.

"None of these three possibilities can be excluded. However, what is a fact is that we have a date that is sure: that of the Euro-elections.

"With regard to the electoral system, I do not believe that there is a chance of a two-round election. Something like this is not about to happen."

Ideology and Unity

On the other hand, Mr. Averoff made reference--evidently because of the Manos matter--to the ideology and unity of the party, emphasizing:

"New democracy is a homogeneous party. New Democracy does not have ideological divisions. There are no members who are further to the Right or further to the Left. We are all New Democrats who believe in the radical liberalism handed down by the founder of our party and ratified by the party congresses.

"This ideology of ours is so current and so Greek that 80 percent of the Greeks can feel comfortable with it.

"I am sure that none of us disagrees with these facts.

"There are no ideological differences or other disagreements. I am not talking about splits because I believe that it is impossible for splits to occur. They are inconceivable because of the will of the grassroots! Because the party's grassroots wants us totally united, woe to the one who would dare to disturb this unity. Therefore, what is said and written is beyond the realm of reality."

The Cyprus Issue

Mr. Averoff made reference to the latest developments in the Cyprus issue and to the failure of the EEC summit conference as well as to developments at home.

During yesterday's meeting of the Parliamentary Group--which was the first regular monthly meeting according to the resolution adopted at the 9 November meeting--after Mr. Averoff's introductory remarks, Messrs. K. Mitsotakis, V. Matzoris, A. Tsaldaris, A. Kalatzakos, G. Souflias, I. Varvitsiotis, N. Anagnostopoulos, K. Printzos and D. Vrettakos spoke in turn and made known their views on the subject of preparing for and holding the Euro-elections.

Party Renewal

The radical renewal of the electoral ticket of Eurodeputies was revealed during yesterday's meeting of the Parliamentary Group, both as a demand by the grassroots and a decision of the leadership. From this point of view, political observers note the seriousness of the matter, taking for granted that the same criteria are expected to obtain for the drawing up of the ticket of the candidates of the official opposition party for the general parliamentary elections whenever they may be held.

Electoral Representatives

To the next election is connected--to begin with the Euro-elections--a second significant subject which was discussed yesterday:

Mr. Averoff announced that the drawing up of rosters of electoral representatives has begun and he called on the deputies to participate actively in this work.

It is to be noted that during previous meetings of the Parliamentary Group, the subject of creating a unit of party electoral representatives, who--as a consequence of charges by the ND that PASOK will attempt to use violence and fraud in the next elections--would cover absolutely all electoral districts of the country, was broached.

Yesterday, Mr. Averoff made allusions to the possibility of an attempt to fraudulently influence the results of the forthcoming elections by emphasizing:

"The popular feeling is with us and I do not hesitate to say that if honest elections were to be held today, I am sure that we would obtain more than 50 percent of the vote. This should be our objective in order to be able to meet the coalition of the two other parties."

9731

CSO: 3521/108

COMMUNIQUE ON RESULTS OF KKE PANHELLENIC MEETINGS

Athens I AVGI in Greek 11 Dec 83 p 4, 15

[Communique by the Organizational Office of the KKE-Interior Central Committee, issued on 3 December]

[Text] The organizational conference of cadres from throughout the country was a significant event. A new spirit is beginning to prevail within our party. The problems of political performance and effectiveness were raised in the discussion and progress was made on their solutions. The planning in each KO [Party Organization] for the first 6 months of 1984 will be the first sphere of activity for putting into practice the conclusions and aims of the Panhellenic Organizational Conference. What is needed now is not any additional general discussion, but a practical and specific application in each organization of the findings and objectives of the conference.

Development of Our Activity Under More Favorable Conditions

1. The more general political conditions which are forming 2 years after the accession of PASOK to power are favorable for our party. The impasses in connection with progress toward the Change which arise from the policy of PASOK are causing our own policy to be listened to more attentively by broader masses of people, who are becoming more easily persuaded about the need for strengthening the KKE-Interior as the condition for a change in the political correlations, in order for progress toward the Change to acquire a new dynamics.
2. Our party has taken significant steps with respect to popularizing its policy and projecting it to broader masses. But we have not made qualitative changes in our organizational situation. We are not always effective, and whereas we are developing our relations with the people, we do not always transform these relations into a lasting political bond.
3. Today, what is both essential and feasible is:
 - a) To strengthen the attractive elements in the ideological and political image of our party and to make them more distinct to the people.
 - b) To work toward a more practical political functioning on the part of the KO's, with the immediate objective being a program of political

activity for their sector and the instituting of a regular bi-monthly monitoring of this activity.

The Political Spearheads of Our Activity

4. The prerequisite for such a change in our organization, operations, and activity is a consistent orientation to the masses on the part of the KO's, and the proper ordering and development of their involvement in selected fronts (institutions, public agencies, sectors), with the spearhead being:

- a) Involvement in the labor-union movement, and the strengthening of our positions and our ties with the workers.
- b) Our involvement in the new institutions for representing workers, such as the consultative councils and supervisory councils, as well as the new agricultural associations.
- c) Our involvement in local self-government and especially in its new institutions (districts, neighborhood councils, assemblies).
- d) The continuation of our effort on behalf of developing an independent peace movement.
- e) Developing the movement for resolving the problems of the combatants in the National Resistance.

The Battle of the Euro-elections

5. Our entire political presence and activity in the next 6 months must focus on and assist in the battle of the Euro-elections. More specific tasks for the timely and adequate preparation of the party for this are the following:

- a) A studying by each organization of the 1981 election results, a determination of which circle of voters voted for us, and approaching these voters in a variety of ways, beginning with the popularization and discussion of the election-platform draft.
- b) On the initiative of the Organizational Office, the running of special seminars on Greece-EEC problems in the large metropolitan areas.
- c) The scheduling of a series of political events throughout the country on the subject of our policy on the EEC and Europe.
- d) Utilization of I AVGI as a political link with the community in which we have influence and with our constituency, by means of its projected wide circulation.

The Critical Organizational Problems

6. The party's policy is meeting with broader approval within the organizations and a broader response among the people. What is needed above all today is for us to solve our critical organizational problems at this stage so that we can measure up to the tasks of these times and successfully pursue our objective "to change the correlations on the mass-movement and political levels to the benefit of the forces of the reformist Left." The critical problems are the following:

Organizational Development

The growth of the party in both numbers and breadth in arenas which have not been exploited adequately by our party, such as the rural areas and the premises of large factories and businesses, presupposes:

- A general plan of development aimed at reaching a 30-percent growth by June 1984.
- An individualized plan for each organization, including the drawing up of rolls, lists of personal obligations, and examining the process of enrollment of new members into the party.
- The formation of new KOV's [Base Party Organizations] in the sectors of critical importance.
- Enrollment of new members from the immediate sphere of influence of the KOV's on the basis of the requirements of their by-laws.
- Mobilizing inactive members on the basis of a program for their inclusion in effective activity by way of assigning to them elementary party or public tasks.

With this as its basis, the individualization of the plan aims at the following objectives: KO Athens, 20 percent; KO Salonica, 50 percent; KO Piraeus, 20 percent; with an average percentage for the 50 nomes of 27 percent upon individually applying the plan in each KO.

The conference pointed out the need to support the drive for the growth of the party by the issuing of the requisite informational material.

The Improvement of Performance

We must improve the performance of the organs and the KO's, with our aims being further politicization, greater effectiveness, and finally the formation of the image of a reliable party in the minds of those of the working classes. Indispensable factors in achieving this objective are:

- Strengthening the guiding role and the advisory links between the intermediary guiding organs and the KOV's.
- A mass-oriented structuring of organization on a sectional basis, where this is feasible, the objective being:

To attend to the needs for involvement in the new institutions of local self-government, and involving ourselves in local mass organizations on the basis of specific selections.

To decentralize the operations of the KOV's and their members and to link them more closely with the special problems of each sector.

To monitor better the work done and to better utilize all the members, and to avoid time-consuming proceedings, meetings, and conferences.

- A similar conformation and similar divisions in the KOV office.

The Needs for Cadres

Meeting the needs of the party for cadres by way of an integrated cadre policy having the following elements:

- A bold promoting of officers at all levels on the basis of stipulated criteria, and the development of their ideological and political standing.
- Combating inhibitory perceptions about the necessity for professional officers, and meeting the basic needs of the party at this stage.

For Total Involvement on All Fronts

7. For sake of the unified and systematic involvement of the party in important panhellenic organizations, we are placing our work on a panhellenic basis in the public utility organizations and the organizations of educators, tradesmen and craftsmen, and seamen:

- By the coordination of the party's forces by way of panhellenic conferences.
- By the panhellenization of the trade-union factions in which we participate.

8. More specifically with respect to the development of our work in rural areas:

- a) It is corroborated that we have political opportunities for changing the situation and the party's influence in the countryside, which has been forsaken.
- b) Within the Nome Committee the organizational scheme on rural committees is to be implemented immediately in about half of the nomes and gradually in the others.

Their objective: 1) to put in order and consolidate the scattered forces of the party, and 2) to extend the party's presence to new areas of the nomes--such as the main villages, 3) to help to create new EKON [Greek Communist Youth]-Rigas Feraios organizations.

c) The activity of the organizations is being oriented toward the cooperatives, agricultural associations, and local self-government. The immediate objective: Our organized participation in the elections for the new agricultural associations on a district basis (February-March 1984) and in the elections for neighborhood councils.

d) We are supporting the initiative on the creation of a panhellenic reformist agricultural-union faction.

e) In order to increase our electoral influence in the Euro-elections: Tours and meetings in rural areas have been scheduled, with the greatest possible participation of local cadres, and this will be assisted ideologically and politically by way of 10 key seminars.

The Development of Our Involvement in the Labor Sectors

9. The conference pointed out the difficulties as well as the new opportunities in connection with the development of the party's constructive work by means of organizations and cadres in the factories and in the major sectors involving labor (businesses, hospitals, and so forth).

More specifically, the courses to be taken are:

a) A study will be made on the unification of factory work in the Attiki Plain area.

b) Special groups will be formed in the KO's--depending on their strength and the importance of the industrial outfits in their areas--with the objective being to make contacts and to form organizations in the large outfits above all.

c) On the responsibility of members of the Organizational Office for the corresponding KO's, in addition to the three large cities priority in this constructive work in the factories is also to be given to Ptolemais and Megalopolis, Kavala, Volos, Patrai, and Kalamata, for the purpose of bridging the gap between our trade-union presence and the absence of party organization in the factories.

d) At the end of February 1984, a panhellenic meeting of cadres will take place concerning the new type of unified organizations in the hospitals.

e) The role and responsibility of the AEM [Antidictatorial Labor Front] and of the other reformist union factions must be strengthened on a panhellenic basis.

Raising the Ideological and Political Level

10. The special importance of the ideological work within the party is being emphasized right away, with a 4-month program (December-March) of special discussions in the KO, where the subjects are:

- a) The labor-union movement in Greece.
- b) Peace and contemporary pacifist movements.
- c) The democratic way, socializations, self-government.
- d) Greece, Europe, and the EEC.

RIGAS Our Ongoing Concern

11. At the conference, stress was placed on the great importance and urgent character of the measures needed to provide for more stable and more functional relations with the organizations of EKON-Rigas Feraios and to build youth organizations where they do not now exist, on the responsibility and initiative of the KO's.

In the service of these objectives:

- a) Measures will be outlined immediately for reestablishing regular and mutual cooperation between the party organs and RIGAS and coordination in their work.
- b) EKON-Rigas Feraios is proceeding with a Panhellenic Organizational Conference early in 1984, to the success of which the party will also make a contribution, by highlighting and offering solutions to the problems it will be concerned with.
- c) We must give serious thought to the great electoral importance the youth will have in the upcoming Euro-elections, and we must make plans together with RIGAS for this particular aspect of our election campaign.

The useful political and organizational conclusions and the optimistic and competitive spirit which prevailed at the Panhellenic Organizational Conference will be passed on to all the KO's and will contribute decisively to the comprehensive preparation by our party for the great political battles which are in store for us.

12114

CSO: 3521/130

ASSESSMENT OF PAPANDREOU-KARAMANLIS RELATIONS

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 6 Nov 83 p 4

[Text] Public speeches, headlines and newspaper reports; the announcement by the deputy minister for Press of the presidential "entreatment" not to comment on the meetings of the president with the premier; reports of the political behind-the-scenes, making the rounds of newspaper offices, have created the impression that, for the first time since the 1981 elections, there is a "heavy cloud" over the relations of the administration with the president of the Republic.

Perhaps appearances may be deceiving; perhaps it is a matter of the distortions created by the magnifying glass which is constantly focused on the presidential palace and the Maximou mansion; perhaps it may also be an occasional raising of the known--and taken for granted--difference in views between the two top state figures that nevertheless has not prevented the smooth functioning of post-dictatorial democracy during the past 2 years in which the president and the premier are not members of the same political party. The amazing fact of the harmonious coexistence of the two politicians was highlighted last year in Athens by French President, Francois Mitterrand, being seated between Konstandinos Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreu at the state dinner in his honor.

However, this is too good to be true, "today at the most decisive turn of Change," when we hear in various ways the haunting question, "Who is governing?"; when we read about the threat of a constitutional crisis towards which "the Junta-rightists, but also--perhaps--some harebrained progressives are pushing (L. Kyrkos, AVGI, 23 Oct.) and when we observe public indications such as that, in order to obtain an unclouded political life, the government must decide now to back Karamanlis' candidacy during the presidential election in May 1985, otherwise, the suspense about who the new president will be will have a negative influence and will alter the contents and the results of the political elections such as the Euro-elections in June. This is the first interpretation of the tension of the past 20 days which is based on the assumption that, in order for the young republic to function, it is necessary not to disturb the basic balance expressed by the "twin" statesmen, Karamanlis and Papandreu.

This requires sacrifices or, to speak in political terms, it presupposes that there continues to exist the possibility of a lessened opposition or, at least,

essentially commonly acceptable solutions at the president-premier level. However, here we run into two types of difficulties.

The first difficulty involves the past. The administration, in order to justify its policy and present its work, feels the need to compare it to the past, a past that is connected with the person of Mr. K. Karamanlis. The comparison often takes the form of very serious charges of either concealing national matters or scandals in the management of public money. Thus, situations are created that poison politics.

The second difficulty involves the present. The president of the Republic is the direct target of the accusations by the party from which he comes that he does not react to the "undermining" work by PASOK. This has led certain observers to predict that Mr. K. Karamanlis will retire from politics at the end of his term and devote himself to the continuation of his work. Reports, confidential remarks made by him and even "logical" analyses are quoted, according to which Mr. K. Karamanlis, with his unerring political feeling, came to realize, from the moment he took over the presidency, that his era had come to an end. Knowing that the "state is based on the leader of the majority, that is, on the premier, 'the chancellor' (Mr. K. Tsatsos' expression at his last meeting with political reporters as president of the Republic) would prefer a glorious departure to being converted to a mere symbol of the state."

According to this version, regardless of whatever is engineered around us, the tension of the past few weeks reflects the intensification of the political struggles or even the "soccer nature" of our political life; it is also possible that it may be paving the way for the roughness of the Euro-elections or for other scenarios of political developments in 1984, but it does not create a major problem. On the other hand, in practice, there is no upheaval in the general premises of the post-dictatorial foreign policy capable of leading to a contest, but to a different handling of the problems by a non-Rightist administration.

However, policy lies not only in general premises; it is practical handling. Many times the impasses are also created by the climate alone that is fostered and does not end where it began.

Even if Mr. Karamanlis is not influenced by the "great fear" of today's Right to remain in the opposition for many years, it appears that he is influenced by the pressure of the problems--especially of the economic one--which now forces the government to resort to talking about scandals and to denounce conspiracies by the Establishment. At this point, there is the latent danger--as some maintain--of a rush to clear "the obstacles which will not permit the completion of Change," with unforeseeable consequences. Unless the undersigned and some others have lost touch with reality, and if the long years of suffering the Leftist influence, have clouded our thoughts so much that we do not understand that we are on solid ground and that the government, together with the people, is striking at the many-tentacled domestic and foreign Establishment" successfully, if we are wrong in estimating that--no matter how things are--the "historical agreement" between a real K. Karamanlis and a real Andreas Papandreou cannot be overcome by forcing history with artful dilemmas, but rather through the consolidation of the institutions of an ever more open democracy.

KKE OFFICIALS DISCUSS EEC, EURO-ELECTIONS

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 9 Dec 83 p 3

[Interview with KKE Eurodeputies V. Efraimidis and T. Adamos, by Kiki Angelopoulou and other journalists]

[Text] [Question] What are your assessments as to the future of the EEC, following the failure of the summit conference and in view of the Euro-elections in June 1984?

V. Efraimidis: The dominant forces in the EEC sector and correspondingly in each member country will show up with proclamations on "European unity." They will support the "united political existence of Europe" as a means for its economic recovery. Nevertheless it is a fact that no matter what changes or reforms are made, they will lead to new burdens for the workers of Europe. As long as it survives, the EEC will drag along with it its disgraceful existence. We believe that a proclamation on its self-dissolution does not suit the potentates of Europe. Consequently the problem is what each member country--and thus Greece in the present case--will do separately to exploit the conflicts among the great monopolies and the relaxing of the EEC's laws and regulations which these conflicts entail, in order to develop its activity also outside the framework of the Community. It is an opportunity for our country to act more easily and more conveniently on the basis of its own policy.

T. Adamos: It is worth pointing out that in the face of the suspense which is gripping all the EEC committees and councils in view of the Euro-elections, it is characteristic that they are hastening to make various decisions which will be used as ammunition in the election campaign, regardless of the practical importance of these decisions.

More Dumping

[Question] In your opinion, what will be the consequences from the restructuring of the Joint Agricultural Policy?

V. Efraimidis: By the way that the Joint Agricultural Policy has been implemented up to now and by the way that the discussions are taking place on its restructuring, it is clear that we should expect more adverse consequences, especially for our own country. That is, more dumping, a

decline in production, an elimination of the traditional foreign-exchange producing crops, and even a greater reduction in the outlets to the markets of other countries.

[Question] Next Monday the government will give its report on its chairmanship to the session of the European parliament. What do you believe will be the reaction of the various political groups which take part in this?

V. Efraimidis: In our opinion, the various political groups will take the same position which they had up to now on all the Community problems and more general international problems.

More specifically with respect to the Greek chairmanship, there had been previous attacks from the first moment that the government assumed its duties, both in connection with Community matters and concerning public affairs more generally. We recall the unjustifiable treatment which was given to Minister of Foreign Affairs Kharalambopoulos both in the political committee and in the session of the European Parliament, especially regarding the positions which our country holds on the missile issue.

Despite what was stated in this body following the conclusion of the session, about the successful conducting of the proceedings, about good organization, and so forth, it is not certain that even the attacks from this session will disappear. Perhaps the big shots went too far here in Athens for them to maintain subsequently that nothing was accomplished with the Greek chairmanship. But in fact, this attacking is just an excuse. Because the great problems which they ignored during the 3-day proceedings of the session could have been discussed.

Challenge to a Televised Dialogue

[Question] What are your expectations for the Euro-elections in June?

V. Efraimidis: The political thesis of the KKE can be summarized as follows: There will be a struggle to repudiate the adverse consequences encountered on the way toward the disengagement of our country from the EEC. On the basis of this political thesis the KKE has begun certain organizational and informational preparations. And--on this occasion--we issue a "challenge" for discussions to be held on television, so that the people can be informed in a responsible and proper manner both about the EEC itself and about the positions of each political force.

We believe that the confirmed consequences of our accession and the political judgment handed down by our people will lead to the strengthening of the KKE forces. And the strengthening of the KKE forces is not just a narrow party advantage. The growth of the KKE is the ingredient, the factor which will help to promote the interests of our people. It is also a source of support for every government which would like to contend for and negotiate for the promoting of the country's special interests.

Cost of Staying is Heavy

[Question] A short time before the summit conference commenced, the premier had maintained in his interview with the TIMES that a disengagement from the EEC would cost the same as--or, according to another version, more than--what it cost for the country's accession to this. What is your own view?

V. Efraimidis: I believe that what is most important today is for us to see what our accession is costing at the present moment. And the data which we have concerning the foreign balance and the agricultural balance are discouraging, since they show that the prospects are for the situation to worsen even more. I believe that it is unacceptable for us to brandish about the possible costs from a disengagement, in order to conceal the cost of our staying. But are there really any costs from disengaging? If so, what will they be? Is it the case that with the withdrawal of the country the economic exchanges with the EEC will be discontinued? But the EEC is seeking markets even in the stratosphere. It is to the interests of the potentates to maintain their markets in all the countries of the world. The difference will be that a Greece outside the EEC will have the opportunity to do business with it not under the terms imposed by the monopolies, but under equal and mutually advantageous terms. Perhaps there will be a political cost? The defenders of the EEC cite each time the political benefits of the accession. However, so far we have not seen the EEC working on behalf of the political interests of Greece. The disheartening example is the attitude which the EEC held vis-a-vis the problem of Cyprus even before the proclamation of the pseudo-state of Denktas. It limited itself at all times to verbal condemnations, without ever going on to concrete practical measures. Consequently, this disengagement will have even a political benefit for the country, because Greece--when relieved of the obligation to go along with the decisions of the potentates of the West and to accede to the procedures of political integration--will have the opportunity to chart and to implement a non-aligned foreign policy at the present time above all, when plans are being pushed forward for the political integration of Europe.

12114

CSO: 3521/130

COMMENT COMPARES PASOK TO POST-WAR DOGMATIC LEFT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24 Nov 83 p 5

[Text] The military and political defeat suffered by the doctrinaire Left in the 1945-49 Civil War was not considered, by the dogmatics of the line-up of the victors, a sufficient blow against their ideological adversaries. It was necessary for those adversaries to be defeated morally as well! The best way to succeed in this endeavor was the choice of forcing those who were not demonstrably "nationalist" to sign the famous "repentance declarations," by which they rejected communism. According to the logic of the victors of the national-purification method, the size of the moral defeat suffered by the KKE was measured by the numbers of these declarations!

The trials suffered in the social and professional lives of those who refused to sign the declarations were indescribable. It was, therefore, justifiable for these men to hate those who subjected them to hard trials, mainly financial, no longer on the basis of ideological opposition, but as their own personal enemies. Despite all of this, the hatred toward the "bourgeois Establishment" of those who refused to sign cannot even be compared, in intensity and depth, to that felt by the so-called "declaration signers."

The latter unremittently hated the then victors, not because due to them, they had lost their jobs as well as the possibility of living without daily fear and mental anguish; they did not lose these; but because they had lost their own self-esteem! No one wants to be humiliated, to appear to be a coward in his own eyes. It is possible that later they may have found that what had attracted them to communism had no connection with "living socialism," that the failure to impose a communist regime in Greece was to their advantage and not only to the "Rightists." The personal trauma, however, remained unhealed. The denial of expectations does not constitute an excuse for the loss of self-esteem!

Our political life would be substantially different; national unanimity, which everyone is trying to find as a rare blessing, would be reality if, from the political confrontations, no matter how violent they may have been, the moral wounds of hundreds of thousands of citizens had vanished. And how true this was was demonstrated immediately after the dictatorship when there began the building here also, with inevitable delays, omissions and reactions of a state without party or ideological preconceptions. The memories of the "moral" war also began to fade.

Then, with the elections of 18 October, came PASOK's political victory, recorded as a victory by the entire Left. It was a victory whose authenticity and democratic legality was undisputed! However, this political victory was not sufficient for the new "victors." It had to be a moral one as well! It had to be accompanied by the forcing of the ideological adversary to recant--in turn--his political, ideological preferences. If he refused to do it, he would give up any hope of being able to have a career based on his knowledge and ability!

The slogan, "Now, let's bury the Right," meant nothing else but the persecution of the rightists, the prohibition for the government and its organizations to hire anyone whose candidacy was not proposed by some branch of PASOK. It also meant the terrorizing of all those who do not belong to the "victors'" camp so that they would not dare to disagree with the "branch cadres."

This is the new, the socialist edition of the "repentance declarations," which have only one difference from their original models in that they do not require the rejection of the party to which one belongs, but require joining the party in power! They are no less demeaning than the previous ones if they force the public rejection of what one believes in order to allow one to work and receive recognition.

The persecution penetrates private enterprise activities. Even there one "cannot find a job" if one is not a PASOK protege. The "Right" must be "buried" everywhere! Everyone is forced to make "repentance declarations"!

Mr. Papandreou's "movement" chose, as the best way to consolidate its electoral victory, the one that divided the nation after a civil war. It believes that in this way it will be able to lay its hands on the labor organizations, to control the economy, to neutralize all opposition for the perpetuation of its authority. It did not learn anything, absolutely anything, from the most foolish and anti-democratic past!

9731

CSO: 3521/109

LIST OF ND EURO-ELECTION CANDIDATES

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 8 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] Initial names for New Democracy Party candidates for the ticket of the European Parliament elections in June 1984 have begun to be discussed, and preparations for these elections on the part of this large democratic and liberal faction were preoccupying its Parliamentary Group yesterday. In its session, E. Averof expressed his conviction that in fair elections the ND would get more than 50 percent! The chairman of the ND referred to the pressures which are being exerted on Papandreou by his associates to proceed immediately to elections, but in Averof's judgment the conducting of the general elections along with the European Parliament elections in June "is more likely."

The criteria which should be operative in choosing prospective Eurodeputies were raised during the discussion in the Parliamentary Group. I. Varvitsiotis insisted on the need for new blood and for the candidates' activity on behalf of the ND to be assessed, and similar views were expressed also by:

A. Kalandzacos, G. Souflias, A. Xarkhas, D. Vrettakos, and other deputies. In response the chairman of the ND stressed that he will take into consideration the opinions of all his colleagues, but that he himself will make the final choice strictly on criteria of merit. Of course, he will also pay attention to the party activity of the candidates. He will try to have on the list a range of candidates, from spokesmen of the laborers to representatives from the top of the hierarchy. Averof characterized as extremely inaccurate the rumor that the list will be inundated by the names of former diplomats.

In fact, among the names which are being discussed are also those of the retired ambassadors V. Theodoropoulos, I. Tzounis, M. Oikonomidis, D. Kosmadopoulos, K. Stavros, and N. Kambalouris--of whom it is believed that one or two will be included on the ticket. Of the present Eurodeputies, two or three will be candidates again (Evstr. Papaevstratiou, K. Gondikas, and probably M. Protopapadakis). Further inclusions on the list will be one of the women who are current national deputies, Anna Psarouda-Benak or Fani Petralia-Palli. Also being mentioned are the names of the former

deputy minister and journalist, Takis Lambrias, the members of the Administrative Committee, V. Manginas and Str. Stratigis, the former deputy G. Dalakouras, the chairman of the EVEA [Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry], L. Efraimoglou, the former elected chairman of the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor], Kh. Karakitsos, and others.

12114

CSO: 3521/130

PAPANDREOU CONSIDERS MINISTERIAL COUNCIL CUTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 Dec 83 pp 1,3

[Text] The premier, Mr. A. Papandreou, is studying, according to reports, a severe limitation of ministerial and vice-ministerial portfolios. Evidently there is a clear intention to limit the ministries and vice-ministries which PASOK had increased to the impressive number of 52 and raised, at the same time, bureaucratic rate of the administrative machinery, to less than 20.

Most probably these structural changes will coincide with the extensive reform rumored to take place after the holidays. According to the same sources, the Ministry of Commerce is among the ministries being considered for abolishment, while certain of its agencies will be placed under the Ministry of Industry and these changes may include the Ministry of Merchant Marine as well.

Government sources revealed that through the intercession of Mr. Papandreou the improved relations between Messrs. Arsenis and Roumeliotis will most probably result in the taking over, by the former deputy minister of Finance, of the Vice-Ministry for the EEC to be created. However, Mr. Roumeliotis and Mr. Varfis are also in the running for the position of the Greek delegate in Brussels to replace Mr. G. Kondogeorgis. Political circles connected Mr. Papandreou's intention to limit the ministries and vice-ministries with the recognition of the malfunction of the administrative machinery and the overlapping of jurisdictions that created frictions between the members of the government because of the multitude of ministers and deputy ministers. In addition, it is said that Mr. Papandreou can thus curb the pressures to "take care" of many of his cadres with ministerial portfolios.

9731

CSO: 3521/108

ACTIVITIES, OFFICIALS IN GREEK COMMUNIST YOUTH

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 27 Nov 83 p 2

[Text] The 3rd Congress of the KNE [Greek Communist Youth], which will convene in Athens from 14 to 18 December, will be--according to all indications--"co-ordinated," without political surprises and spectacular changes in leaders. It is expected that the nearly one thousand participating members and "permanent observers," members and cadres of the KNE from all over the country, who will meet in the "Party House" (the new KKE offices in Perissos), will approve the proposal of the Central Council (whose spirit and basic points have already been specified in the "posture" text of the KS [Central Council] that was made public 3 months ago) and will elect the new KS in which the changes of individuals will be numerically limited and, in any event, without political significance.

In the meantime, there is a pre-congress movement and it lends itself to drawing a rough draft of the present identity of the KKE's youth based as much on the data and materials that it officially makes public as on unofficial (but reliable) information.

With significant organizational development and influence worthy of note, the KNE is today a political force that must be reckoned with and, of course, the "well-cared-for child" of the party. Politburo member and KKE deputy Mr. Grigoris Farakos, has the responsibility of party supervision and, more specifically, of the "political guidance" of the KNE.

At the summit of the organizational pyramid of the communist youth is the Central Council Office, a 16-member "collective leadership" which guides its activities. It is headed by 36-year old Mr. Spyros Khalvatzis, worker. The regular members of the Office are as follows:

Mr. Giorgos Grapsas, 30, worker, alternate member of the KKE's Central Committee, is responsible for the "worker and working youth."

Mr. Sifis Konstandis, 30, worker, alternate member of KKE's Central Committee, organizational secretary of the KNE's Makedonia-Thraki region.

Mrs. Maria Damanaki, 30, chemical engineer, KKE deputy, responsible for student youth.

since its 2nd Congress to date. This growth (which is net and does not include KNE members who moved on to the KKE) comes mainly from the worker's sectors.

Despite this, "the special plan for the 2nd Congress for the KNE build-up in the factories and work places was not totally implemented," as reported in the posture report of the KS. Thus, the efforts of the KNE in this direction (which always remain the "number one priority" to recall the "proletarian character of communist youth") are continued and expanded. Cadres with this special responsibility and the new rush "for the recruiting of new members in the KNE" (mainly from the workingmen's sectors) are placed in the guiding organs.

Special importance is also given to the growth of the organization's forces among the students (which are estimated to be secondary if not co-equal with the first objective).

Finally, certain organizational rearticulations have already been carried out in the large district organizations while others are being investigated. In the Athens organization (which comprises the First and Second Electoral Districts of the capital) as well as in Salonica and the student sector, the "Sections" were broken down to smaller ones, while the same thing happened to many "basic organizations." The purpose of this measure is to restore a more flexible structure where every organization will have broader area to maneuver and direct contact in its area of responsibility. This because the excessive numerical growth of certain organizations had led to an enormous increase in size that hampered the functional liaison for the guiding organs with the KNE members as well as (and in a wider sense) with the youth of each district.

With the same reasoning and for the same reasons, the proposal to split in two (or even in three) the "hydrocephalic" Athens organization is presently under consideration. This decision is not considered simple and presents significant difficulties. In any case, however, such a plan is not going to move prior to the congress and, in the end, its implementation will depend upon whether the KKE will also implement a similar division in the KOA [Party Organization of Athens].

But the identity of a political youth organization would, of course, be "faceless" if it did not have its "political brand," especially at a time when it is intensely preparing for its congress.

In the "posture," then, of the KS, the defined political coordinates do not differ from what is already known nor do they deviate from the KKE's political estimates. It is pointed out that "the question of change is at a critical juncture. The youth which fought on the people's side to oust the Right does not see any change in its life and the course of things in the country." Further on it is emphasized that the "3rd Congress of the KNE will keep the flame for change burning among the youth." A "program of real change for youth" which is composed of "packages of measures" in all areas in the lives of young people is being proposed. The assurance of work, education and recreation.

With regard to the KNE's objectives, it is mentioned in the "postures" "that the worker and working youth must become the basic force within the youth movement" and its development "in the factories and work places" is designated as

Mr. Angelos Khagios, 33, chemical engineer, municipal councilman of Athens, responsible for KNE's weekly newspaper ODIGITIS.

Mr. Sifis Kavkalas, 29, topographer, responsible for the university students.

Mr. Khristos Tolis, 31, assistant engineer, Athens KNE organizational secretary, and Messrs. Angelos Karaindos, 27, clerk, and Takis Gerolymatos, 26, worker, who are also cadres of the Athens organizational office.

Messrs. Dimitris Kondofakas, 30, economist, Takis Sembos, mathematician, and Kostas Papasotiriou, 27, university student, who direct regional organizations.

Mr. Mbambis Angourakis, 32, electrical engineer, responsible for international relations.

Mrs. Nandia Valavani, 28, economist, responsible for "ideological and enlightenment work."

There are, finally, the two alternate members of the KS Office: Mrs. Eleni Papaevthimiou, 29, biologist, responsible for cultural and recreational affairs of youth. Mr. Dimos Foundalis, 31, assistant engineer, who is involved in "ideological work."

It is not expected that the congress will effect significant changes in this leadership nucleus of the KNE. It is, of course, considered sure that (as always happens in similar proceedings) certain KNE cadres will "move on" to the KKE, to reinforce the intervention of the party in critical areas (where it is judged that "there is increased need") and because, at the same time, their age is rather "advanced" for the youth organization. Amongst them there will also be, in any case, some members of the KS Office: in this regard, the names of Messrs. Angelos Khagios and Takis Sembos as well as Mrs. Maria Damanaki are mentioned. On the other hand, it does not seem probable (without anything being categorically excluded) that Mr. Spyros Khalvatzis would be transferred to another party position and it is said that he will remain for another 4-year term (the second in a row) as secretary of the KNE.

Beyond the biographical data of its cadres, the data that describe the composition and disposition of its forces are characteristic of the identity of the KNE. Thus, of the KKE's youth membership, 37 percent are workers and clerks; 25 percent, high school students; 18 percent, university students and 10 percent graduate students (a total of 53 percent of the KNE's members belongs to the "student youth"). Women constitute 40 percent of its forces.

With regard to the distribution of the KNE's members in the different regions of the country, it is noted that much more than 50 percent of its overall forces are concentrated in the organizations of the large urban centers. After the 1981 elections an effort was begun to improve the situation somewhat in the countryside and to develop its organizations (a process that still has a lot of ground to cover until the "empty spaces" and "weaknesses" that are evident today have disappeared).

The most impressive element, however, with regard to the KNE's organizational identity is the 25 percent increase in membership in the intervening years

the basic premise for it. In addition, the need to confront "the strong attack for the ruling class against the students," but, more generally, the "effort of corruption of the young people's conscience" is emphasized.

Finally, the need to strengthen the organization's ideological activity is put forth especially "around youth's everyday problems" so that "the youths may be freed of the concern for the impasses of the attainable and the compromise with the Establishment by reformist self-deception and revisionist perceptions." Together with these reports of "ideological purity" the "openings" which take place are felt as well as they now express views on subjects such as love relationships between the two sexes, the phenomenon of solitude, mental anguish and insecurity that affect the young people of our times.

One way or another, however, these "postures" seem to be generally accepted by the members and cadres of the organization. Both in the public pre-Congress dialogue and in the internal process, the general political framework is not contested and no "platforms" along other lines of thought have appeared. Rather, in the 150 articles published until now, an "exchange of experiences" and "critical observations" on the aspects of action are made while the views about a different policy or (even more) political enlightenment (that were so much in evidence both at the 11th KKE Congress and the previous, 2nd Congress of the KNE) are lacking. Even the pre-Congress District Organizations conferences that have taken place until now (those left are: Athens; Athens-Student, and Makedonia-Thraki), the "postures" of the KS were nominally approved by the representatives.

Without any smoldering clashes being observed, then, and without the presence of "dissenting political reason," the 3rd KNE Congress will confirm (as it appears) its up-to-the-present course and it will examine with the same looking-glass its tactics for the future in the "new situation in the country that the exercise of PASOK's administration is shaping."

9731

CSO: 3521/108

RANGE OF VIEWS ON NEW ELECTORAL LAW

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 10 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] The matter of the electoral law came before the Chamber of Deputies yesterday on an interpellation by the KKE, but the government refused to give a clear answer on the form of the simple proportional vote which it had promised it would submit to a vote in the Chamber of Deputies in 1985... In his remarks, ND parliamentary representative, Mr. Kon. Mitsotakis, emphasized that the indecision of the electoral law does not help the country's political life and the introduction of such a bill on the eve of the elections is totally unacceptable.

Interior Minister, Mr. G. Gennimatas, in repeating often that the "right time has not yet come" for the electoral law, said that the administration has neither "broken its word" nor "abandoned" the simple proportional vote and is in favor of the firm system of the simple proportional vote.

Continuing, the minister spoke about the various "systems" of simple proportional vote and promised that the next elections will be held on the basis of the data of the population census of 1981. He also said that, in 1985, a short time before introducing the electoral bill in the Chamber of Deputies, the bill will be given to the parties to examine.

Finally, Mr. G. Gennimatas said that the electoral law is not a matter of immediate priority for the administration, which does not wish to create a climate of "election talk." He added that, at present, the government is concerned with serious national problems.

In his reply, Kr. K. Mitsotakis said that the minister should not invoke national problems because their seriousness demands national unanimity, based on the premise that the written and unwritten rules of the political game be kept. One of these rules is the electoral system.

The parliamentary representative of the ND emphasized that the ND believes that the reinforced proportional system that exists today is the best law and added:

"For the government to put on hold the electoral law as a sword of Damocles over the head, not so much of the official opposition which is not afraid of any law because it has a large following, but over that of the rest of our political world, is unacceptable, both morally and politically, but it also poisons and endangers

the unity which one way or another--and I do not wish to touch on other subjects nor to heighten the tension in the present climate--is endangered by the government's entire policy."

And Mr. Mitsotakis emphasized:

"I wish to call attention to a very deep suspense that the PASOK administration consciously maintains, when it is reported daily in the press and is not doubted by anyone and no responsible government official has denied it, that the government is considering ~~strange~~, last-minute electoral fraud systems on two Sundays, or something similar. I was glad to hear that even the KKE is against this view and, needless to say, that we, Mr. Minister, are absolutely against any electoral fraud system that is cut to your specifications, which you will attempt to impose at the last minute. At the same time, we say that the fact that you are keeping up this suspense for so long is poisoning and damaging political life."

KKE deputies, Messrs. Nik. Kalondis and K. Kappos, in their interpellation, criticized the administration because it has not fulfilled its verbal commitment, which it had made when it was the opposition, to push forward the simple proportional vote as the country's electoral system and the establishment of a firm electoral system, they said, that will allow the parties to elect as many deputies in proportion to the votes received and "are closely connected to the smooth course of political life."

Minister Gennimatas observed that, in view of the fact that the simple proportional vote will be put into effect during the next elections, it is completely unimportant as to when the bill will be voted upon. Finally, in response to a question on the subject by Mr. Mitsotakis, he said that the matter of the abolishment of the preferential cross vote is now the law of the land and there is no open question for the government.

9731

CSO: 3521/109

FORMER ND MINISTER CALLS FOR COMPREHENSIVE FOREIGN POLICY

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 11 Dec 83 p 16

/Article by Miltiadis Evert, ND deputy from Athens and former minister/

/Text/ The last act in the Cypriot tragedy with its side effects as well as the dangerous international situation that is appearing around us make it imperative that a long-term and realistic foreign policy be shaped. A policy that would not be influenced by dogmatic and ideological biases and one that would not be changed with each succeeding development in domestic conditions so as to serve short-term party interests. Rather they would realistically serve the long-term interests of the nation and the people.

If all of us had realized this truth we would have avoided making many of the mistakes that have been made. During the critical moments through which we are going it is of no importance who is right or who is wrong. What is of importance is that we realistically see without any bias and on a long-term basis what can be done from now on.

The errors of yesterday will be judged objectively by historians. We, however, are obliged to look upon the now and above all the tomorrow. And if we do look back, let us do so merely to avoid repeating our errors of the past.

Almost all of us agree that the central pivots that should determine a national foreign policy are the following:

a. The safeguarding of national independence, the territorial integrity of the fatherland and national dignity.

This means the existence of strong armed forces that are to be complimented with secure diplomatic supports. It also means the existence of national unity that forges the internal front and develops the armed force of the country.

b. The development of international relations that will permit the forging of close ties of friendship and cooperation with all countries of the world regardless of their social, ideological and economic systems.

We must also agree that an independent foreign policy does not mean that we remain exposed and neutral in international rivalries. It does not mean that we should remain outside of every alliance and to promote a refusal --in advance-- to enter any kind of international relations system.

It does, however, mean that we ourselves and nobody else should decide if and where we are to belong, of and with whom we are to cooperate, to what extent and for how long.

In other words, we accept in principle our participation in international unions, economic, political, military ones, in which we have an equal presence. And, of course, we reject any alliance that is based on subordination and one-sided discipline.

The Indispensable Choice

Greece, in the face of the West-East-Third World triptych, in the face of international developments that lead to an increase in political, economic and military formations, does not have the capability of an unlimited choice. We are located at a critical crossroads where ideological and political currents meet and are taken into account. The West, the East and the Third World.

The Third World is an area to be taken into account. In the Middle East, Africa and the Persian Gulf, the so-called nonaligned countries fight each other and then end up asking for protection from the big powers. They thus become easy prey in the strategic plans of the powerful.

Under the continuous burden of international rivalry, the nonaligned arena becomes "neutral" in name but aligned in reality. And we should not forget that local conflagrations constitute an endemic situation in the Third World. And this situation does not appear to be changed during the coming decade.

All those who talk about the neutrality of Greece consequently forget that something like that could present us with frightening dangers from friend and foe alike, without, indeed, having any substantive benefit as a counterbalance.

I believe that the conclusion is reasonable. It would be an error to endanger our national security that constitutes the basic goal of our foreign policy for the sake of some apparent and uncertain neutrality being offered by the Third World.

Moreover, Greece's joining the Eastern World is out of the ideological concept of the two major parties given the fact that in the countries of this alliance the meaning of popular sovereignty and national independence is downgraded.

And even if our orientation toward the Eastern World were to be decided upon, once again the fate of such a policy would be condemned because of the world correlation of forces in our critical region.

To safeguard its national independence and territorial integrity, our country does not have the right to ignore these truths that are historically proven.

Just as it cannot ignore the fact that foreign policy must be practiced outside of every form of romanticism or bias. Basically, its goal must be the proper anticipation and appreciation of the international correlation of forces.

The Western World

After all of this, the Western World remains as the only place to which Greece can belong. And the need for this remains despite the disappointments that Greece has suffered from time to time during its history. Indeed, perhaps these disappointments would have been worse and nationally more destructive if we had belonged to other alliances. Besides this, however, there are three other factors that advocate our country's belonging to the Western World.

a. Security: Greece is located in a critical region where interests with strategic ambitions clash. Consequently, security is of interest to Greece that safeguards national independence and territorial integrity.

As we mentioned before, however, the Western World can provide this security without, of course, this meaning that by joining it we revoke the general goals of national and multi-dimensional foreign policy that is the development of friendly ties with all countries of the world and especially neighboring ones, independent of ideological, racial or cultural differences.

b. Ideological Identification: In the West, national independence and popular sovereignty are safeguarded and human rights and personal freedoms respected. Only in the Western World do the people decide without pressure, fear or coercion on the way the country is to be governed, within a pluralistic system and in accordance with the democratic principle of the majority.

c. Economic Progress: Greece ensures its economic development within the broader community of western countries, and especially within the European Community.

The nature of Greek products, the capability of their being absorbed, the indispensable investment resources and high technology can be secured only in the Western World.

The European Community

This last factor makes necessary the development of close economic relations with the West and more specifically with the EEC. This is so because Greece is a country with a limited population, with insufficient wealth-producing resources, with a lack of high technology and with insufficient investment resources.

This singularity contributes to the adoption of a strategic economic development that must aim at the development of those fields that are characterized as comparatively profitable and at the development of all fields of the economy. In other words, economic development can be attained through the expansion of Greek exports rather than through the substitution of imports.

The upward trend of the Greek people's wealth and happiness cannot coexist with the implementation of a closed economy. In other words, an economy that is screened by the walls of high tariff protection that results in giving the people low quality and high cost goods and services. From the moment that Greece chooses such a model for economic development, just as other countries with a similar population figure have done, it is then obliged to seek outlets in major markets abroad.

As has already been emphasized, Greece's geographic position, the nature of Greek products, as well as the possibilities for their being absorbed by foreign countries brings us closer to the European Community of some 300 million people.

Security

It is not only economic reasons, however, that advocate our country's joining the European Community. Joining the EEC would dissuasively act against the dangers that could threaten Greece, it would safeguard the democratic state and it would offer unrestricted possibilities for us to participate in European and international decision-making centers, i.e. where world developments are shaped. For that exact reason it is to our country's interest that the political unification of West Europe be realized as quickly as possible. Because European unification would constitute a factor of balance, peace and civilization between the other superpowers.

Of course, this unification does not mean that the member-states would lose their national identity. Indeed, Greece would see the development in West Europe of a new Greek classical civilization since the ideas of Greek classical antiquity had been transmitted to this region and had been rendered fruitful there. We must courageously and unhesitatingly support and promote this reality, regardless of the possible disappointments that we had experienced in the past. And it would be a mistake for this possible disappointment to lead us to repudiation. To the contrary, it should steel our faith and our decisiveness. Justification will be found from the proper positioning in our foreign orientation.

Differences with Turkey

Certain people maintain that the differences we have with Turkey must make us move away from the West since that neighboring country also belongs to the military alliance of the West. Such a syllogism is a big mistake because it is absurd for us to determine our foreign policy as well as our international positioning because of differences with Turkish policy. Also, let us not forget that with its provocative stance against Greece, Turkey is aspiring to turn us away from the West so that it can itself become the one and only support in this region.

Turkey is aiming at playing a significant role in Europe through its penetration into the Aegean. That is why within its short-term ambitions is the partition of the Aegean, with the contesting of Greece's air and sea rights and the isolation of the Greek islands.

The danger from such an ambition is removed once Greece is a member of the economic and military alliances of the West. The same, of course, could not have happened with Cyprus that belongs to the so-called non-aligned world.

Greece has no claims against its neighbor. This is well known to Turkey's political leadership that should realize that this provocative policy leads nowhere. This is so because Greece is decided to defend the integrity of its inalienable national rights as they are safeguarded by treaties and international practice. On the other hand, it should become apparent that the interests of the two people, both Greeks and Turks, lie in the peaceful resolution of differences, in justice and logic.

Moreover, within this context, the Turks should understand that the Cyprus tragedy is against the interests of the Turkish people. For that reason a just solution to the Cyprus problem is essential. Of course, the resolution of the Cyprus issue is not an easy matter. Many struggles and vast sacrifices will still be needed on all levels. Finally, the adoption of a policy that is devoid of partisan biases and disturbances on the domestic front would be needed.

Our Relations with the Balkan Countries

In a period when our relations with Turkey are going through successive crises, Greece is obliged to shape its international relations with caution and prudence. Especially necessary is the development of friendly relations with our neighbors to the north.

However, the policy of friendship and cooperation with the Balkan countries must be developed beyond short-term considerations. A basic objective effort is not only for the Balkans not to become an area of conflagration but, to the contrary, to provide the example of a peaceful coexistence of peoples. Because we should not forget that in the case of a more general conflagration bilateral friendly relations are surpassed by other interests, much stronger interests that come between the ideological and economic orientations of the opposing worlds.

With these factors in mind, Greece's foreign policy must be practiced with prudence but also with firmness and consequence. Acrobatics in international policy, when indeed imbued with sentimental exhortations, are dangerous for every nation.

Consequently, what is needed in today's international disorder is the shaping of a national foreign policy that would not change with each succeeding development in domestic conditions. In other words, it would not serve the short-term interests of parties but the long-term needs of the nation and people.

5671

CSO: 3521/129

ALLEGED GOVERNMENT BUGGING OF ND OFFICES

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 9 Dec 83 pp 1, 9

/Text/ Activities and conversations in ND's central offices (on Rigillis Street) were monitored from a KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ safehouse furnished with sophisticated high technology equipment.

The KYP safehouse vanished the next day at the exact time that the party inside was discussing ways of confronting the situation.

Deputy Koutras made this charge during a discussion about the monitoring of ND officials, and more generally speaking of political parties of the country, by state services.

The question by Deputies N. Gelestathis, K. Sapsalis and P. Koutras was put forth following startling revelations by AKROPOLIS on 24 July 1983.

Specifically, the ND deputies charged that:

- During the morning of 2 June 1982, a vehicle with licence tags YM 1505 carrying many persons in it monitored who went in and out of the ND office.
- That same afternoon, another vehicle with foreign licence tags (FTP 538) was on duty.
- The telephones of Messrs Mitsotakis, Palaiokrassas, Xarkhas, etc. were monitored.
- The government purchased 600 tape recorders without anyone explaining for what they were going to be used.
- Mr Tombras, deputy director of OTE /Greek Telecommunications Organization/, recently admitted impassively that he monitors OTE employees.

Mr Averof's Home

- The deputies also mentioned the surveillance of Mr Averof's home when a reception given for his daughter was presented by a newspaper, closely tied to PASOK, as being a secret political meeting. The newspaper in question published

the names and photographs of the visitors that only state employees could have transmitted.

- Mr N. Gelestathis emphasized, "The impresssion is widespread that the security services, instead of being engaged in doing their duties, are engaged in monitoring those having different opinions, and as result an atmosphere of terrorism and totalitarianism is being created in the country."

- AKROPOLIS' article of 24 July 1983 was not the only thing that highlighted the problem. Deputies Gelestathis and Koutras stressed that that was perhaps the tip of the iceberg.

Mr Koutsogiorgas

Answering the deputies, Minister to the Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas described as pure fiction the AKROPOLIS article to which the ND deputies referred.

Mr Koutsogiorgas said that "the KYP does not have a safehouse" and that "no citizen is being followed regardless of what party he belongs to."

The minister added, I wish to God we had the opportunity and the means to monitor but we do not have the financial means or the possibility for modernizing our equipment.

In his rebuttal, Mr Gelestathis, referring to Mr Koutsogiorgas' use of the words "pure fiction," charged him with anti-parliamentary behavior. As he said, "This is so because the description he made of the deputies and the press --the newspaper AKROPOLIS which carried a story on this subject-- I believe is unacceptable and I do not know if it is permitted me to answer."

5671

CSO: 3521/129

BARBIERI EXAMINES SOVIET LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS

PM171604 Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 8 Jan 84 pp 36-41

[Article by Frane Barbieri: "The Elusive Andropov"]

[Text] However paradoxical it may seem, it is a monarchy that is in a state of crisis in the Kremlin. The revolution that should have created the mythical dictatorship of the proletariat has instead created the dictatorship of a party, which then led to the dictatorship of the general secretary, who then went on to become at the same time head of the party, head of the government, head of the state, and father of the nation. The only limit on his power is now death. The socialist system thus becomes the only real absolute monarchy in existence. The body that should in some respects influence or limit the monarch's power--the famous Politburo--turns into a kind of "crown council" once the sovereign has been elected for life. Attempts made during periods of transition to turn it into a "collegial leadership" failed as soon as the secretary's primacy became established. Historians will continue to discuss for a long time whether the Soviet Union would have become the superpower that it is if the revolution had not resulted in a monarchy. There is no doubt that the USSR is now the strongest monarchy in the world.

Its weaknesses and moments of crisis stem from the fact that it is not yet an institutionalized monarchy. There are no rules or laws of succession. Therefore, every transition, since it can only occur as a result of a demise or a palace revolution, regularly sparks off a succession struggle and a more or less protracted period of readjustment. Stalin fought for 8 years to secure full regal powers (that was the time, in fact, when the monarchy imposed itself on the revolution). Khrushchev, having taken on the post in 1953, succeeded in ridding himself of the other pretenders only in 1957, only to be dethroned 7 years later. Brezhnev, the first to hold--formally, too--all the party and state posts together, achieved this only after 6 years of contested "collegiality." The periods of transition are characterized by the so-called "troikas," when the designated successor and potential successors appear together everywhere, tied together like Siamese twins, until eventually the general secretary appears on his own, apart from the other Politburo members, crowned at last.

With Andropov, the rules of succession seemed for the first time different or better regulated. The monarch was designed at once and granted full powers. But not even this time has the power at the Kremlin found the hoped-for stability. Andropov's health cannot stand up to the impact and efforts of the top responsibilities. He was elected because he was the youngest of the pretenders, but also because he had the most reassuring cardiogram. According to some rumors, he suffered a shock as soon as he was designated. The tribulations of his unexpected power caused him to lose 12 kilos. Moreover, the time when he took over the throne was politically one of the most agitated, both on the world scene and within the confines of the empire.

Unlike his predecessors, however, Andropov initially displayed considerable confidence. His statements were clearly reformist: "We have reached the stage when thorough qualitative changes are not only ripe but necessary." He called for "frank discussions," "a spirit of initiative," "a critical spirit," and "decisions not approved in advance." And Gromyko echoed him in foreign policy. Soviet leaders should be reformist by virtue of their ideological training, but in practice they become so only insofar as economic and social necessities demand it of them. Irrespective of his ideological stances--at least more sophisticated, if not more open-minded--Andropov really seemed faced with the need to carry out radical changes.

However, suddenly it seems as though everything has been shelved at the Kremlin. On the international plane Moscow has withdrawn into a systematic refusal to compromise. At home the reformist plans have boiled down to a series of disciplinary measures, bound, as always, to run out of steam after the initial impact. At first the reasons for the return to misoneism were sought in Andropov's delicate health. Zamyatin's denials eventually confirmed the gravity of the illness. Never has there been such a need--psychological as well as practical--for an appearance, however fleeting, by Andropov, in view of the speculations and anxieties prompted by his prolonged absence. The country feels deprived of its monarch and even if Reagan were to decide on a summit meeting, he does not know when and with whom he could meet.

Another reason for the interruption of the Andropov line--whether real or apparent--has been sought by some in the resistance supposedly offered to him by Brezhnev supporters still within the Politburo and Central Committee. Andropov has purged a number of corrupt and inefficient ministers, but has not hit out at the opposition to his new course (assuming that there is a course and that it is new). The "Dnepropetrovsk mafia," that is, the group of Brezhnev supporters, has remained in place: Tikhonov is still prime minister, though flanked by Andropov supporter Aliyev; Chernenko, Andropov's real or assumed antagonist, has been kept in his second position overall (even during Andropov's absences). The only one clearly on the way up is Gorbachev, who joined the top body, coming from Stavropol to Moscow, as the creature of Brezhnev and Suslov.

Now there are two possibilities: either a confirmation of the theory that there was no trial of strength within the Politburo in deciding on Brezhnev's successor and that even the "Dnepropetrovsk mafia" accepted the least elderly of all the candidates (Andropov, too, was considered a Brezhnev supporter);

or we accept the other hypothesis, whereby the rival groups, finding themselves in a stalemate as a result of Andropov's illness, international tension, and domestic conservatism, decided to reach a compromise--to continue with the Brezhnev arrangement, but via Andropov's leadership. No winners, no losers. We are inclined to accept the second theory, on the basis of a number of pointers.

First, having read--albeit late--the full texts printed by the Soviet press, we feel we can say that during the commemorations on the anniversary of Brezhnev's death and, implicitly, Andropov's accession, the emphasis was never placed on a critical dissociation from the previous reign. Indeed, the first thing to be stressed was "continuity." The guidelines laid down by Brezhnev are considered still valid, in both foreign and domestic policy, and it is merely observed that they have not yet been fully implemented. "Loyalty to the Party's Major Task" (a headline from PRAVDA) proceeds from Brezhnev and continues with Andropov. The principle of continuity and the limits of Andropov's line can be appreciated in the formula: "Continuity in politics does not mean satisfaction with what has been achieved."

The fact that the emphasis on continuity is the result of an accommodation among the groups within the leadership can also be deduced from Chernenko's resurgence. Following Andropov's election, though taking over Suslov's former post as ideologist, Chernenko failed to appear at any of the major plenums, conferences, or celebratory rallies. It was thought that he had stepped down owing to a grudge at the defeat he had suffered. However, during the October celebrations Chernenko reappeared in Andropov's vacant place on the Red Square balcony. Even more significant than this, however, is a lengthy theoretical essay by him appearing at the same time in KOMMUNIST. In his capacity as top ideologist, Chernenko paints a picture of the CPSU's ideological strategy. The first thing that strikes one is that this picture is centered on Andropov, who "has stood out for his innovative approach to the most complex problems of domestic and foreign policy, his realistic assessments of the present, and his bold viewpoints based on an analysis of the real and scientific trends of the future." Then Chernenko voices Andropov's plans for "a substantial enlargement of enterprises' rights and the further development of democratic principles."

Is the antagonist falling in with Andropov's plans to avoid being left out of the leadership and the race for power, since its arrangement is still uncertain? Perhaps. But, rather than an alignment, it is more likely an equitable agreement among the elderly figures of the Politburo, a kind of nonaggression pact: to survive and act together (not to mention dying together), since none of the rivals has enough time or strength left to fully complete a term of monarchy. Indeed, they have agreed to postpone all transformations of the system until the 12th 5-Year Plan, that is, until 1986. Meanwhile experimental models of reform will be implemented on a local basis. The following Brezhnev axiom is even repeated: "Sudden and inadequately tested changes are not suited to a state as large as the USSR."

In practice the Kremlin is confirming how impracticable the reform road is in the USSR, even with Andropov. Indeed, reforms are bound to be shelved if they are promoted by the very people intended to suffer as a result of

their introduction. Bureaucracy declares war on itself to safeguard its ideological supremacy, but then does its utmost to lose that war. The reforms are not premature; if anything they are all too overdue: It is the fortress of bureaucracy, the stubborn wall placed between society and the political bodies, that has become virtually unshakable.

At the moment there is a great deal of talk about a confidential document sent to the Kremlin by the Academy of Sciences Siberian Department. It argues that it is impossible to manage 45,000 industrial concerns from a single center without causing serious damage. An identical letter bearing 1,050 signatures and containing similar demands was sent to the Politburo by the managers of Siberian enterprises 7 years ago. Then, too, it caused a great sensation but led nowhere.

The Kremlin, therefore, seems doomed to misoneism. However, it would be rash to join Reagan in proclaiming the "final crisis" of the Soviet system and of the "empire of evil." The USSR's resources are still great and its capacity for resistance, if not recovery, incalculable. The misoneism which in the case of the Euromissiles turned into a flexible stubbornness, has in any case not yielded entirely negative results in the international field for the Andropov administration. Moscow has suffered anything but a defeat. Of course, it has not achieved the maximum objective, to prevent the Pershings' deployment and to start the Americans' elimination from Europe. But though it has not separated Europe from the United States, the challenge of the SS-20's has given strength in Europe to a movement, which, though not exactly pro-Soviet, is nevertheless decidedly anti-America. Whatever the final Euromissiles count--more or less balanced--the U.S. Government influence over the European allies will emerge diminished and attenuated, while the Soviet Government's will increase proportionately. It is of decisive importance for the Kremlin to have discovered that a large proportion of Europeans--indeed, the most militant sector--is much more afraid of a possible disruption of the Soviet empire than of possible chaos within the Western alliance.

As for the domestic system, economic and social, of the USSR, despite the evident crisis, it is not so near to collapse as is apparently believed by those who apply Western parameters of efficiency in assessing the progress of the Soviet pachyderm. It seems obvious to them that a system such as the Soviet one, which produces a third as much, per capita, is bound to succumb to the U.S. system, which produces three times as much. But here it is necessary to add another element, that is, that a Soviet consumes one-fifth as much as an American. The USSR's basic problem is not when and how it will attain the U.S. level of productivity by improving threefold, but for how far and for how long the Soviet citizen will be willing to consume one-fifth as much as the U.S. citizen. For the time being he accepts this sacrifice for the sake of the Russian people's messianic quest, in which he profoundly believes, identifying Slavic orthodoxy with communism, and by virtue of a strange social pact reached tacitly over the decades of the labyrinthine system.

The citizen, hypnotized by revolutionary ideology and demagoguery, does not presume--or has not yet presumed--to participate in government. He submits to the vanguard party's authoritarian power in exchange for a guaranteed job

and income. Material prosperity is at a minimal, subsistence, level, but the returns in terms of work and production commitment are minimal, too. The government's great skill has been to always raise living standards just above the level of tolerability. Thus the citizen has been given the impression of slow but continuous progress. And at times of stagnation the party has taken care to fill the gap with injections of propaganda and patriotism, putting the blame on external factors, always "subversive and aggressive." Basically, few regimes can enjoy a consensus as stationary as the Soviet Union's. In any case no credible alternative has ever been put to the Soviet citizen and his options remain wholly within the system and its possible evolution. The advantage to the regime lies in the widespread belief that every country in the world--even the most capitalist--can still become socialist, whereas a socialist country has no chance of returning to capitalism.

In this way the whole stability of society stands up without too many threats to the government. This is shown partly by the signs of consensus that are accompanying the measures--basically, police measures--adopted by Andropov to increase discipline and improve the functioning of services and supplies. The assault groups, the "druzhinniki" who carry out checks, following absenteeists and "parasites" into movie theaters and canteens, have nothing to do with the democratic reform and do not increase the citizen's rights, but nevertheless the citizen does not reject them, convinced that they will help to fill the shops better and make his neighbor work harder. As long as the system suits the Russians, the Kremlin cares relatively little whether Westerners are producing and consuming more. Nor does it care whether socialism really exists in Russia; it is enough that the Soviets accept it as such. If anything, the problem for the party is the new generations, which have more ideas, are better educated and more acquainted with the world, and so are more and more critically aware of the gulf between the Soviet standard and that of other countries, including the "fraternal countries." These young people also wonder whether an internal stability built on the present basis is not causing the USSR to lose the "historic race," turning technological backwardness into a political defeat.

The Politburo's answers to this problem are not unanimous, as one would be prompted to imagine by applying Western criteria. There is a school of thought--especially among Andropov's advisers (who were also Brezhnev's, namely Aleksandrov, Arbatov, and Bovin)--according to which attention must be given to technological "linkage," by binding the West, with its industrial patents, to Soviet natural resources. The USSR would in any case benefit since the Western economies would ultimately become dependent on the USSR's resources and markets, increasingly important to those whose own markets are saturated and whose own resources are exhausted. By virtue of geographical logic and economic interests, Europe would be bound to become a major factory of the USSR's.

Another school of thought--with more ideological leanings--previously headed by Suslov, maintains, however, that capitalism will experience a crisis despite its technological superiority, and indeed that the technologies themselves will cause the social crisis. According to these theories, technology is an

antisocial trick: high technologies are making the Western peoples almost totally unemployed and underprivileged, whereas the USSR has a system capable of relating technology to employment. In the final analysis, the world does not move at the West's rapid rate, but at the slower and more flexible rate of the USSR. This is argued in certain respects by Andropov, too, in an extraordinary interpretation of Marx. In his essay on Marx' centennial the CPSU leader speaks very arrogantly about those in the West who maintain that "the October Revolution exploded in conflict with all the forecasts of Marxism." They say: "Marx left Russia out of his reckonings." In fact, Andropov says, even if Marx is considered the repository of all that is best in German philosophy, British economic policy, and French socialist utopianism, he was in time to perceive a major social revolution maturing in Russia. In conclusion, it is no accident that after Marx and Engels communism moved from the West to Russia, with Lenin. This time it is the West that finds itself "left out of the reckoning" while the USSR turns its attention to the Third World, which is changing in accordance with its likeness and its yardstick. The envisaged North-South conflict is apparently turning out in the Eastern bloc's favor.

From this angle, what appears to be a misoneism due to paralysis seems to be an ideologically well founded concept. It is enough to tenaciously withstand Reagan's attacks: This seems to be the axiom of the moment among both politicians and military men. There are no signs that the latter have taken the upper hand under Andropov. The party is still in power, including within the military structures. The marshals carry greater weight only inasmuch as the defense syndrome has prompted increasingly aggressive undertakings, involving the whole of society, and inasmuch as there is a widespread belief that capitalism, in its ideological death throes, could launch a desperate attack before breathing its last. But, paradoxically, the military is also more aware than others of the pressing need for reforms, since an excessively large military mechanism needs a more efficient and socially more stable hinterland. If anything, Andropov is undergoing twofold influence from his major military electors.

In this way Andropov has also reduced the functions of the so-called international Politburo. Brezhnev regularly convened the party leaders of the Eastern bloc countries in an attempt to formulate a joint line. He not only had the Soviet line translated into respective national lines, but sometimes also used the super-Politburo to ensure the passage of his own line within the Kremlin without too much resistance. If there was not actually a real pluralism, there was an impression of dialectical relations among leaders who owe their power to the USSR but who, in order to better preserve it, have in some way to base it on the interests of their own nations, too. Andropov no longer concerns himself with these relations. Indeed, he is imparting a new impetus to the "monolithic nature" of the socialist community, invoking the international threats and tensions. The "pluralism of interests even within socialism" has been relegated to and enclosed within the single volume of his complete works, published recently. Will he have enough time to fill a second volume?

Andropov surprised almost everyone by not doing what seemed logical to consolidate his position, by imparting an imprint of innovation to his reign. But within the Kremlin the most difficult thing to do now is that which is dictated by logic: The sons of the apparatus can find no way of freeing themselves from its web.

Whether his illness is real or political, Andropov is in any case not retiring. For a revolutionary monarchy early retirement would be an admission of weakness. An attempt will be made to bring him to the coronation of a CPSU Congress, perhaps an early one, perhaps to have that same assembly produce a less personal and "voluntarist" mechanism of succession. Andropov emerged because he was a neighbor of Brezhnev's. Gorbachev, his predestined successor, came to the Kremlin because Suslov noticed him when, as a young regional secretary, he accompanied him on visits for thermal treatment to Mineralnyye Vody, a Caucasian city then under the jurisdiction of Gorbachev's Kraykom. This time it will no longer be a matter of replacing one Politburo member with another: It will be a matter of carrying out the change--biological, as well as political--between two entire generations. And trying to transform the state of the first revolution from a monarch into a republic at last.

CSO: 3528/43

WILLOCH IN PRESS CONFERENCE DISCUSSES OIL, NATO, POLL TRENDS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Dec 83 p 3

[Article: "Willoch Says Did Not Threaten Departure. Praise for Christian People's and Center Parties. Conservatives Will Work for New Easing"]

[Excerpts] At the end of the fall session Prime Minister Kare Willoch gave high marks to the Christian People's and Center Parties--and their parliamentary leaders--for their willingness to cooperate. At his press conference yesterday the prime minister categorically denied that he had threatened to resign in order to force combined solutions. "Besides, we are now stopping inflation and strengthening the social economy. This work could cause a burden in the form of a decline in the polls, but it is our duty to do it," he said.

"Cooperation among the three governing parties is going well," maintained the prime minister. "All of my colleagues are showing a clear willingness to find solutions which all parties can defend, and they will be defended--in the Storting as well," he emphasized.

"I am not acquainted with any cases in which there has been real disagreement between myself and the professional ministers, as the newspaper comments have implied." And Jo Benkow's reported "cabinet questions" were called by Willoch "a theory of the press."

To use the term "dramatic" in describing cooperation in the three-party government is largely deceptive, to put it mildly. Willoch, however, admits that many voters may believe that there are problems in cooperation, and that can be part of the reason for the declining support that all the three parties have had in the polls lately. It is therefore important that the government parties endeavor to avoid statements and actions which can create a false impression, he added.

"But has the prime minister learned anything new about the Christian People's Party in the Center Party in the time since the enlargement of the government?" he was asked.

"One learns as long as one lives," answered Willoch, but emphasized that the statement was not meant to be malicious.

Statfjord

The prime minister did not consider it sensational that there were differences over the issue of Statoil's eventually taking over the responsibility for operating Statfjord. There is a need to clarify the matter further before the government takes a position. It is wrong to interpret that as lacking confidence in Statoil. Willoch interpreted the statement from the chairman of the Storting Industrial Committee, Reidar Due (Center Party) that Statoil will be preferred, as a prediction from Due about what the outcome will be.

Gallup

Willoch maintained that the difficult economic times are an important cause for the declining popularity. "That is forcing us into moderation, meaning a policy which is relatively easy to attack." He rejected, however, the idea that a general atmosphere of expectation was created before the election in 1981.

"We never concealed how difficult the situation was," pointed out the prime minister. And at the press conference he did not conceal that it will take time to solve the problems, either. But the government today is in firm control, and the budget work last fall showed that the effort to reduce price increases and fight inflation is making progress, he emphasized.

The prime minister said this about his task as head of government: "To contribute to seeing that spokesmen for the government appear with common viewpoints when that is possible, and that there is mutual respect when it is not--we are still of course three independent parties."

In his mention of the importance of the polls, Willoch also reminded of Einar Gerhardsen's old warning against "blaming the voters."

The fact that the voters are more mobile than previously can just as well be seen as a healthy sign. "It can go both ways--and to those that we have lost we wish a hearty welcome back," said the prime minister, who refused to indicate what percentage makes up the voting foundation for the Conservatives.

Industry

The prime minister said that he studied the last semiannual report of the Industrial Association, which predicted increased competitive problems, with

certain concern, even if that departs from other more recent predictions. There is no reason to hide the problems with larger price increases than the countries that we are competing with. Even if the deficit in the national budget will probably be greater than expected, there is also a need to conduct a tighter budget policy. The government parties are fighting a difficult fight against the opposition to avoid an inflationary policy.

To the question of whether there would have been progress in reducing taxes if the Conservatives had continued alone in the government, the prime minister said that he believed that there has been more progress with cooperation among the three parties than there would have been with the support of only one-third of the members of the Storting.

Sliding Wage Scale

Willoch emphasized that there will not be a law proposed by the government to prevent a sliding wage scale. That would be too strong an action. It is normal that people get increased wages as their responsibility and tasks increase. But the government also believes that something must be done to the sliding wage scales because they drive prices and costs up. In that connection the prime minister appealed to the groups in the workforce to show restraint.

The prime minister assured that the government will continue to follow developments in unemployment very carefully, and take appropriate measures. Predictions indicate that unemployment will increase somewhat in the coming months, but we hope that thereafter the curve will turn downward again, he said, and reminded that the total number of employed is now higher than last fall--but the number of unemployed has increased still higher.

The question of Statoil's role was also brought up during the prime minister's semiannual press conference. Willoch maintained that "clipping the wings" of the company is an expression which the Conservatives have never used. "And that is not descriptive of our policy in that area," he emphasized. "It is entirely a matter of finding a more appropriate distribution of responsibilities and tasks," he maintained.

'Firm NATO Policy Necessary'

"I hope that a majority of the Norwegian people understands that the government must follow a firm course in security policy. We cannot allow the shifting voting which is expressed in the polls to be the basis of our policy," said Prime Minister Kare Willoch. He emphasized that it would be very damaging if Norway, like Denmark and Greece, broke with the line on which there has been unity in NATO on the question of the so-called double resolution and the deployment of new missiles in West Europe.

The prime minister found it impossible to answer with certainty a question of who is really in line with the popular majority as to NATO's double

resolution and missile deployment. Is it the parties which are in a minority in the Storting, but which on this issue according to the polls have the support of a majority of the population? Or is it the parties which have been supported by a majority in an election, but which are not in line with the majority according to the polls?

"There seems to be one line in several West European countries on this matter," said the prime minister. "People can support the opposition on an issue such as that, but they prefer in an election to support the parties which represent a firm course."

The prime minister emphasized that the government must conduct the policy that it is convinced is necessary to protect the security of West Europe. He reminded that the Soviet Union tried to split the NATO countries and that the negotiating position of the West was weakened to the same extent as the attempts at splitting were successful. The Soviet Union wants to avoid deployment of new weapons in the West at the same time as it wants to maintain the superiority which it has built up in numbers of missiles and warheads.

"If in Moscow they come to the conclusion that they can reach their goal without negotiations, the Soviets will not return to the negotiating table," maintained Willoch. "NATO is split because Denmark and Greece broke with the unified policy. It would be very damaging if Norway also broke out."

Willoch reminded that the Danish Government was forced by a majority in the Folketing to take a position within NATO that the government disagreed with. "Denmark will soon elect a new Folketing. It will be exciting to see what influence the missile issue will have on the election result," said the prime minister.

To the question of whether he expected a prompt solution in relations with the Soviet Union on the question of oil and gas extraction on the disputed part of the continental shelf, the prime minister said that there had been no breakthrough. Norway has said that it is willing to make concessions. There has been no indication of when eventual agreement will be reached.

9287

CSO: 3639/52

PAPER PONDER'S VIABILITY OF WILLOCH'S COALITION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Jan 84 p 2

[Editorial: "A Combined Strategy"]

[Text] In connection with the year's end, individual representatives of the government coalition have expressed themselves in such a way as to create a certain doubt about what should be the government's main political task. This is amazing, because the political discussions that took place between the Conservatives, Christian People's Party and the Center Party showed with all possible care and clarity the purpose of the cooperation. This also appeared in the protocol concerning the political foundation for the formation of the government last June.

The agreement documented here about the main purposes of the government's work is obviously binding on the coalition as a whole. If one agrees on the goals, he must also approve of the means. The task of the coalition parties is therefore to come together on a policy which, as quickly and effectively as possible, will lead to the fulfillment of the goals. In this connection, the most important thing is to strengthen the foundation of the welfare state, and employment both in the short and long term.

Expansion of the purely Conservative Government to a majority government of three cooperating parties has--without a doubt--created better conditions for cooperation on the nonsocialist side. And best of all: We have demonstrated a willingness to pull together. But it is in the nature of things that in every coalition government there will be shades of interpretation, and in certain individual cases perhaps also strong differences of opinion. We further realize that in certain controversial cases there will be situations in which a natural need for party posturing will overshadow considerations of necessary cooperation. That is a classic dilemma.

Under such circumstances a coalition government will always be obliged to find solutions which the participating parties can stand together on and defend, both before the Storting and public opinion. The Willoch government has largely practiced this rule very well. The problem of the coalition was first observed in the form of weakening communications between the

government on one hand and the government parties' Storting groups on the other. As a result of this we have experienced a couple of working mishaps which could have been avoided by more deliberate control of the coalition.

Just because we have a strong sincere desire for the present government to succeed with its great tasks, we ask the coalition parties to consider adopting a combined strategy toward the Storting election in 1985. In the first place that will emphasize and confirm the parties' responsibility for fulfilling the political objectives, and thereby make it easier to find solutions to the individual issues. Without a dominant combined objective it is easy to wind up gradually in the same old trenches as the traditional conflicts arise. And that applies not only during the government's budget preparations, although perhaps especially there. Furthermore it is time to do something which can ignite a spark of enthusiasm in the nonsocialist voters. It has been a while since the last time.

9287

CS0: 3639/52

AP CONGRESS TO APPROVE IDEOLOGICAL MANIFESTO

Madrid YA in Spanish 3 Jan 84 p 7

[Article by F. L. de Pablo]

[Text] The Sixth Popular Alliance [AP] Congress, which will be held in Barcelona from 27 to 29 January, will approve a manifesto setting forth the alternative program for government that the leading opposition party will offer to consolidate the natural majority that it hopes to get in the forthcoming general elections of 1986. Together with this manifesto, which will update the liberal-conservative, reformist platform outlined in the political report prepared by the spokesman for the AP block in Congress, Miguel Herrero de Minon, there is also under preparation a series of priority actions by the coalition which, logically, will not be a subject for discussion at the congress but, in case the AP is successful in the elections, would result in the realization by the government of this updated platform.

At the same time, the congress will consider the possibility of strengthening the party's reformist line by incorporating such important elements as the liberals coming from the UCD [Civic Democratic Union] and, if the contacts now being made with the former mayor of Seville, Luis Urunuela, prove fruitful, an important group of former members of the PSA [Andalucian Socialist Party].

Consolidate the Territorial Structure

The congress will institutionalize the party's territorial organization in an attempt to unite its members around not only a leader but especially a platform and will establish a regulatory system that will strengthen membership and aim for a balance in action between the party's bureaucracy and its political leaders.

It is hoped to achieve this greater cohesion of the management team by setting up a reduced and more homogeneous executive body, in which tasks would be assigned according to areas of activity, in order to allow for closer tracking of the government's work and eliminate duplication and lack of coordination between the party's bureaucracy, its politicians in various

representative or executive bodies and its leaders at different territorial levels. Emerging from the Congress with increased strength will be a group of young leaders who have already proven themselves not only in their respective areas of origin but also in political activity.

The "New Right"

This homogeneous team, which will be concentrated in the new AP executive, does not consider itself a "shadow government" but, rather, a group of men charged with representing the "new Right" to the voters.

They are middle-aged men, between 30 and 40, who are playing outstanding roles in the party organization or in the AP parliamentary delegation and have bet heavily on party renewal by participating actively in drawing up the reports and communiques that the Congress will approve.

Outstanding among these individuals are a group of parliamentarians who, with the approval and at the instigation of Manuel Fraga, have been meeting in recent months to incorporate their ideas into the various reports. They are not dissidents, nor do they belong to the group with which Fraga intends to form the new executive body, though it is probable that some will be elected to this body from among the 12 people who have attended the above-mentioned working dinners, which, coordinated by Alfonso Osorio, brought together Lasuen (author of the economic report), Calero (editor of the report on party statutes), Herrero de Minon, Aznar, Arias Canete, Planas, Navarro Velasco, Alvarez Cascos, Camunas (Gabriel) and Rato. Also present at these dinners were the party's secretary general, Jorge Verstrynge, and the vice president, Abel Matutes.

All of them could form part of the future Executive Committee, together with such other well-known individuals as Fernando Suarez, Fernandez Albor, Hernandez Mancha, Ruiz Gallardon, Arespacochage, Cargic Tizon, Bueno Ferrer, Lapuerta, Montesinos and other party technicians like Carabias, Baon, Sanchis, etc. But all of them, apart from enjoying the confidence of the leader, must have distinguished themselves in the party organization or been elected by their provincial or regional organizations at the many congresses that have been held at those levels in recent months, with the exception of that of Aragon, which will be held on 15 January.

More Than 3,000 Delegates

This strengthening of the regional organizations shows that the AP has adapted fully to the reality of the autonomous state. The congress will be attended by 3,105 delegates in all, of which 2,705 will have been elected on a territorial basis. The regions contributing the largest numbers of delegates are Andalucia (some 500), Valencia (300) and Madrid (292). The interest of all these delegates in party renewal has been emphasized by its inclusion in the most important reports, such as the economic one, the political one, the one on statutes and the sociopolitical one, drawn up by Hernandez Mancha, for which two alternative texts have been presented.

Probably, the debate at the congress will concentrate on these reports, rather than on the composition of the Executive Committee, the election of which will be by the majority system of closed lists, rather than as had been suggested by Fernando Suarez and others on the basis of open lists. The closed list is a device used by the large parties, such as the government party, to ensure homogeneity in the leadership. The congress will end with an enormous dinner, attended by more than 15,000 people, at Barcelona's Victoria Eugenia building--an organizational challenge undertaken to stress the AP presence in Catalonia. It will also be the first preelection act in Bueno Ferrer's campaign as a candidate in the Catalan elections of April, in which the AP will consolidate its rising fortunes or see them reversed.

12336

CSO: 3548/161

NAVY STUDY WARNS AGAINST USSR-KIEL FERRY ROUTE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by Nils Norten Udgaard: "Tug-of-war About German-Soviet Ferry Project in the Baltic Sea"]

[Text] A tough tug-of-war has broken out between the West German Navy and the young Prime Minister Uwe Barschel in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein: Will Bonn give the green light to a big German-Soviet project for railroad ferries in the Baltic Sea? Will that open the way for a Soviet military push against Western Europe?

In reply to a question from AFTENPOSTEN the 39-year-old Barschel answers that he regards the military concerns as "Nonsense. We are sticking with the project." But he adds that the federal state will be loyal if his party comrade, the Federal Republic's Chancellor Helmut Kohl, definitely turns thumbs down.

Investments which are estimated at 1 billion West German marks (2.8 billion kroner) are at stake together with a further expansion of the federal state's strong position as a channel for West Germany's and a significant portion of the EC's traffic and commerce with Scandinavia and the entire Baltic Sea area.

Ferry harbors have grown up like toadstools in Schleswig-Holstein in recent years at the expense of other German harbors, and new plans are being formulated: A "jumbo-ferry" to Gothenburg will be in operation in 1985. There will be a new railroad ferry to Sweden. Traffic to Finland will be expanded, and the Norwegian Kiel ferries are operating. The big possibilities for expansion lie in the East, in the Soviet Union, as it, viewed historically, always has been for the Germans.

The idea is now to establish a new ferry connection between the Soviet port Klaipeda in Lithuania (formerly Memel in German East Prussia) and a harbor in Schleswig-Holstein. Here Kiel, Lubeck, Flensburg, Puttgarten and Neustadt are interested, but at the moment Kiel appears to be ahead. In such a case Klaipeda and Kiel would be expanded to receive the arrival of 2--and later of 4 or 6--railroad ferries, each of which could take 75 railroad cars each with a load of 60 tons. The ferries will be owned equally by shipping companies in the two countries, and will start operating in 1985-86. The construction of the ferries will give new jobs to the German shipyards which have been hard hit by the crisis.


But then the problems arise. The Soviet railroads are wide-gauge. Quite extensive and complicated facilities for changing the gauge on the cars must be constructed, and Moscow is insisting that this facility must be in the German port, not the Soviet. On the other hand, they appear willing to discuss all other practical questions.

This very thing arouses suspicion in Bonn. A study by a West German naval source states that "exactly at a time when NATO is trying to find the means for balancing the East Bloc's enormous conventional superiority, such a project would undermine all these efforts in that the project would actually make it possible for the Soviet Union to land troops from Asia directly on NATO territory, getting around the insecure satellite states" in East Europe.

It cannot be said any clearer.

Undersecretary of the Defense Department Kurt Peter Wuerzbach, has said that the Soviet Russians will get new and good possibilities for espionage. In addition, other people have pointed to the danger of subversive activity and sabotage in a crisis situation. Another argument which the Navy is strongly making is that the ferries will displace the West German shipping companies and consequently the already seriously reduced West German merchant fleet will become even smaller, and will not be in a position to bring adequate supplies to West Germany in a war or crisis situation.

The Russians have not made a secret of the fact that they are strongly dissatisfied with their transportation connections through Poland and East Germany, and to a degree Czechoslovakia. The Russians say that they are looking for a more effective system for an increasingly significant trade with the West in grain among other things. They have already invested in railroad ferries from Klaipeda to a new port installation which is under construction on the East German peninsula of Rugen where the wide-gauge Russian railroad cars will arrive. Even if this is more than the military in Bonn likes, they gestured meaningfully with their arms when there recently were unsubstantiated rumors that the Russians "for practical reasons" also could contemplate a wide-gauge railroad from Kiel to Hamburg.



TRAINING CHIEF REJECTS CALLS FOR INCREASED SERVICE PERIOD

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 22 Dec 83 p 36

[Article: "Lieutenant Viita: No Reason to Prolong Service Period"]

[Text] "The short training period is an exacting challenge for the defense forces," says Lieutenant General Raimo Viita, the General Staff's training chief, in his commentary on the evaluative survey of the conscripts.

Viita does not, however, call for a prolongation of the service period.

"It's a matter of how the conscripts' 'learning arrangement' is carried out. Everywhere in the world the defense forces are managing the best they can with what they have, when a large part of the men for several months are more or less on command assignments. Because of the short service period this difficulty is magnified here in Finland," Viita says.

In the December issue of SOTILASAIKAKAUSLEHTI there is a comprehensive report on the results of the evaluative survey of the training which conscripts receive, results which leave something to be desired.

The numerical evaluation of the conscripts' skills and knowledge is a relatively new thing in the defense forces. The scale does not correspond to the one used in schools, and the gradation of 1 to 10 is not appropriate for every category.

The average score of 5.9 on the tests in combat training means, according to Viita, that a statistically noteworthy portion of the conscripts possesses a basic knowledge.

"If the test had been given immediately after instruction, the situation would certainly be different. So the test really measures what has been thoroughly learned and absorbed."

Less Emphasis on Lectures

Viita considers it a very positive sign that the evaluative survey shows there is instruction in all necessary subjects, even though the conscripts do not retain everything that is taught.

"You have to remember that we have instructors here who've been teaching for up to 25 years. Before this survey they've never received any feedback on their work."

Viita says that the defense forces are all the time adopting the same teaching methods and equipment used in other educational institutes. How to handle a high-explosive shell and a bazooka, among other things, is demonstrated on scientific films. The language laboratory is used as an aid in instructing how to give commands.

"We're trying all the time to get away from the lecture method. In large part, it's a matter of how well the instructor is able to take a bundle of information concerning security policy, for example, and present what is really essential to his students."

"More and More Uniform"

The training review did not call into question the ability of the conscripts to learn. Viita states that over a long period of time the basic mental and physical attributes of the conscripts have clearly become more and more uniform.

"A miscellaneous group of men is deliberately chosen for the recruiting class, so that we get comparable groups that work well together."

Marksmanship Surprisingly Good

The average marksmanship score of 7.2 hits surprised the survey evaluator. Viita considers the result excellent. An explanation for the outcome may lie in the fact that the shooters knew they would be granted leave if they scored well.

Results in Evaluative Survey of Training

GOOD

- Marksmanship
- Weapon use
- Putting combat equipment in working order

SATISFACTORY

- Preparation of firing position
- Bazooka use
- Medical tasks

WEAK

- Preparation for attack
- Throwing accuracy of hand grenades
- Replenishment of assault rifle's cartridge case

12327

CSO: 3617/67

REPORT CRITICIZES SHORTCOMINGS IN REFRESHER TRAINING

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 21 Dec 83 pp 1,7

[Article: "Training Critique: Conscript Skills Not Satisfactory"]

[Text] Where have the efficient, old-school combat instructors gone? This is a question raised in an evaluative survey of the training which conscripts receive.

According to a report published in SOTILASAIKAKAUSLEHTI [Military Journal] conscripts spend too much of their time standing around in the woods listening to instructors' speeches, instead of actively participating in operations.

This training review has shown that the 1982 change in the training set-up has brought about one hoped-for result: the personal combat skills of the different branches of the defense forces are now at about the same level. The level as such, however, is not satisfactory.

According to the scale used by the defense forces the conscripts received an average grade of 5.9 in combat training, which means that even during the last weeks of the service period the conscripts failed to reach the level of required instinctive competence.

To find the reasons for this failure the General Staff's training division is checking both the instructors themselves and the conditions under which the training takes place. No training review has called into question the basic ability of the conscripts to learn.

Dry Lectures Don't Produce Good Soldiers

Are the defense forces producing the kind of military personnel they should, is the question asked in the December issue of SOTILASAIKAKAUSLEHTI.

Major Eero Riuttala's report on the training review does not offer a clear-cut answer. According to the article, however, the knowledge and skills of the conscripts are far from satisfactory in all respects.

In his report Major Riuttala, who works in the office of the General Staff's training division, examines military training area by area.

About training in the field of security policy he states that high military rank does not necessarily mean excellence in classroom instruction.

"We know what the permanent staff's upper-echelon training institutes are like. Is it under their influence that conscripts are subjected to dull lecturers, the primary point of which is to allow the instructor to show off the depth of his knowledge? The trainees are practically asleep. No questions are asked, no notes are taken," says Riuttala.

The prerequisites are there for excellent results, according to Riuttala. The educational surroundings and skill in instructing determine the results.

In his opinion the unsatisfactory level of combat training also indicates that the short period which conscripts serve can no longer be used effectively for its intended purpose, military training, or for the most important facet of military training, which is combat training.

The opinions expressed in Riuttala's extensive report do not represent the official standpoint of the defense forces, but they come fairly close, according to the writer.

'No Correspondence to Schools' Grading System'

Defense Forces Commander Jaakko Valtanen was not prepared at this stage to comment on the results of the training review. He pointed out, however, that the defense forces' grading scale does not correspond to that used in schools.

During the training review the conscripts' average grade in marksmanship was 7.2 hits, which is considered good, according to the defense forces' scale.

4

Riuttala also mentions drill formations and asks where the good drillmasters have gone.

The results in specialized training are characterized in the report without exception as at least satisfactory, and often as good. The conscripts' muscular fitness is satisfactory. In the abdominal muscle tests and in the performance of chinups one-third finished below the good level.

Swimming skills are good, and orientation skills satisfactory, but not sufficient for a Finnish soldier. The physical condition of the conscripts is characterized generally as at least satisfactory. The difference between those in good condition and those in poor condition, however, is considered significantly large.

12327

CSO: 3617/67

REORGANIZATION OF NAVY WAR COLLEGE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 1-2 Jan 84 p 3

[Text] A new organization of the Naval War College will take place soon. The relative presidential decree has already been prepared by the National Defense Ministry. The salient points of the bill provide the following:

The Naval War College is a graduate school for naval science and strategy training. Its mission is to provide training for higher staff to create a uniform concept among the line officers of the Navy and to give staff knowledge to engineers and supply officers of the Navy as well as to a limited number of officers in the other branches of the Armed Forces, in the Port Corps and to officers in the armed forces of other nations.

The College includes Senior and Junior officer schools, is directed by a line commander or captain and its administrative personnel comprises a deputy director-director of studies (line captain or commander) as well as heads of departments of training and research (senior line officers) who compose the regular faculty of the College. The visiting faculty is composed of active duty or retired officers, members of the government, diplomats, foreign officers, research teaching personnel of AEI [Supreme Educational Institutions], etc.

The training subjects comprise the sections of: command (staff officers), operational planning (operations-tactics), naval power-strategy, national defense, national policy and international relations, environment and economy.

9731

CSO: 3521/138

MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEF

ROMANIAN HEAVY REPAIR EQUIPMENT--The Army's Mechanical Repair Units (MOMA) will soon renovate their equipment through Romania's provision of heavy machinery. According to information given to the press, the matter was discussed during the recent visit to Greece of General Milea, Romania's deputy minister of defense and head of its armed forces. According to the same information, Romania is prepared to offer such machinery on favorable terms (the debt to be paid in Greek products). In addition, it has become known that by a circular of the Ministry of National Defense the procedures for carrying out scheduled jobs are being simplified by the demes and communities of the MOMA. [Text] [Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 11 Nov 83 p 2] 11587

CSO: 3521/106

DEFENSE MINISTER SJAASTAD ON PROPOSALS FOR RESTRUCTURING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Minister of Defense Anders C. Sjaastad: "Need for a New Defense Structure"]

[Text] Minister of Defense Anders C. Sjaastad sent the following letter to the Norwegian Reserve Officers Association which responds to the association's communication of 16 December.

Constructive proposals as to how the defense of Norway can be improved must take into consideration the following circumstances:

- There are clear limitations to resources available for defense purposes.
- There are also other political restrictions which should not be disturbed.
- A number of defense tasks are clearly national tasks.
- Norwegian units must be able to meet the first attacks against our area.
- Counterattack and support of allied reinforcements require actions by Norway.
- Allied reinforcements are also subject to limitations regarding accessibility.

If one considers these circumstances one will find that the problems we have in defense can not be solved with increased appropriations alone, within an appropriation level which it is politically possible to achieve.

Furthermore one will find that political restrictions place clear limits on how far we can go in the direction of turning over larger parts of our defense tasks to our allies. Furthermore a number of tasks are required to be covered by our own forces, for example minesweeping and escort missions along the coast.

Preparations for counterattack by allied reinforcements by advance storage and host country support are an effective way of strengthening the defense of Norway. Here we can take a significant defense mission for a relatively limited investment of national resources. But we are competing in many

aspects with others about the reinforcement forces, which often have several options with reference to the area of input. Possible input of allied forces outside the NATO area is also a factor of significance in that connection.

As a responsible cabinet minister I am required to consider the above limitations. It is all too easy, as it is often done, to list weaknesses and shortages in individual branches of the armed services, and so to solve the problems by asking for larger appropriations, eventually at the expense of other branches, and increased inputs from the allies.

We know that alone we can not defend our farflung country against an eventual broad attack by a great power. That is why we are members of a defensive alliance. Through continued cooperation with our allies we seek to get the best possible support for the solution of our defense tasks. There has, however, been no expressed wish by the allies that Norway be excused from its navy and air force missions in order to strengthen its ground forces. NATO military authorities are in agreement with our national leaders on the necessity of a reasonably balanced national defense.

In my opinion our defense concept requires no significant changes. What we must do is to prioritize our use of resources better, with a view to the best possible defense efficiency with the resources available. In that prioritizing the army has an important place, which the Defense Commission has also confirmed.

9287

CSO: 3639/52

IMPACT OF UNION WAGE DEMANDS ON NATIONAL ECONOMY

Madrid ABC in Spanish 3 Jan 84 p 11

[Text] Negotiations and the Economic Model

The negotiations for working conditions in 1984 begin today. On one side of the table is the employers association, whose unwavering position is that wage increases must not exceed 6.5 percent. This is the same stand as the administration's. On the other side of the table are the union federations, which disagree to differing extents with the common stand of the employers association and the administration. UGT [General Union of Workers], the socialist union, contends that the wage ceiling should be upped to eight percent. Workers Commissions (CCOO), the communist union, is calling for a higher wage hike ceiling: 10 percent.

The battlelines have been drawn. The employers association and the government say that their position is based on rational economics. If inflation is expected to hit 8 percent in 1984, wage increases above 6.5 percent cannot be given consideration. The major cause of rising inflation in recent years has been wage boosts, which were always agreed upon in the belief that they had to cover cost of living increases. And while it is true that acceptance of this principle led to a larger share for wages in national income, it is also true that this was achieved at the cost of a steady decline in employment levels. Inflation has thus been officially cut to around 12 or 13 percent, but the jobless rate is up to 17.5 percent. At given manpower costs Spanish companies can maintain only so many jobs.

Realizing that the parties to the 1983 Interconfederation Agreement missed a decisive opportunity to put the Spanish economy back on the road to stability (inasmuch as jobs continued to be eliminated, while stabilization efforts took the form of a steadily more restrictive monetary policy), we must not, under any circumstances, repeat the same mistake in 1984.

Now that our maneuvering room has been narrowed so severely, the alternatives now open to the negotiating parties will affect our economic model itself. Any union bid for a wage ceiling higher than 6.5 percent (the upper limit proposed by the administration and the employers' representatives) is a wager on the economic model or, more accurately stated, against the free economy model. Workers Commission, the Communist Party's workhorse, is proceeding in accordance with its logic in proposing a 10 percent wage increase. Its strategists know quite well that this would mark the start of a particularly rapid plunge into a crisis without return. The State would have to take charge, almost comprehensively and irreversibly, of allocating the nation's economic resources.

The Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations is aware of the political objective of the CCOO stand and takes it for granted that negotiations with it will, in practice, be impossible. And although the wage ceiling will be the first item negotiated, no one should lose sight of the fact that during this phase of the bargaining they will be deciding what the jobs policy will eventually be.

8743

CSO: 3548/159

FISHING FLEET TO UNDERGO COMPLETE REVAMPING

Madrid YA in Spanish 3 Jan 84 p 19

[Article by Jesus F. Briceno]

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and Food is advocating a gradual dismantling of Spain's fishing fleet, which is one of the world's largest in terms of gross registered tons (GRT) but also one of the most obsolete, which adds input costs to the price of the catch, thus making the fleet much less profitable.

To this end Credito Social Pesquero, the sector's official bank, will be granting shipowners 11 percent loans for up to 80 percent of the price of building new vessels as long as they agree to dismantle 150 GRT's for every 100 new GRT's. This measure is designed to discourage the expansion of a sector hampered by the obstacles to Spain's fishing in international banks.

These measures, which took effect yesterday, have been harshly criticized by the unions, whose representatives claim that the government is converting the sector without offering any solution to the loss of jobs.

All of the shipowners who avail themselves of this opportunity to revamp the fishing fleet will receive 30,000 pesetas for each new vessel gross registered ton. This will be paid out of the funds that the general State budget has allocated for this purpose to the General Directorate of Fisheries Management.

Aid and Compensation

The plan to restructure and modernize the fleet also provides sizable funding for the overhaul of vessels and for compensation in the event that some units are forced to move from their usual fishing grounds. The plan is being implemented as the last stage of fishing negotiations with the EEC for 1984 begin. Further reductions in catch quotas and in the number of vessels authorized to fish in EEC waters are expected to come out of these talks.

The nonreimbursable modernization grants can cover up to 30 percent of the cost of the work done or the purchase price, up to a maximum of 5 million pesetas.

When the administration is forced to ask a fishing vessel to move from its customary fishing grounds or to alter its catch methods, it can grant financial aid up to 3 million pesetas in the first case and up to 30 percent of the exact outlays required to adapt and outfit them for the new method.

These measures, which are part of a wideranging program to modernize and convert the sector and which have already taken effect, are designed to adapt Spain's fishing fleet, in numbers of units, GRT and power, to current and near-term requirements, as well as to make catch methods consistent with a rational exploitation of resources, according to official sources.

Financial Aid

Prominent among these measures are financial aid and incentives, which aim at a controlled renovation of the fleet in a bid for greater efficiency. This is in response to the unavoidable need to weed out those obsolete, poorly maintained vessels that fish in almost all grounds, because they consume more fuel, have lower yields and are not very safe for crews.

In addition, some of the fishing boats are not in compliance with existing legislation and are thus causing irreparable damage to this source of income. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing wants to gradually get rid of these units.

Among the arrangements that shipowners and fishermen can avail themselves of, we should mention that a special credit line has been opened for the construction of vessels between 20 and 150 GRT's. Credito Social Pesquero will finance up to 80 percent of the total price of the vessel, once the shipbuilding premiums and the pertinent tax credits have been calculated and deducted.

Payback Periods

The maximum payback period for the loans is 12 years as of the date that construction work is completed. Borrowers will not have to make principal payments during the first 2 years. The interest rate will be a minimum of 11 percent.

The most prominent feature of this credit line is that the General Directorate of Fisheries Managament must authorize the application for units that are going to fish outside the Mediterranean. Moreover, the owners must dismantle 150 GRT's for each 100 GRT's of new construction, and the vessels must be more than 25 years old.

Among the vessels that can be dismantled are those that have not yet put in 25 years of service but that are currently not in compliance with the power and GRT limits and other requirements established in the present law for certain fishing zones and methods. Also eligible are vessels that fish in any area and that are unsafe at sea, have obsolete technology, consume too much fuel, are unprofitable and use fishing methods other than those for which they are legally authorized, as well as all boats that exceed the limits for fishing in foreign grounds or that are overfishing in domestic grounds. Priority for withdrawing vessels from service will be, by type, "trawl," "gig" and "seine."

The General Directorate of Fisheries Management must also authorize these loans for vessels fishing in the Mediterranean. In filling the dismantling quota of 150 GRT's and 125 horsepower, shipowners can also turn in legal vessels that have been in service for more than 25 years, in the following order of priority: "trawl," "arte claro" (?) and "seine." Also qualifying will be vessels that are less than 25 years old but that currently do not comply with power and GRT limits and other requirements of existing law.

8743

CSO: 3548/159

AGRARIAN ORGANIZATIONS DISAGREE WITH PRODUCE PRICES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 3 Jan 84 p 51

[Article by Cesar Lumbreras]

[Excerpts] In the agrarian sector, 1984 began with four of the five national agrarian organizations expressing disagreement with the new produce prices fixed unilaterally by the government at the last meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Last week, the government approved the new produce prices that will obtain during the 1983-84 season and that entail weighted average increase of more than 6.5 percent. The initial reaction of the agrarian organizations, except the Federation of Farm Workers [FTT], has been negative, although their definitive position will not be known until after the meetings to be held by their executive bodies this week and the next. Some of them have already threatened to mobilize their forces if necessary.

The reasons leading the government to fix the new prices varied according to product:

--Cotton: The increase is 11.8 percent, plus a subsidy of 5 pesetas per kilo, in order to stimulate execution of the new 5-year plan.

--Grains for animal feed: The price increases for this group are: for barley, 10.40 percent; for oats, 10.45 percent; and for rye, 10.48 percent. It is hoped that with these, production will be stimulated and dependence on imported raw materials for feeding livestock will be reduced.

--Rice: The increase is 9.15 percent, so that a kilo now costs 31 pesetas instead of 28.40 pesetas. During the year that is coming to an end, because of the drought, the harvest was far less than usual, contrary to what happened in previous years, when production surpassed consumption.

--Cow's milk: The minimum purchase price of a liter has gone up from 28.75 pesetas to 31.10, representing an increase of 8.17 percent. During the next season, it is hoped to obtain a structural and production improvement in the dairy sector by means of the Structural Regulation of Milk Production.

--Meats: For this group, consisting of beef and pork, the price increases are 7.23 percent for the former, which has gone up from 346 to 371 pesetas per kilo (dressed), and 7.24 percent for the latter, which now costs 163 pesetas per kilo (dressed) instead of 152.

--Crops for industrial processing: The price increases for this group, comprising sugar beets, sugar cane and sunflowers, are 6.59 percent for the first two--owing to surplus of sugar produced in recent years, which it is costly to eliminate--and 6.43 percent for the last, which have gone up in price from 40.40 pesetas to 43 pesetas per kilo.

--Olive oil: For this product, the increase is 5 percent, the price being raised from 170 to 178.50 pesetas per kilo, to which a subsidy of 12 pesetas per kilo should be added.

--Wheat: The increase in price for wheat has been fixed at 4.14 percent in order to maintain the desired relationship to the price of barley and to stimulate increased production of the latter. In addition, the purchasing monopoly enjoyed by the National Agricultural Products Service [SENPA] has been abolished.

--Corn: As in the case of wheat, the increase is 4.14 percent. To this increase should be added a series of measures designed to stimulate production, such as per hectare subsidies, help in planting seeds, drying rooms, etc, which would raise the established price by two points.

Finally, wine, surpluses of which have been produced in recent years, suffered no change in price. The ministry will promote a special plan for export development and productive transformation.

With regard to the control of prices for "inputs," the products bought by farmers and stockbreeders, the government has established maximum increases of 11 percent for diesel oil, electricity and fertilizer. For stockbreeders, a maximum of 13 percent has been established, taking as a point of reference the price of pigs [acabado de porcino].

Nevertheless, owing to the experience of the year now coming to an end, the agrarian organizations have reacted skeptically to this measure. In negotiations in the past a ceiling was also established for increases on "inputs" for stockbreeders and compromise reached for review of prices. This ceiling was greatly exceeded in the case of feed and notwithstanding this, the government refused to consider the repercussions or countervailing moves to be made on this account, which is why there is doubt that the government will carry out this provision in succeeding years.

Moreover, after making a preliminary analysis of the prices, the organization criticized them as too low. The National Confederation of Farmers and Stockbreeders [CNAG] considers them a serious affront to the rural areas and has therefore convoked an extraordinary general meeting for this week to discuss the matter, and the possibility of a mobilization of forces cannot be

ruled out. The National Center for Young Farmers [CNJA], which is to hold an extraordinary assembly on 8 January, and the Spanish Union of Agrarian Federations [UFADE] also foresee this possibility.

For its part, the Coordinating Body for Organizations of Farmers and Stockbreeders [COAG] has convoked a plenary meeting for the day after tomorrow and likewise refuses to rule out the use of pressure.

12336

CSO: 3548/160

POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OZAL INTEREST POLICY

Optimistic Patience Counsellled

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 21 Dec 83 p 1

[Editorial: "The Need for Optimistic Patience"]

[Text] For the last two days, bankers have been toiling over their calculators with a copy of the Official Gazette in their hands. They have been trying to picture what the new interest system has brought and what it has taken away. Meanwhile, they are also preparing the announcements to tell the public that they are complying with the new system. Large banks managed to do this in large circulation newspapers from day one.

Initial results of their calculations seem to have driven some bankers to pessimism. One can feel that only in private conversations. The anxiety expressed stems from the fact that the system could not withstand 50-percent interest rates even at times when inflation exceeded 100 percent.

In general, however, the common viewpoint expressed by bankers is summarized as "optimistic waiting for the effects the new system will produce." Everyone acknowledges that the banking system is plagued with maladies rooted in inadequate resources on the one hand and high credit costs on the other. It is said that something needs to be done to cure these maladies and that the first solution that comes to mind in this area is the adjustment of interest rates.

Contrary to what has been accustomed to so far and what was expected, the new system does not provide for higher interest rates on long-term deposits than on short-term deposits as is commonly believed. If it is assumed that the inflation rate has reached 50 percent--which is what was recently announced in a political statement but which is not supported by price statistics--the new system makes the 3-month time deposit the most sought and the most expensive money. The least sought and the least expensive money is the 1-year time deposit.

This is the arrangement that the new interest system wants banks and savers to endorse.

This arrangement also gives a clear idea about inflation expectations for the future. The chances are that interest rates will fall starting with the 3-month

time deposits when the Central Bank resets them at the end of the first 3 months, and if not, they will surely fall at the end of the second 3 months. Thus, the most expensive and most sought money may be the money used in these 6 months. In the course of time, for instance when the inflation rate is reduced to below 20 percent, the 1-year time deposit can once again be attractive.

The political announcement that the inflation rate for 1983 was as high as 50 percent--even though official statistics put this figure at a maximum of 31 percent--will make it possible to call inflation rates of 40 percent in the beginning of 1984 and 35 percent at the end as "declines." The psychological effect of that on the functioning of market rules is undeniably important.

The new system, furthermore, does seem to have placed too much emphasis on illusions of rediverting into bank deposits the money believed to exist outside the banking system. The elimination of monthly interest payments and the stipulation that interest can be paid only at the end of the specified 3-month period can be considered an admission of the fact that interest compounding has a role in the growth of saving deposits in banks. The new interest rates to be announced at the end of 3 months, will seek to prevent this interest paid from flowing into consumption unless it is essential and to keep it in bank accounts.

This is what the methods and goals roughly are. Time will show their ability to cure existing maladies. However, when it is realized that the new burden of high interest rates will not be felt by the banks immediately and that it will take time before they take effect, it can be said that there is no need for premature pessimism.

Ilicak Praises New Policy

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 21 Dec 83 pp 1,10

[Editorial by Nazli Ilicak: "Interest"]

[Text] During his election campaign tours, Ozal promoted the theme of "we will make the mainmast prosperous". Now that he is in power he has proven that those were not empty words. Higher interest rates constitute his program's most vital and effective measure which can provide short-term relief to the low-income citizen.

Even the implementation of the old days positively impressed most citizens in spite of the broker bankruptcies. Because the people earned 800 billion Turkish liras in interest income and only 30 billion Turkish liras were held back by liquidation boards.

Today, having the benefit of previous experience, Ozal returns to the high interest system in a much healthier environment than before. The mistake of the past was that, brokers who should have acted only as intermediaries became deposit holding and money trading institutions. At the beginning, the brokers were tolerated in order to force banks to raise their interest rates, and then, when things got out of hand, brakes to halt the interest bidding race were not applied in time out of fear of causing turmoil in the market.

Today, the citizen has to deal with banks that are covered by government guarantees. Furthermore, countermeasures to prevent an interest bidding race are also in place: The Central Bank has been appointed to set interest rates every 3 months. Ozal is contemplating to implement an unregulated interest system later in the future. However, this is an implementation that should develop together with the "transparent banking" system. In other words, the banks will be able to raise interest rates without supervision if they agree to make their balance sheets public every 3 months, to disclose their profits and losses and to allow certified auditors to examine their accounting books. This "transparent banking" implementation has been put off for the moment in view of the current problems the banks are facing.

Income Above Inflation

The goal of the new system is to provide the saver with an income that exceeds the inflation rate rather than to increase interest rates per se. At the time when the interest rate on 1-year time deposits was set at 32 percent, the inflation rate for 1983 was projected to remain at 25 percent. Today, it appears virtually certain that the inflation rate will approach 40 percent. Consequently, net interest rates of 44.1 percent on 3-month time deposits, 42.3 percent on 6-month time deposits and 40.5 percent for 1-year time deposits will give deposit holders an advantage of only a few percentage points.

The purpose of raising interest rates is to make the low-income citizen happy and to reduce inflation. It is envisioned that with money going into the banks consumption will decrease and the swollen resources will flow into production and investments. The restored balance between supply and demand will then curb price increases.

The highest interest rates have been set for short-term deposits in order to prevent high interest rates from becoming a burden on banks for too long. If inflation declines in the next 3 months, the Central Bank will immediately pull back interest rates. Because the objective is to give the citizen an interest rate that will exceed the inflation rate without imposing an unbearable burden on the industrialist. Otherwise, investments, which Ozal says will relieve unemployment, will not get off the ground, and, furthermore, the banks' present problems will continue because the resources they have lent out will not be repaid as a result of the bankruptcies.

Tax Revenue Loss

The government has risked loss of tax revenue with the new interest system. The tax withholding rate on earned interest has been reduced to 10 percent to allow the people to draw more money. Furthermore, the expenditure tax paid by industrialists who have taken out loans has been reduced from 15 percent to 3 percent. It is estimated that this loss of tax revenue will be offset by the extra funds to be supplied by increased economic activity. Investments will be revived, employment will increase, and the government will have more tax resources.

The proper functioning of the new interest mechanism will depend on the realization of certain expectations:

--The interest rate boost will substantially raise bank deposits.

--Prices will fall sharply.

--As a result, interest rates on bank deposits will be reduced in a short period of time.

--A balance will be established between money supply and demand, and interest rates on credit will decline.

These are the conditions that are necessary for Ozal's success. When interest rates were freed in the past, although bank deposits rose from 746 billion Turkish liras to 2,416 billion Turkish liras in 2 years, credit interest rates continued to be a heavy burden because the industrialist's need for funds could not be filled. While the 12-point reduction in the expenditure tax is aimed at reducing the industrialist's financing costs, that measure can only have limited effect if a balance cannot be established between supply and demand.

Social Goal

We would like to emphasize again the social goal of the high interest rate implementation. Our colleague, Mehmet Barlas, examined this issue yesterday and said that wealth was being transferred to the masses. The free interest rate implementation, which ends the period of cheap money, constitutes a major step in the direction of social justice by turning over facilities granted to industrialists and bankers to the bank deposit holders.

9588

CSO: 3554/106

ASSESSMENT OF CAUSES, IMPACT OF OZAL POLICY

Ulugay on Causative Factors

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 21 Dec 83 pp 1,6

[Article by Osman Ulugay: "Who Got What from 19 December"]

[Text] One of the most important changes in Turkey in recent years is no doubt the public's increased curiosity toward interest rates and inflation. This curiosity will naturally become more intense following the latest decisions on interest rates which have established a closer relationship between interest rates and inflation. From small savers to "big money" owners, from bankers to industrialists and from housewives to retirees, virtually everyone has already begun figuring out what they have gained and lost by the new interest system.

Without forgetting that the effects of the new decisions will vary from one social segment to another and that a great deal of time and expertise are required to assess all these effects, let us try to summarize the effects and impacts that catch the eye at a first glance.

--The small saver's perspective: As inflation continues to soar, the most rational option the small saver appears to have is to deposit his money in a 3-month time deposit account which bears a gross annual interest of 49 percent. At current tax withholding rates, this interest translates into a net return of 39.2 percent (44.1 percent if the tax withholding rate is reduced to 10 percent). The interest rate after the end of the 3-month term will depend on the inflation rate. If the depositor believes that inflation will rise, he should deposit his money in a short-term account; if he thinks that inflation will decline, he would be better off by depositing his money in a long-term account. Because from now on it will be harder to "change the term" of an account; an account will earn as much interest until the end of its term as the rate prevailing at the time it was opened. Those who are hoping for new interest rates for old accounts will, unfortunately, not get what they are hoping for. Furthermore, interest will no longer be compounded monthly. The saver must wait at least 3 months to earn interest, which is to the disadvantage of the small saver. In brief then, the new interest system provides to the small saver interest income that is in better tune with the inflation rate, but also embodies provisions that tend to discipline the depositor.

--The "big money" owner's perspective: The following measures are introduced to restore the attraction of banks for "big money" owners who may contemplate to speculate in commodities or real estate, to practice usury outside the banks or to invest in foreign currency as an alternative to keeping their money in banks: a) "To the bearer" certificates of deposits are reintroduced; b) The tax withholding rate on "to the bearer" accounts or certificates of deposit is reduced to the same level as that applied to name bearing accounts; and c) Tax easements are introduced for interest income exceeding 3 million Turkish liras a year. In view of the fact that "big money" owners also regain their facility to bargain with banks as in the old days, it can be said that the new system embodies interesting prospects for this segment.

--The banks' perspective: The new system, which reserves the highest interest rate for 3-month time deposits, is envisioned to spare the banks from long-term high interest liabilities. Thus, if the inflation rate drops, the banks' interest burden will also be reduced. However, the fact that distinctions between commercial and public accounts have been eliminated and the fact that interest rates on all accounts have been made to depend solely on the term of the account make it very difficult for banks to compute their resource costs. For example, at the end of November 1983, the banks held 438 billion Turkish liras in demand deposits which earned 20 percent gross interest and 576 billion Turkish liras in commercial deposits which officially earned no interest. How will the banks' resource costs be affected if, for example, half these deposits--which amount to nearly 1 trillion Turkish liras--find the 49 percent rate attractive and are shifted to 3-month time deposit accounts? If some large deposit holders persuade certain marginal banks to pay 49 percent interest on what actually are demand deposit accounts, is it not true that a new "adventure contest" will begin among the banks? Will not the banks' marginal cost of existing time deposits--which totaled 1,349 billion Turkish liras as of the end November--rise in any event?

It is impossible to estimate quantitatively the impact of the new regulations on the banks' interest expenses and resource costs before answering all these questions. New burdens imposed on banks and provisions reducing their burdens must also be taken into account. One short-term gain that this new implementation can produce for the banks is that this year's sluggish growth rate of deposits may regain momentum.

--The credit customer's perspective: In view of the banks' multifaceted problems enumerated above, it is not very easy to predict how credit interest rates will be affected by cuts in the expenditure tax and fund. The general impression is that a tangible decline in credit interest rates cannot be expected--at least for the moment--until a definite drop is observed in the banks' resource costs, and credit resources become substantially more abundant. However, a limited drop in credit cost is expected for credit customers who pay very high premiums--70 to 75 percent--for credit. Meanwhile, the reduction of the differential between export and normal credit costs and the resulting slightly higher costs for export loans are aimed at insuring that only genuine exporters make use of these loans, and it seems that this implementation will work to the advantage of large exporting firms.

Dogan on Interest Rates

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 21 Dec 83 pp 1,11

[Article by Yalcin Dogan: "Where May the Run on Interest Lead?"]

[Text] Ankara--The return to higher interest rates will probably bring a spate of debates with it. However, both sides of the issue must be examined to determine clearly what it will bring and what it will take away. In other words, firstly, what do depositors gain and lose from higher interest rates? And, secondly, will the banks and investors manage to live with high interest rates?

The first important aspect of the issue naturally hinges upon the link between the new interest rates and the "mainmast" which Ozal is so fond of referring. Some very concrete computations are necessary to demonstrate this clearly. Suppose, a citizen has 100,000 Turkish liras. Since a 3-month time deposit account pays 49 percent gross interest on an annual basis, 100,000 Turkish liras will have earned a net interest of 10,250 Turkish liras (if the interest tax withholding rate is reduced to 10 percent). Thus, 10,250 Turkish liras, which is roughly a quarter of the 49 percent, is the net return on 100,000 in 3 months. That translates into an additional net income of 3,500 Turkish liras a month.

At this point, two questions must be asked: First, who has 100,000 Turkish liras to deposit in the bank? Do those known as the "mainmast" own 100,000 Turkish liras to deposit in the bank? And secondly, is there any relationship between providing 3,500 Turkish liras a month in additional income and "spreading social justice"? A net income of 3,500 Turkish liras of course helps. But how much economic prosperity can that additional income give to the "mainmast"?

The more the money saved and deposited in the bank, the more the additional income. That being the case, a number of developments can be expected in the coming period. The "run on interest" will probably resume once again. It is not too hard to predict that housing, gold and automobile prices will decline as a result of that. This is what the "mainmast" will really do. Once confidence is gained in interest rates, the mainmast will sell everything it owns and deposit the money in interest-bearing accounts. This may be expected to have two consequences. Firstly, the society's "wealth distribution" will change, and property will change hands. This is the worst consequence for the mainmast. Secondly, declines will probably be observed in the inflation rate. The mainmast will gain some advantage on that point. Falling prices will give a certain amount of breathing space to the mainmast. However, that development will come about over the long run.

This is the overview of the issue from the "saver's" viewpoint. Then there is the investors' and the banks' perspective of the issue. The banks will buy the money that is being deposited at a cost of 49 percent interest. Directives published in the Official Gazette have set the interest rate on investment credit at 30 percent. In other words, a bank that buys money for 49 percent will have to sell it for 30 percent. In short, the banks will lose 20 percent

on every lira they lend. How will the banks cover this loss? Either the banks losing money will start crumbling, or the Central Bank will finance these banks. A third prospect is that the banks may be supported by foreign credit, and, consequently, investments may be financed by foreign credit. But then, one should ask, where will foreign credit come from and how? Have new undisclosed foreign credit sources been found?

The return to high interest rates can produce short and long-term gains as well as losses for the mainmast. What counts is the final balance sheet on these gains and losses.

The situation is a little bit more confused on the investment front. We believe that the bulk of attention will focus on banks and investors in the coming period. Because that is where the "apocalypse" will come if it ever does.

9588

CSO: 3554/105

OZYORUK ON BUDGETARY NEEDS OF JUSTICE SYSTEM

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 21 Dec 83 p 6

["Your Decision" column by Mukbil Ozyoruk: "The Judiciary's Budget"]

[Text] The country has so many problems in every area that when one looks at the existing prospects to resolve them, or rather, when one sees the extent of the impossibility we are faced with, one is beset by an unbearable pain. We have in our hands the figures and the percentages describing the distance covered by this country in every area since the declaration of the republic. You look at these figures, then you turn your eyes to present inadequacies and then you try to console yourself by saying "even the most developed countries are suffering from all kinds of problems today." But the attempt is futile. The problems of the "developed countries" are no remedy to our maladies. All the efforts and all the progress of the last sixty years notwithstanding, we have still not been able to achieve the state of self-sufficiency. You might say, "Well, the backwardness of centuries could not be corrected in such a small amount of time." That is a fact. On the other hand, it is also a fact that we have lost so much time in our intense efforts to develop ourselves and that we have rowed against the current so many times. In fact, in the last few years preceding 12 September we had come to the brink of bankruptcy in every respect and we were even threatened with losing the state. Consequently, you are naturally pleased with this latest self-rescue movement of ours. You say: "What can we do? We will get back to work. Heaven grant us patience."

That is why one's conscience does not permit one to criticize either the 12 September government of [Bulend] Ulu or today's Ozal government which stands at the doorstep of a new period of democracy. It would really be nothing but cruelty to tell a democratic administration which has not yet begun to toddle: "We will get you. We will reveal everything about you."

It seems to me that everything, without exceptions, depends first on the maintenance of peace and law and order and the preservation of government authority and, immediately after that, the country's economic development. Everything depends on the government's economic strength. And for that, the citizens must grow economically stronger. Because no matter how patriotic individuals are, there is a financial limit on the sacrifices demanded from them to strengthen the government.

While it is obvious how close that "financial limit on sacrifice" has come and how small an area in bounds, one is depressed by the paucity plaguing public services starting with the most important and vital ones.

Just look at the inadequacy of judicial services. As far as we know there is a shortfall of at least 20 percent in the ranks of judges and prosecutors. A recent news item pierces one like a bullet: "None of the 520 graduates of Istanbul University's School of Law this year intend to seek judgeship or prosecutorship positions." Who can claim that the graduates of other law schools will seek positions in the judicial system? In that case, how and when will this shortfall be filled?

If you ask, "What are the leading one or two functions and services the government must provide?" the answer would include, or even begin with, "to insure that justice is done and to disseminate justice." "Inadequacies" are always present in every field of service. However, the "inadequacy in judicial services" is a product of the severe economic crisis of the last few years. The young graduate says: "If I become a judiciary official, I will have to depend on a fixed salary, and I could not live on that. That is why I prefer becoming a lawyer." But are prospects in the legal counseling business so abundant and so attractive, particularly for new graduates who are just entering the practice and who are trying to build a life of their own? Far from so. However, the young graduates, "taking their first steps as jurists", have compared judgeships and prosecutorships with legal counseling and have found legal counseling to be more promising for a prosperous life. Is this "really" a fact? Do not new graduates without offices and "clientele" inherited from their fathers still have to work very hard as lawyers to earn their bread? Yes, but even so, the preference is in that direction.

The judicial branch unfortunately heads the list of service areas which have been most neglected. After every article I write in this column about the problems of the judiciary, I am subjected to a flood of letters from judges and prosecutors, most of whom are former students of mine. They say: "Sir, we would be content if the problems and the pain were only as much as you can see from outside." Then they start enumerating the problems. As I read them, I am taken by deep despair and grief. It is true that no matter how extensive the prospects offered to the judicial staff were, the judiciary would probably still not be perfect today. However, it is clear that, even "with respect to what could have been done", unforgivable negligence has had a part in present inadequacies. Let me draw your attention to a single point: Is it not true that even moderate projections predict an inflation rate of around 40 percent for 1983? However, the amount earmarked for the Ministry of Justice in the 1984 budget is only 20.49 percent higher than that allocated from the 1983 budget. In other words, it does not even compensate for inflation; in fact it lags behind inflation by 19.5--say 20--points. This means that we are entering 1984 with a decline of at least 20 percent over 1983. Such a decline cannot even hold the inadequacies where they were last year; it can only make them worse.

May God help us.

9588

CSO: 3554/108

CENTRAL BANK POLICY FOCUSES ON INTEREST, COMPETITION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 21 Dec 83 pp 1,7

[Report by Yener Kaya]

[Text] With the new Central Bank directive restructuring interest rates taking effect, it has been stated that interest rates on credit have gained particular importance and that the freedom that has been granted may lead to a major competition among banks on this issue. While the announced higher interest rates on bank deposits are interpreted as an effort to reduce inflation, it has been noted that certain bottlenecks may arise if additional measures are not taken.

According to the Central Bank directive restructuring interest rates, from now on, banks will be completely free to set credit interest rates. Garanti Bankasi Director General Halit Soydan said: "A benchmark will be established in credit interest rates. In a sense, a 'prime rate' will be found." Meanwhile, it was noted that competition may increase among banks to invest the deposits that are expected to increase as a result of higher interest rates.

It was learned that banks have begun work to determine interest rates for their credit customers and that the rates they will determine will be disclosed in public announcements in the coming days.

Meanwhile, bankers responded positively to the new directive's provision ending the distinction between commercial and saving deposits and stipulating payment of interest on both types of accounts. The bankers emphasized, however, that the slightest bottleneck in the implementation of these provisions may lead to a major economic crisis.

Noting that the directive on interest rates primarily encourages 3-month time deposits, one bank official said that the fact that banks must from now on invest such short-term deposits in credit accounts with terms ranging from a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 7 years will pose additional risks for these institutions and that, consequently, measures must be taken to insure the continuity of saving deposits.

Stating that the new interest rates constitute an important step for the financial sphere from a viewpoint of their counterinflationary impact, Ertan Ozdemir, a financial consultant, said: "I believe that the government's action

to boost interest rates was inevitable at a time when the savings rate was declining."

Stating that the high interest policy will inevitably boost bank deposits, Ertan Ozdemir said: "People who invested their savings in such deadend commodities as gold and real estate will begin to divert their funds increasingly into banks in view of this high real interest rates. This will increase the volume of funds available for credit, and the current economic stagnation will be replaced by a recovery." Noting that the directive goes beyond classical financial models and that its correctness has been proven by many bitter experiences, Ozdemir said: "As far as I can see the issue is purely mathematical. Therefore, I do not foresee any bottlenecks, as long as everyone arranges his affairs with an eye to selling for more than his cost."

Meanwhile, arguing that the directive will lead the banks to operate like money market institutions and that higher interest rates will force banks to act more intelligently, Yilmaz Karakoyunlu said: "When interest rates were freed 3 years ago, banks paid higher interest on long-term accounts. In the present implementation, short-term deposits are encouraged with higher interest rates, and thus banks are being forced to perform a type of 'money market' function." Noting that the second aspect of the high interest rate issue that needs to be debated concerns the fact that it is impossible to talk about free interest rates, Karakoyunlu said: "This new directive once again makes the government responsible for setting interest rates. The rates will now be determined by the Central Bank." Stating that the newly announced interest rates will force the banks into a serious competition with money market institutions, Karakoyunlu said: "However, no money market institutions exist. We have reached a point where it is necessary for the Central Bank to institute 'open market procedures' to enable money market institutions to function with the desired effectiveness."

Describing the new directive as a long-awaited and belated decision, Imar Bankasi Director General Erol Toksoz said: "The directive has been formulated within the framework of generally positive principles. However, not much has changed for the industrialist who has been complaining about high credit costs. Industrialists, who were complaining about their high costs on credit from banks as a result of certain fund blocking and other accounting procedures, will from now on have to borrow from banks at a minimum of 60 percent interest. Consequently, it is hardly possible to say that the directive has reduced the credit customer's burden." Stating that higher interest rates will boost the flow of bank deposits in the next two months, Toksoz added: "However, the main problem will emerge two months later. In other words, if additional measures to encourage the citizens to save and to raise the national income level are not taken to follow up this directive, undesirable developments may once again be experienced in the financial world."

9588
CSO: 3554/108

NEW REGULATIONS GOVERN COST OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 30 Dec 83 pp 1,11

[Text] Beginning today, private and public banks will determine their own foreign currency prices daily and they will advertise the prices they set by posting them in their branch office windows.

Yesterday's OFFICIAL GAZETTE, which was full of economic decisions, also published a Central Bank notice. According to this announcement, banks are left "free within specific limits" to determine their own foreign exchange rates. This limit of freedom was set at six percent. In accordance with this notice the Central Bank will announce the "official price" of the foreign exchange rates in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE and over the radio just as it has until now. The banks will then determine for themselves the exchange rate that they feel will be appropriate for that day within a range six percent above or below this officially announced price. They will advertise this rate in the windows of their branch offices. The banks will be able to change the rates within this six percent limit daily if they so desire. Thus, instead of the "single exchange rate" announced by the Central Bank, theoretically there can be as many different exchange rates as there are banks. Citizens who want to can go to any bank and shop for the foreign exchange rate that the bank sets.

Within the six percent limit, banks can once again sell foreign exchange to importers and buy it from exporters. In response to the question we posed concerning how this decision will be beneficial, one official told us the following:

"Bankers have been given freedom in buying and selling foreign exchange with this decision. However, the limits of this freedom will not exceed six percent. Such liberty certainly cannot affect the price of the lira in relation to the dollar. If the dollar further strengthens, the Turkish lira will continue to drop in value. The decision will further liberalize the individual advertising of currency rates in the banks' own branches and facilitate shopping for foreign exchange. From an economic point of view, it cannot be thought that it will provide any net gain. In other words, since it cannot affect the price of the dollar, it really cannot impact on the overall economic course."

The procedure was implemented effective yesterday.

REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT'S IMPORT, EXPORT REGIME

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 30 Dec 83 pp 1,11

[Text] The import-export regime has gone into effect with its publication in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE. The new system allows free import of durable goods. It is envisaged that the fees which will be collected from the import of these goods will be invested in the Residence Fund instead of the Housing Development Fund. This will encourage contractors who work alone in the Emlak (Real Estate) Bank. An important point in the arrangements was that the Treasury and the Foreign Economic Relations Undersecretariat was made responsible for import-export and tax rebate rates. In this new arrangement, the security deposit applied to imports was dropped to one percent for incentive certificate investments.

The major changes brought about with the import-export regime that has gone into effect with the new decisions can be listed under the following headings:

--A new era has begun in importing under the name fund system. The permanent undersecretary is authorized to make all arrangements in this matter. (The goods that may be imported and the related funds are in our listing.)

--Any goods not found on the prohibited or restricted goods lists shall, from now on, be considered as duty free and may be imported.

--As was the case in the 1970's, all kinds of used goods can be imported if permission is granted.

--The scope of the foreign currency allotment for importing has been broadened. Henceforth, the foreign currency allotment can be made for freight and insurance expenditures.

--Imports carried out with socialist countries can be executed only by large importing firms which have done 50 million dollars of business over the past calendar year. (There are 22 companies in this category.)

--The security deposit rate for imports has been set at 15 percent. However, the rate for organizations which have obtained investment incentive certificates will be one percent. The undersecretary is empowered to make changes on this matter.

--The Incentives and Applications Office is responsible for tax rebates. The authority to determine new changes and listings remains with this organization.

--Tax rebates on exports will be set on delivery costs (CIF) instead of the sale price. This way, additional tax rebates will be obtained on exports to far-away markets. A Support and Price Stabilization Fund was established, created from funds taken from support products at a rate of two percent of the value of import goods. The fund will be used for agricultural price supports, to boost exports and to finance residence activity.

--In the application of import-export procedures, authority will be given to the professional organizations. For this reason, trade and industry chambers of commerce will be given administrative authority in export processes. (22 companies fall into this category.)

--In foreign trade, the right to do business on a special bartering arrangement or with interconnected sales will be restricted to companies which do 50 million dollars worth of exports.

--Contractors abroad may take out needed machinery and transportation vehicles and workers employed outside the country may bring out foodstuffs without any exporter's papers.

--Permission has been given for re-export (two-stage exporting) as a method to combat EEC market restrictions.

With the new import regime, the first preliminary decision has been made to permit the importation of foreign cigarettes. In a list appended to the regime, permission is granted to import cigarette paper. With this decision, a major problem has been solved for companies which will produce foreign cigarettes. After this step, if the Finance and Customs Ministry gives the "ok" cigarette production can start in Turkey. As is known, in the arrangements established in the law setting up Tekel [the state monopoly] the question of Tekel setting up a partnership with foreign companies and producing foreign cigarettes was stricken from the text.

With the arrangements implemented in the new regime, no fund will be paid into in the event of cigarette paper importing. Furthermore, where formerly the customs duty was set at 50 percent, this rate was lowered to 25 percent.

Banned Items

The following goods may not be imported: Fur products, silk threads, children's games, materials for parlor games, any kind of statue, painting or print, antiques that predate the twentieth century, live breeds of pigs, processed human hair, raw meat extracts and juices, fruit puree and pulp, vermouth, apple wines, glass products for the dining room, kitchen, bathroom and study and for home decorations and similar products, pearls, chandeliers, wheeled cars and vehicles intended as children's toys and hairbrushes, barettes and similar items.

Import Goods Requiring Permission

369 items such as breeding horses, peanuts, cotton, sunflower seeds, tobacco seeds, refined sugar, air conditioners, farm machinery and equipment, bicycles and similar motorized road vehicles, radio receivers and transmitters, television receivers, boats and other water-going vehicles may be imported if permission is granted.

12280

CSO: 3554/115

STRAUSS SEEKS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE FOR ENVIRONMENT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 16 Dec 83 p 6

[Article entitled: "Constitutional Stature for Environmental Protection: Bavaria Intent Upon Playing Pioneer Role/Kohl: Not in the Basic Law"]

[Text] Fin. Munich, 15 December. The Bavarian prime minister Strauss intends to confer constitutional stature on environmental protection in Bavaria. As the immediate cause for this plan, the director of the state chancellery, State Secretary Stoiber, cited the outcome of the talk between Federal Chancellor Kohl and Strauss on 13 December. On this occasion, it was reported, Kohl declared that an amendment of the Basic Law in regard to environmental protection is not to be expected although a commission of experts appointed by the Federal Government proposed such a change. The Bavarian SPD is insinuating that with his initiative Strauss wanted to avert a popular referendum. The SPD fraction in the provincial diet had instructed its governing body last week to bring about a corresponding, in Bavaria admissible referendum, which could then be followed by a plebiscite.

The conceptions regarding the language of the provision to be included in the Bavarian Constitution seem to be still somewhat vague. What is to be avoided in any case is the creation of a new "individual right" which could possibly be used as a basis for a law suit by anyone. Stoiber evidently has in mind a version which identifies "soil, water, air and landscape" as "natural life foundations". Not yet decided is also the question of the mental context in which the provision in question is best to be included. It could find a place in the "first main part--Structure and Tasks of the State", as well as in the already now unique Article 141, which, among other things, lists "recreation in the open fields and forests" and the "acquisition of wild-growing fruits of the forest in locally customary volume" as constitutional rights.

The SPD fraction, without whom a constitution-altering two-thirds majority would not come into being, has affirmed its willingness to negotiate, but at the same time expressed its concern that the constitutional change is being "used by the CDU as an alibi for doing nothing." Strauss, too, has already frequently made fun of those who take the view that reality can be changed with assertions alone. Evidently Strauss and Stoiber expect at least a propagandistic effect, furthermore an impact on the adjudication of the administrative courts in cases in which environmental protection plays a role. The Ba-

varian Council of Ministers has not yet officially dealt with the matter. The CSU general secretary and fraction chairman Tandler, however, has signalled the support of the plan by his majority fraction because a constitutional change would "round off" the efforts of the CSU on behalf of environmental protection and would "underscore the leading position of Bavaria in this sphere."

8970

CSO: 3620/134

SECOND ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT WITH GDR IN PREPARATION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 21 Dec 83 p 2

[Article entitled: "A Further Agreement with the GDR in Environmental Protection Is Possible: Reduction of the Salt Pollution of the Werra and Weser Rivers"]

[Text] fy. Bonn, 20 December. After in October with the agreement about the environmental improvement of the Thuringian-Frankish border river Roeden a first agreement between Bonn and East Berlin in the sphere of environmental protection came into being, the federal government and the states have now created the preconditions for concrete negotiations with the GDR about a second and much larger environmental protection project: The reduction of the salt pollution of the Werra and Weser Rivers.

At a meeting of the Hessian prime minister and the federal chancellor last weekend, Boerner agreed to the financial participation demanded by Bonn in the costs that are likely to arise through the planned reduction of the salt pollution. As quid pro quo the federal government recognized that Hessen is not obligated to do so. The state government insisted on this because otherwise it was fearful of a precedent effect of its willingness to pay for further environmental agreements with the GDR; finally, the federal government and the states which are adjacent to the Elbe have already conducted expert talks with the GDR concerning how the pollution of this river by heavy metals and chlorinated hydrocarbons could be reduced.

According to the agreement between Boerner and Kohl, the federal government and the four affected states have come to an understanding that of the costs which could arise for the federal government through the aspired-to agreement on the reduction of the salt pollution of the Werra and Weser Rivers, the federal government, as well as the states of Hessen, Lower Saxony, Northrhine-Westphalia and Bremen, as adjacent states, would assume one half each. Reportedly an agreement concerning the division of the cost share of the states among the four is still outstanding.

With this the precondition for negotiations between East Berlin and Bonn is given. It is hoped that it will be possible to begin them at the beginning of next year. To date both sides have limited themselves to clarify, in talks among experts, the technical possibilities that can be applied for this purpose. Questions of costs have not yet been negotiated. The salt pollution of

the Werra and Weser Rivers derives from the mining of potassium salts on both sides of the German-German border. It is presently estimated by West German experts as being 30,000 to 35,000 tons of mineral salt a day, of which about 10 percent come from West German potassium mines, the remaining 90 percent from those of the GDR.

In a reply of the Federal Government to a question in parliament in October, the amount of salt introduced into the Werra River was estimated at an annual average of about 171 kilograms per second. Of this amount, 19 kilograms supposedly come from the FRG and 152 kilograms from the GDR. In so doing, the GDR exceeds many times the amount of salt which it was permitted by the Commission for Potassium Waste Water in 1951.

In order to take corrective action, the GDR must give up the washing process which it has utilized up to now and decide in favor of another, but in any case more expensive, process. Which process the GDR intends to give preference to, it has thus far not indicated. In the talks among experts, however, it became clear that the FRG wants to pursue the so-called flotation process, in which the mineral salt is floated and deposited as solid residue. The construction of the needed flotation installations for altogether 11 potassium mines, according to the estimate of West German experts, will cost the GDR about 200 million marks, according to the view of the GDR--800 million marks. Through their construction, as well as through the erection of an underground cache in the GDR, it is believed, it will be possible to reduce the salt pollution of the Werra and Weser Rivers again to approximately the level stipulated by the Commission for Potassium Waste Water.

8970
3620/134

BIEDENKOPF URGES MARKET INSTRUMENT FOR EMISSION CONTROL

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Hans D. Barbier: "Environmental Protection According to Market Laws"]

[Text] Kurt Biedenkopf does not let anyone rest. After unorthodox proposals in regard to the reform of the social system and after sensational remarks about the consensus conditions of external security, he is now conducting propaganda for environmental protection according to the laws of the market. The central points of his proposal, the establishment of an environmental stock exchange and free trade in environmental certificates, have for some time been an integral part of the economic debate on effective tax mechanisms for environmental protection. It is Biedenkopf's merit, as chairman of the CDU-State Association of Westphalia, to have forced an entire party congress for hours into the intellectual discipline of a seminary and in the end to have coined a concept of market theory, which was initially inconspicuous, into a political signal.

The economic reasoning behind environmental stock exchange and pollution certificates can best be elaborated through a comparison with the point of departure of environmental policy customary today--perhaps after the pattern of the technical guidance for air. In regulations of this sort, it is stipulated what maximum amounts of certain harmful substances may be introduced into a region altogether by all producers. The permission of the emission of such harmful substances is then regulated in accordance with the motto: "He who comes first stinks first." This environmental happy-go-lucky process has fatal consequences for environmental protection and for the structure of industry. The enterprises whose emission still barely fall within the maximum permissible immission limits feel no inducement to organize their production in manner more conducive to environmental protection--after all, they stink just as much as they are permitted. For industrial newcomers, however, such a region is closed. No matter how high the value creation planned by an enterprise, no matter how small the burden on the environment in so doing is kept through high costs and a great deal of imagination, it cannot establish itself, because the immission values have already been exhausted; and this possibly through enterprises that are just barely still operating at the very edge of profitability because they pass the dirt on to the environment virtually unfiltered. But nobody forces them, in the interest of environmental protection, to make "room" for those

who produce a greater net product with less pollution.

Precisely this, however, is what an environmental stock exchange could accomplish. The state maintains control over the maximum permissible degree of pollution for a region. But it no longer has to prescribe to the enterprises in detail through which methods they are to contribute to the reduction in damages to the environment. One example will be used to clarify the enterprise calculation: If, in the production of a good, 500 kilograms of sulphur are produced, the enterprise must purchase 100 certificates, which each entitle to the emission of 5 kilograms. If this is too expensive for the enterprise, it has two choices: It refrains from the production, or it attempts to lower the sulphur emission in order to save themselves the purchase of some of the expensive certificates. In the competition for locations of industry, therefore, those enterprises prevail which produce in a nonpolluting manner, that is which must purchase a smaller number of certificates than their competitors. If many enterprises want to produce goods, there is an increase in the demand for certificates; the certificates become more expensive and thus an inducement is created to think about nonpolluting production methods that are less expensive than the acquisition of the expensive certificates. Here it becomes evident that, indeed, there must not be an opposition between economy and ecology if only there is enough courage to organize both systematically via the market.

The concern has been expressed--at Biedenkopf's party congress, too--that "organized groups" could buy up the certificates at the stock exchange and let them disappear. That can happen. But that is no reason for worry. On the contrary. Why should citizens not join together for the purpose of buying up the certificates in order--by way of the detour of rising certificate prices--to steer the imagination of the enterprises in the direction of an environment-protecting production, a production which will thus require fewer certificates? Sooner the opposite argument could be made: When citizens, in their capacity as consumers of the most healthful environment possible, could be as easily organized as in their capacity as entrepreneurs, workers or savers--if, in other words, there were a possibility against the "running-board ride" in environmental protection--the state could even do without the stipulation of a maximum limit for pollution. It would regulate itself through the negotiation result transacted by the "consumers" and "polluters".

In the world, as it is, there will be no environmental protection without the state. In the model of the environmental stock exchange and environment certificates, it continues to occupy the decisive position, viz., [it controls] the determination of the maximum limit of pollution. Nevertheless, many delegates will have asked themselves at the Westphalian party congress of the CDU whether they were engaging in argumentation all too far removed from practical politics. "Ecology in the social market economy" certainly will not yet be found in the legal gazette for 1984. But as a guideline value for practical environmental policy, this concept has a high value. Errors can be seen most clearly in the light of the ideal.

8970

CSO: 3620/134

ZIMMERMANN ANNOUNCES NEW ROUND OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 29 Dec 83 pp 1, 2

[Article entitled: "Bonn Announces a Bundle of Environmental Measures: Air, Noise, Waters/Lead-Free Gasoline/A Preview by Zimmermann"]

[Text] K. B. Bonn, 28 December. Environmental protection is to be strengthened across a broad front. This was announced by Federal Minister of the Interior Zimmermann on Wednesday in an environmental preview for 1984. During the coming year, too, the stopping of harmful substances in the air is to be the focal point of environmental measures. After that it is hoped that progress will be made in the battle against noise and in keeping the waters clean. Finally, Zimmermann wants to present an overall concept for the protection of the soil in 1984. In terms of environmental policy, Zimmermann said in Bonn, the soil, as reservoir and filter of the water supply and as the living space for plants and animals, has long been neglected. An interministerial study group under the central administration of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, is presently concluding its work for a comprehensive conception of soil protection. The federal minister wants to put a stop to the waste from packaging. Whether and how the state would intervene in this, Zimmermann says, depends essentially on the conduct of industry, on the retail trade, and on the bottling companies. The retail trade points out the fact that it has promised the Federal Ministry of the Interior to stabilize the "system of multiple-use packaging". Zimmermann, by contrast, is of the opinion that he was promised that "the market share of multiple-use packaging" will be stabilized. With respect to waste removal, Zimmermann is preparing a re-enactment of the law for 1984. At the center of this re-enactment will be the precept that waste products must be used.

In line with the intention of keeping the air clean, the following measures are planned for 1984: Draft laws and regulations dealing with the announced introduction of lead-free gasoline and low-pollution motor vehicles with stronger purification of exhaust fumes, proposals for the reduction of emission from small furnaces and a further re-enactment of the Technical Instruction for Air (TA-Luft), with which especially the emission of heavy metals, carbon hydrides and dust is to be stopped through the latest state of technology. Research and development of new processes for keeping the air clean as the equipment for the battle against the dying of forests, Zimmermann demands, must be accelerated. After the desulfurization of flue gas, he said, new technol-

ogies above all against nitrogen monoxides are needed now. The new technologies, he indicated, must be employed especially in coal power plants. Only if the coal power plants become less polluting, he said, does the use of domestic coal remain justifiable. The sale of coal must be secured through low-pollution power plants.

In fighting against air pollution, Zimmermann said, the FRG must proceed jointly with the EEC and other neighbors. The goal, according to Zimmermann, continues to be that the motor vehicles in the Community are reequipped in accordance with a uniform concept.

In the striving for reduction of the harmful substances from large furnaces, in particular coal power plants, Zimmermann now perceives progress. The Brussels Commission has just now submitted a guideline proposal, which is adapted to the German regulation of large furnaces. The Commission advocates the use of uniform emission limits. With satisfaction, Zimmermann notes that during the German tenure of the EEC presidency one basic guideline concerning "the maintenance of air purity" has been advanced. An enactment of the guideline, he indicated, now appears to become possible. Through this guideline, the fight against air pollution at the source in accordance with the state of technology is to be made obligatory for all member states.

8970

CSO: 3620/134

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

16 FEB. 1984
